Curbing the Proliferation and Use of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Internal Conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Citizen Security Perspective

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Fai Ernest Suiru

Abstract

Following the end of the Cold War, Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) has witnessed a steady increase in the number of internal conflicts. These conflicts, often based on identity, access to natural resources, wealth allocation, religious and ethnic differences, power struggles, etc, have mostly been violent. This has been rendered possibly by the presence of Small Arms and Lights weapons (SALW) on the continent. Though these arms do not necessarily cause the conflict in which they are used, their presence increases the probability of resorting to violence to resolve differences, as conflicts that otherwise would have been peacefully resolved tend to become violent. SALW in SSA originate from both external and internal sources, and such proliferation is favoured by the colonial legacy of the conflictual artificial border, the prevalence of cross-border crime and conflicts, poor management of national stock-piles, superpower economic interests, unregulated local production and the conversion of arms. The methods used by the various actors involved in arms proliferation range from smuggling and brokering through arms trade to diversion of national stock-piles, foreign military assistance and the use of mercenaries. This proliferation has produced human, material, politico-economic, and psycho-social consequences for both the states and the populations, with civilians bearing the brunt. It is this negative picture that prompted the international community and the various states to adopt legal, institutional, and operational measures to hold the phenomenon at bay. The question that remains is: Why does SALW proliferation and use in SSA continue despite the existing legal, institutional and operational arrangements to fight them? Through structured and semi-structured interviews granted to officials of Small Arms bodies, law enforcement officers, civil society leaders and other non-state actors in the domain of SALW, as well as the consultation of secondary sources and data basis, this study came up with the conclusion that the prevailing situation is largely due to the insufficient implication of non-State actors in the fight against the proliferation of SALW, the absence of specialised units dedicated to this fight, the partial nature of the existing legal frameworks which do not sufficiently address the problem of SALW out of regulatory control and the presence of vast and often unmanned borders across the continent. To ameliorate this fight, there is an urgent need for mainstreaming non-state actors in major aspects of the fight, such as intelligence gathering, advocacy, awareness raising, arms collection and destruction. This citizen-security approach, which places the non-state actors at the centre of the fight in conjunction with state actors, would facilitate intelligence gathering, build trust and bridge the confidence gap between the populations (citizens) and State institutions involved in this fight and hence make them realise that fighting SALW is not the sole responsibility of State institutions such as law enforcement forces but the collective responsibility of all citizens. Moreover, the creation of national small arms commissions and specialised operational units, the intensification of bilateral and multilateral cooperation between states and regional organisations, the harmonisation of national legislations and the revision of existing laws to adapt them to local realities could be an important leap in the right direction.

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How to Cite
Fai Ernest Suiru. (2025). Curbing the Proliferation and Use of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Internal Conflicts in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Citizen Security Perspective . The International Journal of Humanities & Social Studies, 12(11). https://doi.org/10.24940/theijhss/2024/v12/i11/HS2411-019 (Original work published November 30, 2024)