

# THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HUMANITIES & SOCIAL STUDIES

## A Research Project Submitted to the Institute of Peace and Security Studies in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Award of Degree of Master of Security Management and Police Studies

**Jonathan Kiprop Chepkwony**

Security Manager, Department of Security and Safety Management,  
Export Processing Zones Authority, Kenya

### **Abstract:**

*Management of public demonstrations is amongst the duties bestowed on law enforcement officers in preservation of law and order in society. Unfortunately, there are instances where public demonstration management by the Police turns out to be the cause of major conflicts that results in destruction of property, bodily injuries and at times fatalities which is contrary to what is expected. Yet few studies have examined the challenges that police officers face in the management of public demonstrations. This study sought to establish the challenges facing the police in handling demonstration in Kenya using Nairobi County as a case study. The study focused on comparing the police numerical capacity, training, planning and intelligence gathering in management of the public demonstrations. First the study provided insight to the background, problem statement and significance, research questions, objectives, theoretical and conceptual framework of the research. These aspects were covered through a critical review of existing literature, secondary data and a survey targeting areas that mostly held demonstrations such as the civil society groups and the Kenya human rights groups against various grievances such as against legislatures' salary increase demands. The study used descriptive research design in collection of data. The target population consisted of police officers drawn from Kenya Police service, specifically police stations situated across Nairobi County and members of the public who had been participating in demonstrations. The study used multi-stage sampling to obtain sample population for the study. Primary data was collected using questionnaires which ensured that the details and relevant information was collected. Data was analysed using descriptive and regression statistics with the aid of SPSS 21. Data was presented using tables. The study found out that availability of resources ( $p$ -value=0.001), planning ( $p$ -value =0.004); inter-agency coordination ( $p$ -value =0.002) and intelligence gathering ( $p$ -value =0.007) are smaller than the significance level of 0.05 hence influence the management of public demonstration in Kenya to a higher level. Police officers are usually constrained by inadequate numerical strength, tools and equipment available to policemen for proactive crowd management. Police forces regularly request mutual aid from other forces (agencies) which necessitate shared responsibility and cooperation for a successful crowd management. During crowd demonstration however there is poor coordination and sharing of responsibilities. In the management of demonstrations police do not usually identify and arrange for special support, sufficient resources and adequate administrative/ support personnel. Police agencies usually do not gather useful intelligence and information on demonstrations hence affecting the management of public demonstrations. There is need for the police service commission to avail policemen necessary resources, to develop written understanding that outline the roles and rules for each of the agencies involved in the joint endeavour, to ensure early and effective planning and to communicate intelligence gathered in a timely manner to the users of the information.*

**Keywords:** Coordination, demonstration, intelligence, law enforcement agencies, planning, riot, protest, resources

## 1. Introduction

### 1.1. Background to the Study

Police offer different services in line with their duties which are to maintain law and order. Among the duties include managing public demonstrations which are characterized by mass population of people agitating for some cause(s). According to LePard (2011) demonstrations is a public display of feeling toward a cause such as a political convention; a labor dispute; major sporting or social event. It normally consists of walking in a mass march formation and either beginning with or meeting at a designated endpoint to hear speakers and it may involve marching, chanting slogans and singing (Stott, 2009). It may also involve picketing, in which people surround an area, while sit-ins, involve demonstrators occupying an area, sometimes for a stated period of time and sometimes indefinitely, until they feel their issue has been addressed, or they are otherwise convinced or forced to leave (Temple, 2003). Public demonstration is a worldwide phenomenon often used to express dissent, anger or support against or for a particular public cause or causes

According to Narr, Toliver, Murphy, McFarland and Ederheimer (2006) the right to peacefully demonstrate in public is a core human right and fundamental freedom and it has been recognized for decades that freedom of expression not only apply to ideas or opinions that are popular or favorable, but also to those that offend, irritate, shock or disturb individuals or a section of the population. The authors further observes that insulting words or behaviour or display of any threatening, abusive or insulting material which is likely or intended to cause harassment, alarm or distress; or which is intended to cause fear of or provoke unlawful violence; or which is intended to stir up racial or religious hatred could be part of lawful public demonstration. Balancing the right to freedom of speech and freedom of protest so as to ensure that the demonstration does not infringe on the rights of others and do not disturb public law and order poses challenges for the police (Stott, 2011). Therefore, managing public demonstrations requires a tactful approach that is well coordinated. Public demonstrations usually require effective management in terms of control so that it does not get out of control and results in lawlessness and destruction of property. Most often police become involved in cases where there is crowd demonstration at times in order to try to prevent the protest from taking place at all. In other cases, it may be to prevent clashes between rival groups, or to prevent a demonstration from spreading and turning into a riot; to ensure that the protesters maintain order and peace during demonstrations. In Kenya, this is in accordance with Section 14 of the Police Act of 1988 which sets out the functions of the police as the maintenance of law and order; preservation of the peace; the protection of life and property; the prevention and detection of crime; the apprehension of offenders; and the enforcement of all laws and regulations with which the Force is charged.

The challenge of policing crowd demonstrations highlights a number of issues for today's police officers. These include: how to effectively manage police resources to deal with large numbers of people who may be either expressing their fundamental constitutional right to protest. It also highlights how to work with members of public who are not involved in the demonstration but who have an expectation that the police will protect them and their property from unlawful or destructive behaviour. Other issues include how to effectively gather information for a planned or spontaneous mass demonstration; how to identify the policy issues and what procedures and safeguards should be in place for mass arrests. Finally, how to determining what level of force should be used when demonstrators become unruly and who gives the command to use it and who is in charge of managing the demonstration (LePard, 2011).

However, managing a demonstration presents certain challenges that may require tactful management if the police have to maintain law and order. The police for example, are usually unaware of the number of the demonstrators, the route the demonstrators will use, the approach they will use to confront them and the final assembly point in order to be able to plan ahead. In addition, the bystanders are usually unaware that a demonstration would take place and would endear to come out and find out what is happening and, in the end, it would be difficult to distinguish them from the demonstrators.

The challenge to the police is in finding the proper balance between using investigative techniques to protect the public from harm while not unlawfully interfering with the exercise of constitutionally protected rights as enshrined in the bill of rights in the constitution. This involves having prior knowledge of planned demonstrations, understanding the vicinity of the demonstration, knowing members of public not taking part in the demonstration and people who may take advantage of the situation to engage in other criminal activities in order to effectively manage the demonstrations.

Notably, during demonstration, the police officers are hardly aware of the size of the demonstrators making it hard for effective management. Some demonstrations have large number of protestors often outnumbering the police by far. This is not withstanding that the ratio of police officers to individuals who require their services have always been low in most countries. For example, Austria police to population ratio in 2012 was 1:326, Belgium in 2009 was 1:373, and in South Africa in 2012 was 1:317. In Kenya the police to population ratio have declined over the last 15 years: the ratio was 1 to 711 in 1991; 1 to 875 a decade later; and 1 to 1150 in the year 2004, against the United Nations recommended ratio of 1:450 (Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, 2006). The ratio is cause for concern, as the Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative note: It is estimated that even if the two forces merged, taking attrition into account, the country will need to recruit 999 recruits per year for ten years (2004-2014) to reach international policing population standards by 2014 (Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, 2006)

The inadequacy in numbers of policemen can also be reflected in the gender disparities in the police service. Police work in all societies is seen as a 'man's job.' This is evident from the fact that in most countries of the world, women are poorly represented among police personnel. On average, only around one in 10 police officers in the world is a woman (UN Women, 2011). Developed countries and sub-Saharan Africa have the largest proportion of women police officers, with 13 and 12 percent respectively. The Middle East and North Africa, and South Asia have the lowest proportions of women police, at 2 and 3 percent respectively. Countries like Australia or South Africa, where at least one quarter of the police force are women, drive up the global average, but the exceedingly low numbers of women elsewhere testify to substantial barriers to women's access to police work and to problems with retention of female staff once employed (William, 2007). The low proportion of women in the police force impedes the numerical strength of police who may be deployed to effectively handle police duties which include managing demonstrations. The factors cited above could be attributed to what could be described as mismanagement of public demonstrations worldwide.

In the past examples of public demonstrations that required tactful management and necessitated a large and coordinated police response include: Mardi Gras disorder in Seattle in 2001, which led to rioting, vandalism and assaults (Seattle Police Department, 2001). For instance, in Washington, D.C., in 2002 mass arrest tactics during the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank demonstrations became the cause of criticism after numerous people were arrested, including non-violent protestors and bystanders (Temple, 2003). The police indicated that they gave adequate warning to the protesters to disperse but they did not heed and police resorted to arresting them. Rioting during an

international meeting proposing a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) in Miami in 2003 led to arrests and injuries to both demonstrators and police in the Bay front Park Amphitheatre after the rioters failed to heed police warning to disperse (Timoney, 2004). In 2012 the Occupy Wall Street and its cousins around USA protested against the existing financial system and its beneficiaries which occasionally turned violent. Leaders across the Middle East were toppled or forced to make concessions amid Arab spring mass protests in 2011 (Reiter, 2012). The governments across the region were forced to go into reform, aware that corruption, incompetence and police brutality could no longer go unchallenged. On January 2011, a coalition of student movement groups organized mass demonstrations involving thousands of activists in four cities in Sudan. In each city, the police and security agents attacked demonstrators using tear gas, water pipes and sticks; more than 100 students and journalists were arrested (FIDH, 2011). During demonstrations in 2012 following presidential elections, the unnecessary use of lethal force by Ugandan security forces resulted in the deaths and arrest of some demonstrators. Those arrested were charged with unlawful assembly and incitement to violence (HRW, 2012).

In Kenya, although the Public Order Act does not require a license to hold a meeting since its amendment by the Statute Law (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act No. 10 of 1997, police still routinely break up peaceful demonstrations claiming that they are unlicensed. For instance, police broke up and arrested a group that wanted Education Minister Professor Sam Ongeru sacked over the alleged mismanagement of Sh4 billion meant for primary education (South Consulting, 2012). The style of police management of public demonstrations can be further evidenced by the manner in which they handled demonstrations in Kisumu which broke out immediately after the Supreme Court's verdict on 30 March 2013, upholding the narrow win of President-elect Kenyatta. Some of the demonstrators were violent, as crowds barricaded roads, looted shops and burned tires. In response, security forces attempted to disperse the demonstrators using tear gas, rubber bullets and live ammunition. Police also used sticks and batons to violently disperse crowds, reportedly using these tactics indiscriminately and without regard to whether individuals were actually participating in the violence (INCLO, 2013). In 2013 Protesters demonstrated against newly elected MPs who were demanding higher salaries. Protesters released a pig and about a dozen piglets outside parliament to show their anger over "greedy" MPs. They also blocked MPs from entering parliament and demanded that they sign a petition rejecting a \$10,000 salary. However, riot police violently hit protesters and fired tear gas to disperse the demonstrators (Mutai, 2013). This is contrary to what is expected in a tactful management of public demonstrations.

Managing mass demonstrations need early and effective planning. A thorough planning process lays the foundation for informed and competent decision making (Njuguna, Michuki & Wanjiru, 2013). Careful planning for the success greatly enhances a possibility of crowd management. Agencies that experienced difficulty managing a demonstration all agreed that better planning could have avoided some major problems. A properly executed planning process helps an agency to prepare its internal resources for a variety of contingencies, and to secure cooperation among partner agencies that will be sharing resources and knowledge during the event. The planning process is recognized as the key to greater safety and security for both officers and the public (Mwenda, 2005).

The reality that large events cannot be handled by any single agency makes cooperation and effective communications the most essential aspects of mass demonstration event management. Critical planning issues and processes must be addressed by all agencies prior to an event and effective intelligence gathering must be done (Temple, 2003). Public protest should not be driven underground, on the contrary, maintaining proper structures to ensure that legitimate political protest can find a voice is a positive duty of Government (Gimode, 2007). Effective communication is important in crowd management as ongoing communication should be maintained with all relevant stakeholders throughout the operational planning stages and during the event, to allow for appropriate inter agency coordination. Protesters and the public should be made aware of likely police action in order to make informed choices and decisions.

The current Police strategy or tactics are oriented exclusively towards the control of the crowd through the threat or use of force but should ensure the effective facilitation of the legitimate intentions underpinning the protesters' action. There is minimal communication between protesters, together with an indication of what conduct will and will not be tolerated by the police (LePard, 2011).

The management of resources for use in controlling demonstration by the police is often a challenge to police. These resources among others include: standard-issue equipment, such as straight- or side-handle batons, hand-held pepper spray and conducted-energy devices (tasers, stunguns) which need constant review of applicability, proper utilization (both technique and placement within the use-of-force continuum) and officer proficiency. Moreover, the available resources need to be deployed depending on the scale of demonstrations. Indeed, the deployment and use of lethal equipment is normally a response to escalating disorder and violence; however, in Kenya such deployment has always been done by police regardless of the magnitude of disorder or violence experienced (South Consulting, 2012). However, it is not clear why use of lethal equipment appears to be the popular approach employed by the Kenya police service.

Improper or excessive use of force by the police undermines the legitimacy of police action and reduces public confidence in the police. This study sought to find out the challenges that police face in managing public demonstrations.

### *1.2. Statement of the Problem*

Although police in Kenya are alleged to poorly manage public demonstrations no studies have examined the challenges the police face in the process of managing demonstrations. Public demonstrations are enshrined in the bill of Rights which gives individuals the right to assemble and express themselves freely. Public demonstrations could be peaceful but also chaotic owing to the many uncertainties and ambiguities that characterize them. For example, the number of demonstrators is often unclear and so are the activities that they will undertake. The police officers who are

charged with the responsibility of maintaining law and order hence managing crowds may experience challenges in planning, managing resources and also coordinating management activities across the agencies involved.

Notably, during demonstration, the police officers are hardly aware of the size of the demonstrators making it hard for effective management. Some public demonstrations have a large number of protestors often outnumbering the police by far. This may challenge the officers especially, where there is no proper planning, coordination or inadequate resources. However, few studies have examined these factors in relation to the challenges experienced in management of public demonstrations by the police in Kenya.

Previous studies have focused on general policing in Kenya such as: Violent Crime and Insecurity (Gimode, 2001; Katumanga, 2005), Police performance (Kimani, 2012, Mwenda, 2005) and police and political violence (Ndung'u, 2008, Gimode, 2007), however, there are few studies that focus on the police management of demonstration in Africa and more specifically in Kenya. Therefore, this study sought to examine the challenges facing police service in the management of public demonstrations in Kenya.

### *1.3. Purpose of the Study*

The purpose of the study is to investigate the challenges facing police service in the management of public demonstrations in Kenya.

#### 1.3.1. General Objective

The major objective of the study was to establish the challenges that police face in the management of public demonstration in Kenya.

#### 1.3.2. Specific Objectives

The following specific objectives guided the study:-

- To examine the effects of available resources on the management of public demonstrations in Kenya
- To establish how the coordination of law enforcement agencies influence management of public demonstrations in Kenya
- To examine the effects of planning on the management of public demonstrations in Kenya
- To Assess the role of intelligence on management of public demonstrations in Kenya

### *1.4. Research Questions*

- To what extent do resources influence the management of public demonstrations in Kenya?
- To what extent does inter-agency coordination influence the management of public demonstrations in Kenya?
- How does crowd management planning affect the management of public demonstrations in Kenya?
- How does intelligence influence the management of public demonstrations in Kenya?

### *1.5. Justification and Significance of the Study*

The study findings will be significant to the police services as it will provide insight on the challenges facing police service in the management of public demonstrations in the country and be able to look for proactive solution to these challenges so as to improve their overall capacity in the handling of public demonstrations in the country. The study will be significant to the general Public and organized groups who will be able to understand and appreciate the various challenges that face police service in the management of public demonstrations and be able to advocate for appropriate action to be taken to address these challenges so as to enable the police service to improve their capacity to manage demonstration in a generally acceptable and appropriate manner.

The research study will be of importance to the government which will be able to understand and appreciate the challenges that influence the capacity of the police to manage public demonstration in the country and facilitate appropriate regulatory and policy changes so as to adequately address these challenges.

The study will provide the background information to research organisations and scholars who will want to carry out further research in this area. The study will also facilitate individual researchers to identify gaps in the current research in this area. The study is important in that it will add to the existing empirical data.

### *1.6. Scope and Limitations of the Study*

The study was limited to investigating the challenges facing police service in the management of public demonstrations in Kenya with particular reference to Nairobi County. The study focused on effective management of available resources, planning; influence of inter-agency coordination, intelligence gathering and use of force on management of public demonstration in Kenya. The research study covered the period between 2010 and 2012.

Most times police matters are considered confidential hence there will be some reluctance to provide full information for fear of being reprimanded by superiors for giving out information that might be considered confidential. However, the researcher will assure the respondents of the confidentiality of the information that they provide and attach a letter of introduction from the University indicating the purpose of the study and will also seek authority from the police management to undertake research.

### 1.7. Assumptions

The researcher assumed that the target population would be able to answer the questions contained in the questionnaire effectively. The research also assumed that the analysis selected and the sizes of the sample are sufficient to detect significant differences/relationships if they exist in the population.

## 2. Literature Review

### 2.1. Introduction

In this chapter, literature, which is related to and consistent with the objectives of the study, is reviewed. Important theoretical and practical problems are brought out; relevant literature on the aspects pertaining to the challenges facing police service in the management of public demonstrations in Kenya is discussed.

### 2.2. Theoretical Review

#### 2.2.1. Elaborated Social Identity Theory

The Elaborated Social Identity Model of crowd behaviour (ESIM) provides a theoretical basis for accurately explaining and predicting the nature of crowd behaviour, particularly as this relates to the emergence of collective 'disorder' (Stott, 2009). ESIM recognizes the contextually determined nature of crowd action and defines the social psychological impacts that police tactics can have upon crowd dynamics. Collective conflict can emerge during crowd events as a consequence of the indiscriminate and disproportionate use of police force. This occurs because of the unanticipated impact that policing can have upon crowd psychology and dynamics (Reicher, Stott, Cronin, & Adang, 2004). The elaborated social identity model supports the argument that a 'graded' tactical profile that is strategically oriented toward facilitation, differentiation and communication is effective and efficient at managing crowd dynamics, promoting 'self-policing' and improving police community relationships. The indiscriminate use of force by the police during an event can negatively impact upon crowd dynamics to increase the risk that a crowd poses to public order. Indiscriminate use of force by the police can create a sense of unity in the crowd through a common perception of the illegitimacy of police action and corresponding opposition in response. Perceptions of police legitimacy are critical because they affect the crowd's internal dynamics, facilitating or undermining the ability of those seeking conflict to exert social influence over others in the crowd. Consequently, there is an increase in the numbers within the crowd who perceive conflict against the police as acceptable or legitimate behaviour, thereby empowering those prepared to engage in physical confrontation with the police. In this way, the crowd is drawn into conflict even though the vast majority had no prior intention of engaging in disorder. The ESIM gives a perspective of the influence that the different approaches employed in management of public demonstrations by the police may impact on the outcome of the whole process.

#### 2.2.2. Classical Theory

The Classic theory decontextualizes crowd behaviour (Le Bon, 1895). It asserts that crowds are irrational, dangerous and open to easy exploitation by agitators and therefore implies that physical crowds are single psychological entities posing inherent dangers to public order. Given that from this perspective crowds are understood as unpredictable, volatile and dangerous, it becomes almost self-evident that they need to be controlled and that this control must be exerted primarily through the use of force. The theory implies that the mitigation measures deployed in the management of public demonstration may influence the behaviour of unpredictable group of demonstrators (Reicher, 1987).

This theoretical position results in police tending to see the general heterogeneous composition of crowds in terms of a simple dichotomy: an irrational majority and a violent minority who can easily assert influence over the crowd (Zeitz, Tan & Zeitz, 2009). The 'us-and-them' mentality extends to the police themselves. The police tend to view crowds as a homogenous, dangerous mass that requires controlling, partly as an effect of their training, but partly as an effect of their social identity as police officers. Police are trained in this model, and taught to disperse or contain crowds where they form (Reicher, 1987).

### 2.3. Review of Related Literature

#### 2.3.1. Crowd Behaviour and Management of Public Demonstrations

Zeitz, Tan and Zeitz (2009) provided a review of the current understanding of the psychological factors of a crowd within the psychosocial domain as they apply to mass-gathering settings. Zeitz, et al (2009) says that gaining an understanding of crowd behaviour is important in supporting timely and appropriate crowd management principles in the planning and provision of emergency services at mass gatherings. The authors highlight two important elements of crowd behaviour which are that there must be a seed and people must engage. Understanding these behaviours may provide opportunities to change crowd behaviour outcomes.

In their study, Narr, Toliver, Murphy, McFarland and Ederheimer (2006) which examined Police Management of Mass Demonstrations noted that perhaps there is no greater challenge for police officers in a democracy than that of managing mass demonstrations. It is here, after all, where the competing goals of maintaining order and protecting the freedoms of speech and assembly meet. Police in the United States have a long history of handling mass demonstrations. During the 1960s and throughout the Vietnam War era, American law enforcement was tested time and again on how to best manage mass protest demonstrations. Often the police succeeded brilliantly in peacefully managing hundreds of

thousands of demonstrators. At other times, the actions of the police became the unintended focus of protesters and the centrepiece of media coverage of the event. Tough lessons were learned during this period. In the relative calm that followed for almost twenty years, police attention to preparedness for mass demonstration events assumed a lower priority than it had in previous decades.

In the study Connors (2010) in his report provides a framework to assist local law enforcement in planning and managing security for events that attract large numbers of people. It includes examples of best practices employed by federal agencies with security responsibilities, as well as strategies that have been effective for local law enforcement and private security. The focus is on national and regional events, which often include a variety of VIPs and may be targets for terrorists, other criminals, and protestors. The variety of approaches discussed can be tailored to large or small local special events.

## *2.4. Review of Past Literature*

### 2.4.1. Management of Public Demonstration

In the past governments have resisted the notion of individual and collective rights in public demonstration and tolerated protest only if it did not challenge or cause inconvenience to anyone (Gimode, 2007). However, most citizens now know their rights and have a good understanding of the scope of laws relating to individual rights. Majority of the citizenry are clear about laws curtailing demonstration and protest and restricting the expression of political opinion, and in particular how they intersect with their constitutional rights are powerful tools (Kimani, 2012).

In maintaining order, a flexible and humane response is most important and the task of managing behaviour as distinct from enforcing the law is given priority. Police actions in demonstrations are based on the primary goal of police in conventional crowd situations is to manage them to see that they do not get out of hand (Reiter, 2012). In other incidences police may serve as mediators and interpreters and this may protect demonstrators and counter-demonstrators from each other and irate citizens, as well protecting the property and representatives of the state (Stott, 2011).

At times police are misused by the government in power to suppress its political opponents by breaking up demonstrations; however, it is acknowledged by nearly all the experts and the society at large that police are servants of the law, not the private army of whoever happens to be in power (Galtung, 1990). While they are agents of the state in one sense, they are not the personal agents of those running the state but civil servants whose allegiance is to the law (Kimani, 2012). Efforts to legally and organizationally control how police regulate traditional criminal behaviour has in recent decades been extended (to a degree) to the relatively less regulated high policing of politics including demonstrations (LePard, 2011).

In discussing how best to maintain order and minimize harm (whether material or symbolic/political), many authors (Stott, 2009; Temple, 2003; LePard, 2011) conclude that rigidly enforcing the law through use of overwhelming force is counter-productive, whether in the short or long run. Management of crowds through the use of force and/or arrest, need to be avoided as it is simply more efficient to avoid problems of disorderly crowds and invariably messy coercive responses through planning and anticipation involving the development of contingency plans (Reiter, 2012). More sophisticated intelligence activities permit greater selectivity in response to protest activities. Rather than stereotyping all demonstrators, authorities are better able to discriminate and can be more selective in their strategies. Should the use of force and arrests become necessary they can be focused on those groups that are most likely to behave violently (Reicher, Stott, Cronin, & Adang, 2004).

Officers must negotiate, educate, and maintain continual dialogue with organizers and crowd members (Temple, 2003). Police personnel initially must state that they defend the public's right to demonstrate, but cannot allow the crowd to hurt others or destroy property (Stott, 2009). Whether officers support the crowd's position or if the group holds an unpopular view, law enforcement agencies must remain neutral and prevent physical injuries or property destruction. If arrests become necessary, police officers must respect individuals and avert harm to anyone in custody. Officers must convey that they expect cooperation in return (Reicher, Stott, Cronin, & Adang, 2004).

In discussing how best to maintain order and minimize harm (whether material or symbolic/political), many authors (Stott, 2009; Temple, 2003; LePard, 2011) conclude that rigidly enforcing the law through use of overwhelming force is counter-productive, whether in the short or long run. Management of crowds through the use of force and/or arrest, need to be avoided as it is simply more efficient to avoid problems of disorderly crowds and invariably messy coercive responses through planning and anticipation involving the development of contingency plans (Reiter, 2012). More sophisticated intelligence activities permit greater selectivity in response to protest activities. Rather than stereotyping all demonstrators, authorities are better able to discriminate and can be more selective in their strategies. Should the use of force and arrests become necessary they can be focused on those groups that are most likely to behave violently (Reicher, Stott, Cronin, & Adang, 2004).

Officers must negotiate, educate, and maintain continual dialogue with organizers and crowd members (Temple, 2003). Police personnel initially must state that they defend the public's right to demonstrate, but cannot allow the crowd to hurt others or destroy property (Stott, 2009). Whether officers support the crowd's position or if the group holds an unpopular view, law enforcement agencies must remain neutral and prevent physical injuries or property destruction. If arrests become necessary, police officers must respect individuals and avert harm to anyone in custody. Officers must convey that they expect cooperation in return (Reicher, Stott, Cronin, & Adang, 2004).

#### 2.4.2. Management of Available Resources

Police officers are usually constrained by the available resources that are inadequate for crowd management. Thus, Police officials are required to keenly evaluate the decision of deployment of any equipment whether the equipment is best suited to remove the threat to front-line officers and enable them to maintain or regain their objectives and if its use is reasonable, balanced and proportionate in light of the circumstances prevailing (Reiter, 2012). Officers deployed in the field with lethal options must, without exception: be fully trained in their use, including regular refresher training; be fully aware of the capabilities of the option; be fully aware of the limitations of the option and be empowered to make the final decision to use, or not to use (Richardson, 2002). Police managers must ensure, through a system of checks and balances, that any use of less-lethal options is necessary and proportionate, and can be supported in after-action inquiry through sufficiently detailed records (Stott, 2009).

The deployment of physical barriers which are commonly used to assist in crowd management and take many forms should be considered a support option and not a substitute for personnel (LePard, 2011). The primary purposes of barrier use are to control crowd movement (in the case of enclosing/defining legal protest areas); prevent street/building access to restricted or vulnerable areas; and channel or guide protestors along a particular route (Reiter, 2012).

Barriers to prevent determined access should be more substantial, in fact three barriers that are effective at mass events include: thirty-six-inch perimeter fencing (bike-rack style); 6'-8' fencing to prohibit access to areas; and K-rail cement dividers (Reicher, et al, 2004). A crucial consideration when placing barriers, particularly those that are more robust and static, is that sufficient exits and gates must be included to allow police to cross barriers in response to crowd dynamics, or to allow crowds to cross barriers for safety reasons (LePard, 2011).

Police need to be availed with effective transportation so as to travel quickly to and from events, if they have to quickly respond to issues arising from these events. However, In Kenya the police are availed minimal vehicles to carry out their duties, even the few available ones are poorly serviced and scarcely fuelled (Gimode, 2007). The lack of reliable transport means therefore that the police will be slow to respond to incidents of crime. Similarly, it also minimizes police presence in certain crucial localities, making it possible for criminals to have a field day. The police acknowledge that their mere presence in various localities is in itself deterrence to crime. The poorly serviced vehicles also mean that the police cannot match the speed and efficiency with which criminals often escape from crime scenes (Mwenda, 2005).

There are inadequate tools and equipment available for proactive crowd management and officer protection is extensive. According to Stott (2011) protective equipment for officers comes in a variety of forms. When choosing gear, it is important to balance flexibility of movement against level of protection. The use of standard-issue equipment, such as straight- or side-handle batons, hand-held pepper spray and conducted-energy devices (tasers, stunguns) should be reviewed for applicability, proper utilization (both technique and placement within the use-of-force continuum) and officer proficiency (LePard, 2011). Training should include both a review of the use-of-force policy and a hands-on demonstration of officer proficiency. Specialized tools such as long batons and riot shields will require regular training to ensure officer proficiency (Richardson, 2002). However, the value of such tools is debated with some viewing them as necessary to protect front-line officers from debris and missiles; others view them as a hindrance, as they can limit an officer's ability to make an arrest or manoeuvre quickly to avoid injury (Reiter, 2012). The deployment and use of less-lethal equipment are normally a response to escalating disorder and violence; however, such deployment has always been contentious, whether engaging in physical contact; discharging projectiles, gases and chemicals; or using conducted energy devices (Reicher, et al, 2004).

#### 2.4.3. Multi-Agency Coordination

The maintenance of public order and ensuring the safety of the public at large events is a high-profile policing activity which attracts significant media and public attention. Due to the significant numbers of people attending these events, police forces regularly request mutual aid from other forces to help support them in their policing duties.

Mass demonstrations because of their size, potential for violence, and the sheer demands they can place on an agency often require the host agency to call upon neighbouring law enforcement agencies for assistance. A significant challenge facing the lead department is the coordination, training and deployment of a multi-agency force in a crowd management situation. For example, the Boston Police Department; the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF); and other agencies involved in the planning and handling of the 2004 Democratic National Convention recognized they could not handle the event without collaboration. Understanding that shared responsibility and unprecedented cooperation would be essential to a successful police operation, the Boston Police Department sought and received the assistance of scores of outside agencies to manage the event.

Large-scale events often take place in a variety of venues that span jurisdictional lines; multi-agency cooperation is a key factor. As such, one initial goal of the external planning process should be to develop written agreements that outline the roles and rules for each of the agencies involved in the joint endeavour. The general content of Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) between public safety organisations can be thought out and structured in advance, but experience has shown that there are often unanticipated last-minute issues. In order to mitigate such issues, several topic areas should be addressed through stipulations prior to a multi-organization event agreement. They include the following: mission, direction—joint philosophical framework, supervision, assignment of personnel, Authority (deputation), Joint organizational structure, Equipment, funding, payment and financial processes, Joint facilities agreements, Internal and external communication plan, liability and legal services, documentation and tracking system, agreement, operational plans, use-of-force policy and duration.

#### 2.4.4. Demonstration Management Planning

The key to effectively managing mass demonstrations and other major events is planning and preparation (Richardson, 2002). Police officers must continually assess their ability to handle demonstrations of all manners and sizes. For those events that are anticipated well in advance, police officers have the opportunity to develop in-depth operational plans, but still rely upon standing plans as a foundation (Temple, 2003).

In managing mass demonstrations, strong emphasis needs to be put in early and effective planning. A thorough planning process lays the foundation for informed and competent decision making (Stott, 2009). Police recognized that for their successful management of a demonstration careful planning is necessary. A properly executed planning process helps an agency to prepare its internal resources for a variety of contingencies, and to secure cooperation among partner agencies that will be sharing resources and knowledge during the event (Perry & Guy, 2002). The planning process is recognized as the key to greater safety and security for both officers and the public. The process should operate in an environment where information becomes a key commodity as planners and organizers seek ways to justify and marshal adequate resources (Mwendwa, 2005).

Good working relationships at a multitude of levels are essential to facilitating a proficient process to acquire, analyse and interpret vital information that must be woven into the ever-evolving planning process (Reiter, 2012). A lack of information or significant misinformation can negate the value of otherwise well-thought-out plans. Information and intelligence management must be ongoing and must coincide with the earliest stages of the planning process, continuing even after the event has ended (Stott, 2011).

An effective planning process will expressly recognize the need for plans to be flexible in the face of rapidly changing circumstances (Richardson, 2002). The planning process should employ a discipline of continually challenging assumptions by considering all the 'ifs' and 'worst-case' scenarios. Officials and planners should be cautioned not to underestimate the level of coordinated effort that some protest groups are capable of putting forth. Even after contemplating extreme potential scenarios, some police officials have been left reporting that demonstrations, even celebrations, resulted in unprecedented brazen violence for which they were not prepared. Pre-planning permits the opportunity to test and validate responses to a variety of scenarios, whereas, in the emergency-planning scenario, testing and validation of tactics do not occur (Reicher, et al, 2004).

Police command need to establish call response alternatives (telephone reporting, delayed responses by appointment) Support police operations; Set up logistical support for officers (nutrition, water, replacement uniform articles, weapons and ammunition, other weaponry and force alternatives, mass arrest supplies, spare vehicles and fuel, property/evidence control. Consider interoperability issues (individual communications—radios, cell phones, other equipment (barriers, fencing, containment alternatives), Arrange for heavy equipment and operators, and vehicle removal/towing capability.

Establish evaluative responsibility, including, a system to record decisions and information flow in order to maximize effective event management, support the department's ability to review events for after-action reporting and respond to legal challenges (LePard, 2011).

It's necessary to hold formal meetings with event organizers as early as possible before the event and identify potential protest groups. It is important to determine command and control; appoint operational and tactical commanders, outline the circumstances in which command and control transfer to another level, determine when the organization will rely on a team approach to decision making versus sole responsibility for decisions, review the rules of engagement for a hostile response, i.e., rules of conduct, force options, level of authorization required, levels of force to be engaged, etc.; consider who will be authorized to deviate from the pre-determined rules of engagement and under what circumstances, review parameters for declaring an "unlawful" assembly, plan for media contact; establish procedures for information dissemination (routine, press releases, inquiries), affix primary responsibility for information dissemination, and identify Public Information Officers for each agency involved (Reiter, 2012).

Identify and arrange for special support (canine, mounted, bicycles, other special vehicles, air or marine support), plan for sufficient resources to be at the ready for the "what ifs" and the worst-case scenarios; determine whether provisions of the applicable labour contracts or agreements will impact the availability/flexibility of the officers needed to properly manage the event; ensure adequate specialized training of police officers before the event; Arrange for adequate administrative/ support personnel for stepped-up operational activities (Stott, 2009).

Basic logistics also are an essential part of mass demonstration management and must be integrated into the planning process (Perry & Guy, 2002). Field units will need food and drink, replacement vehicles, fuel, replacement ammunition, chemicals and munitions, and more. The ability to manage such supplies— including storage, transportation and distribution in the field is important. Communication is essential, and some experts recommend allocating a radio channel exclusively for logistics. This allows supervisors and managers ready access to those who can meet their needs, while reducing unnecessary traffic on operational frequencies (Della Porta, 1995).

According to Reiter (2012) it is necessary to develop procedures for a post-event stand down system to return to normal operational status by identifying a method for post-event debriefing and requesting the parties to produce a written after-action report outlining lessons learned, next-event planning and additional training opportunities and review standing plans in light of their effectiveness during the demonstration event. The planning process should remain active and flexible as new information informs the scope and nature of adjustments to the existing plan. Planners should remain in a constant state of evaluation to ensure the plan remains an appropriate response, consistent with the circumstances (Stott, 2009).

#### 2.4.5. Gathering Intelligence

Information is crucial to managing mass demonstrations (LePard, 2011). Gathering intelligence from myriad sources prior to the event help police prepare for a host of possible scenarios. Staying aware of developments and breaking events during the demonstration and communicating that information to police officers on the ground can contribute greatly to effective management of the demonstration event, while after-action assessments may help police to examine what worked and what needs to be improved (Gimode, 2001).

Mass demonstration management demands careful attention to managing information before, during and after the event (Reicher, et al, 2004). Gathering and thoroughly analysing information or intelligence about the activities of demonstrators can dramatically strengthen police demonstration management plan (Galtung, 1990). However, for a variety of reasons, accomplishing this is not always easy because of limited experience gathering intelligence, secretive preparations by demonstrators, or a lack of incorporation of gathered information into the planning process. Nonetheless, police agencies are usually inept at gathering useful intelligence and information (Gimode, 2007).

Among the easiest pieces of information to collect are routine data; declassified information; and accounts from dispatch, operational commanders, various governmental departments, other law enforcement agencies and the public (Stott, 2009).

To gain a strategic perspective of an upcoming event, credible sources with links to the information sought should be identified and tasked to provide information (Perry & Guy, 2002). On rare occasions, usually during the height of an event, raw information may be so compelling that it must be considered for deployment and other tactical decisions. However, it remains vitally important to analyse all information in the context of the event, the organizers and the environment as well as political, economic and social issues to permit planning personnel to develop the most appropriate response or modification to existing plans (LePard, 2011).

A process to produce meaningful and useful intelligence requires holding regular meetings at which information is shared and compared in hopes of cross-confirmation of details and sources. This helps analysts to distinguish rumour from corroborated accounts, and to separate criminal intent from legal acts of protest. Recognizing these differences is crucial when translating intelligence for consideration (Reiter, 2012).

It is recommended that, as early as practical in the police planning process for a mass demonstration event, protest leaders be contacted (via letter, email, telephone or in person) to solicit their support in ensuring a safe, violence-free protest (Baylely, 1987). Though some groups may not respond, many others, whose groups have legitimate objectives, will be interested in cooperating and appreciative of the offer to help facilitate a lawful, peaceful protest (Stott, 2009). This outreach effort not only creates the possibility of a positive and cooperative relationship, but also serves to inform protest leaders of police expectations and objectives. Furthermore, it can provide police officials with new information useful to developing an appropriate response (LePard, 2011). Police efforts to work with protestors toward a violence-free event, and all information obtained as a result, should be documented for future reference. Considerations relating to intelligence should include systems to communicate intelligence in a timely manner and systems to record and retain the assessments arising out of the intelligence function.

During the time of demonstration, the intelligence transitions to a more tactical approach, where information received is quickly assessed to offer timely input to commanders and other decision makers (Richardson, 2002). Though there is still a strong focus on gathering intelligence, there is now also a need to manage a wide range of information. A formal information/data collection system should capture and record critical information during the event. Key events, decisions and actions (including their rationale) should be documented to create a historical record of all that took place (Stott, 2009). Some of the important elements for command-level personnel to consider in this stage include Chronology of the event—maintaining a running account of occurrences; information tracking mechanisms—recording the source of information and the time obtained and relayed to command; command decision recording processes a chronology of decisions, to include when, by whom and the rationale; and active deployment of personnel (Spuy & Rontsch, 2008).

Intelligence gathering can be overt and combined with other pre-event planning initiatives. For example, it is recommended that, as early as practical in the police planning process for a mass demonstration event, protest leaders be contacted (via letter, email, telephone or in person) to solicit their support in ensuring a safe, violence-free protest. Though some groups may not respond, many others, whose groups have legitimate objectives, will be interested in cooperating and appreciative of the offer to help facilitate a lawful, peaceful protest. This outreach effort not only creates the possibility of a positive and cooperative relationship, but also serves to inform protest leaders of police expectations and objectives. Furthermore, it can provide police officials with new information useful to developing an appropriate response. Police efforts to work with protestors toward a violence-free event, and all information obtained as a result, should be documented for future reference.

Of all the methods utilized to obtain information, the use of covert means, either the deployment of undercover officers or the use of technological (audio or video) equipment, will be most likely to attract scrutiny and criticism. There should be a reasonable suspicion that the targeted group is planning or about to engage in criminal activity, not just civil disobedience, based on explicit intelligence and not simply on the content of their political speech or ideology. There is a recognized need for clear policies outlining operational limitations to intelligence collection, adequate training for intelligence officers and an oversight mechanism to review ongoing activity for continued justification.

In jurisdictions where such intelligence gathering is legally restricted, police departments, being aware of the applicable limitations, must consider these ramifications early in the planning process. Other states have transparency laws that consider most police policies and manuals as public records. Whether collected during an early stage of the planning process or after the event has commenced, new intelligence is often responsible for both small and large

adjustments to the execution of the plan. Therefore, considerations relating to intelligence should include the following: Systems to communicate intelligence in a timely manner; assessment to separate truth and accuracy from rumours, rhetoric, exaggerations and half-truths; and systems to record and retain the assessments arising out of the intelligence function. There is a continuum of intelligence gathering, from nonintrusive public sources of information to more-intrusive and less-clear areas of police authority.

Whether collected during an early stage of the planning process or after the event has commenced, new intelligence is often responsible for both small and large adjustments to the execution of the plan. Therefore, considerations relating to intelligence should include the following: Systems to communicate intelligence in a timely manner; Assessment to separate truth and accuracy from rumours, rhetoric, exaggerations and half-truths; and systems to record and retain the assessments arising out of the intelligence function.

Even after a mass demonstration event has concluded and the participants have departed, there is an abundance of information that needs to be collected (Perry & Guy, 2002). Some is intelligence related and include: verifying reliable sources for future use; identifying intelligence shortfalls; and identifying ongoing activity. Other information includes costs of providing police services (pre-established accounting procedures to isolate event costs) and damages incurred (procedures to estimate event-related damage). Details such as these will be critical to an effective after-action critique of the plan and of the police services' management of the event (Reicher, et al, 2004).

#### 2.4.6. Use of Force in Managing Public Demonstration

Allegations of improper or excessive use of force by the police undermine the legitimacy of police action and reduce public confidence in the police. It is critical that all police officers are absolutely clear about the circumstances in which they can use force and the legal thresholds that must be met before they use any level of force. And yet it appears that the majority of public order training courses assume officers have a clear understanding of the law on the use of force and its application in the public order context. This is not adequate. But this is not unique to public order policing – manuals of guidance on other key areas of policing (use of firearms; police pursuits) vary in their approach to the use of force.

The police have the authority to use force in specified circumstances, however the degree of cooperation of the public that can be secured diminishes proportionately to the necessity of the use of physical force. It is critical that all police officers are absolutely clear about the circumstances in which they can use force and the legal thresholds that must be met before they use any level of force. Adapting to protest highlighted inconsistencies and the police has the authority to use force in specified circumstances.

In managing and controlling demonstrations, Police officers, as far as possible need to apply non-violent methods before resorting to any use of force. Police officers should use force only when strictly necessary and where other means remain ineffective or have no realistic chance of achieving the lawful objective. Any use of force by police officers should be the minimum appropriate in the circumstances. Police officers should use lethal or potentially lethal force only when absolutely necessary to protect life. Police officers should plan and control operations to minimize, to the greatest extent possible, recourse to lethal force. Individual officers are accountable and responsible for any use of force and must be able to justify their actions in law.

Other important principles on the use of force include: legal tests for the use of force (reasonableness; absolute necessity); the principles of necessity and the minimum level of force and the 'continuum of the use of force' model (from communication and negotiation to escalation and back to de-escalation); recognition that police officers have the right in law to use force in self-defence or the protection of others but remain individually accountable for any use of force and finally adhering to existing requirements on the proper recording and reporting of all uses of force.

#### *2.5. Summary of Literature and Research Gaps*

In the past governments have resisted the notion of individual and collective rights in public demonstration and political expression and to say that citizens had a positive right to assemble, to march together, to chant and to campaign ; rights that might be weighed against the undoubted rights of property owners, road users or business people was to swim against a strong current of judicial thinking and an ever-rising tide of repressive legislation, which appeared to tolerate protest only if it did not challenge or cause inconvenience to anyone (Gimode, 2007). However, most citizens now know their rights and have a good understanding of the scope of laws aimed at curtailing demonstration and protest and restricting the expression of political opinion, and in particular how they intersect with their constitutional rights are powerful tools (Kimani, 2012).

The reality that large events cannot be handled by any single agency makes cooperation and effective communications the most essential aspects of mass demonstration event management. Critical planning issues and processes must be addressed by all agencies prior to an event; what ifs, worst-case scenarios and plans for mid-course corrections must be included in the planning and training processes. There is a balance to be struck between, civil liberties, and on the other hand, the interventions required to protect public safety and property. The agency must make the best use of real time and strategic intelligence, managing it both internally and via the media; and the agency must determine how to best educate and reassure citizens about police professionalism and proportionate responses.

The Kenyan police are understaffed and therefore the country is under policed. There are estimates that the Kenyan police have a total population of about 40,000 personnel. The public - policing ratio can be deduced therefore to be roughly in the ratio of 1:1000 going by the 2009 national population census figures of roughly 40 million citizens. This is far below the UN recommended police public ratio of 1:450. The best officers to use in crowd control situations are those

specifically selected and trained who have the personality to use a soft approach under difficult circumstances. Police training for large-scale demonstrations, however, is a fairly new, yet critical component of successful demonstration management.

The key to effectively managing mass demonstrations and other major events is planning and preparation. Police officers must continually assess their ability to handle demonstrations of all manners and sizes. For those events that are anticipated well in advance, police officers have the opportunity to develop in-depth operational plans, but still rely upon standing plans as a foundation. Information is crucial to managing mass demonstrations. Gathering intelligence from myriad sources prior to the event can help an agency prepare for a host of possible scenarios. Staying aware of developments and breaking events during the demonstration and communicating that information to police officers on the ground can contribute greatly to effective management of the demonstration event, while after-action assessments may help police to examine what worked and what needs to be improved. Officer safety is an inherent goal of any mass demonstration event, particularly where disorder is expected or anticipated. Protective equipment for officers comes in a variety of forms. When choosing gear, it is important to balance flexibility of movement against level of protection.

## 2.6. Conceptual Framework

The study can be conceptualized in a conceptual framework explaining the relationship between management of resources, inter-agency coordination, planning, intelligence gathering, and use of force (independent variables or factors) and management of public demonstrations in Kenya (dependent variables or outcomes). The Figure 1 below shows the relationship between the dependent and independent variable.




Figure 1: Conceptual Framework

## 3. Research Methodology

### 3.1. Introduction

This chapter focuses on the research methodology which contains the procedures and methods used to collect and analyse (obtain and process) data. The chapter looks at study area, study design, target and study populations, sampling frame & techniques, research instruments, ethical considerations, data collection, data quality control, data management and analysis.

### 3.2. Research Design

The study used a descriptive research design in collecting data from the respondents. Descriptive design portrays an accurate profile of persons, events, or account of the characteristics. The descriptive research design is preferred because it ensures complete description of the situation, making sure that there is minimum bias in the collection of data.

### 3.3. Study Location

The site of the research was Nairobi County. Founded in 1899, Nairobi is the epicentre of Kenya's administration and commercial capital. It occupies an area of 696KMsq. According to SRIC (2012) Nairobi is one of the major metropolitan cities in Africa, and largest in the Eastern Africa region and is 12th largest in the continent. In deed the national population and housing census of 2009 indicated that the city had a population of 3,138,295 residents (KNBS, 2009). According to the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission, the county comprises of 17 constituencies. The city is also one of the largest in Africa and is the main coordinating headquarters for the UN in Africa and Middle East (Njuguna et al, 2013).

The city is currently experiencing rapid expansion. Nairobi is therefore not spared the vulnerability of being crime-prone, and therefore experiences a myriad of crimes, from petty crimes of shop lifting to convoluted ones of organized crime. With Nairobi being the melting pot of political activities, the police have continuously been accused of human rights violation when handling political activists and demonstrators. The police have also been accused of high handedness when handling hawkers in Nairobi. Previous researchers have also observed appropriateness of Nairobi for research into issues concerning police officers (SRIC, 2012).

### 3.4. Target Population

The target population consisted of police officers drawn from Kenya Police service, specifically police stations situated across Nairobi County. This is due to the fact that policemen who participate in the management of demonstrations in Nairobi County are drawn from these police stations. The study also targeted members of the public who have participated in public demonstration.

Category	Frequency	Percentage
OCS	34	13.5
Operation Officers	5	2.0
Police constables	102	40.6
Members of the Public	110	43.8
Totals	251	100

Table 1: Target Population  
Source: HR, Police Service (2014)

The study population consisted of members of the public, thirty-four (34) Officers commanding police stations, three (3) police constables from each police station and five (5) police officers in charge of operations at the police headquarters as provided in the population frame provided by the Human Resource (HR) department of police service commission as shown on table 3.4.1.

### 3.5. Sample Size and Sampling Technique

The study used multi-stage sampling procedure with the first stage consisting of undertaking a census of the entire population of thirty-nine (39) OCSs and five (5) operation staff as a sample. The second stage involved using purposive sampling to select a sample of one hundred and ten (110) members of public who had participated in public demonstrations. The last stage involved the use of simple random sampling which consisted taking 20% of the target population which give a sample base of twenty (20) respondents as shown on Table 2 below

Category	Population	Sample
OCS	34	34
Operation Officers	5	5
Police constables	102	20
Members of the Public	110	110
Totals	251	169

Table 2: Sample Population  
Source: (Author, 2014)

### 3.6. Data Collection Instruments

Primary data was collected through the use of a questionnaire. Data was collected using a questionnaire containing closed and open-ended questions as this allowed for intensity and richness of individual perceptions by not restricting the content of responses.

### 3.7. Reliability and Validity

A measure of reliability and validity was also guaranteed by discussion of the instrument with peers, research supervisors and by ensuring high precision and minimal errors in the data entry through training of the research assistants.

A pilot survey was then conducted in order to ascertain and detect any ambiguities, questions that would not be easily understood or poorly constructed and even those that would be irrelevant. The pilot study was conducted on seven respondents from the target population who were not included in the final sample. The questionnaires were administered to the group and thereafter the feedback was obtained through debriefing them individually and comparing the results and then analysed using Cronbach's alpha test of measure of internal consistency. The Cronbach alpha of the measures was applied with a set lower limit of acceptability of Cronbach alpha 0.60.

Findings of the pilot test analysis on Table 3 below established that all the scales were significant having Alpha above the prescribed threshold of 0.6., with the average alpha being 0.736. From the results it can be deduced that the research instrument measures what it claims to measure (valid) and yields consistent results (reliable)

Scales	Cronbach Alpha	Items
Availability of Resources	0.751	6
Multi-agency Coordination	0.729	6
Planning	0.746	6
Intelligence Gathering	0.718	6
Average (All Scales)	0.736	

Table 3: Reliability Analysis

### 3.8. Data Collection Procedure

The researcher used the self-administered questionnaire method for all correspondents. Self-administered method is preferred because the potential anonymity of the respondent can lead to more truthful or valid responses, it is inexpensive and allows the respondents to complete the questionnaire at a convenient time. A cover letter explaining the purpose of the study was attached to the questionnaires.

### 3.9. Data Analysis

The data collected by use of the questionnaire was first thoroughly edited and checked for completeness and comprehensibility. Quantitative data, which was collected using closed ended questions in the questionnaires, was chronologically arranged with respect to the questionnaire outline to ensure that the correct code was entered for the correct variable. Data cleaning was then done and tabulated. The study used descriptive and regression statistics to analyse the data with the aid of SPSS 21. Presentation of data was in the form of tables, where it provided successful interpretation of the findings.

### 3.10. Ethical Issues

Prior Informed Consent (PIC) was sought from the participants before administering the research instruments. All respondents were assured of total confidentiality that the information was used only for the purpose of this study.

## 4. Data Analysis and Interpretation of Results

### 4.1. Introduction

This chapter presents the analysis of study findings on the main objective of the study which was to investigate the challenges facing police service in the management of public demonstrations in Kenya based on the specific objectives which include effective management of available resources, planning; inter-agency coordination and intelligence gathering of public demonstration in Kenya. This chapter analyses the variables involved in the study and estimates of the model presented in the previous chapter.

### 4.2. Presentation of the Findings

#### 4.2.1. Response Rate

Out of the 163 issued questionnaires, 137 questionnaires representing 84.0% of the total questionnaires distributed were returned fully completed, while 26 questionnaires were not returned representing 16.0 % of the total questions distributed to the respondents. It can be inferred that the response rate was good. According to Mugenda and Mugenda (2003) a response rate of 70% and over is excellent for analysis and reporting on the opinion of the entire population.

#### 4.2.2. Demographic Characteristics

The results shown on Table 4 below indicate the demographic characteristics of the respondents.

Demographic Factors	Categories	Frequency	Percentage %
Gender	Male	123	89.8
	Female	14	10.2
Level of education	Secondary	65	47.4
	College	40	29.2
	University	25	18.2
	Others	7	5.1
Age	18-25years	44	32.1
	26-35 years	37	27.0
	36-40 years	32	23.4
	41+ years	24	17.5

Table 4: Demographic Characteristics

Study findings on Table 4 above shows that majority, (89.8%), (47.4%) and (32.1%) indicated respectively that they were male, had attended college and were aged between 18-25 years. The findings of the study concur with the findings of UN Women, (2011) which established that in most countries of the world, women are poorly represented among police personnel and that on average, only around one in 10 police officers in the world is a woman hence this has negative implication on the performance of police officers even in relation to the numerical strength of the police force in managing demonstration

#### 4.2.3. Crowd Management

The study on Table 5 below sought to determine how often police are involved in crowd management during demonstrations in Nairobi County.

Question	Scale	Distribution	
		F	%
How often are police involved in crowd management during demonstrations in Nairobi County	More Often	75	54.7
	Often	55	40.2
	Rarely	7	5.1
	Total	137	100

Table 5: Frequency of Involvement in Crowd Management

Study findings on Table 5 above shows that majority (54.7%) of the respondents stated that police are most often involved in crowd management during demonstrations; while 40.2% and 5.1% indicated that police are often and rarely involved in crowd management during demonstrations respectively

It can be deduced from the findings that police are most often involved in crowd management during demonstrations to ensure that peace prevail during the public demonstrations and there is no loss of live, while at the same time protecting the fundamental rights of those citizens who are involved in the demonstration and those not involved. This concurs with the views of Reiter, (2012) and Stott (2011) that police actions in demonstrations are based on the primary goal of police in conventional crowd situations to manage them to see that they do not get out of hand. In other incidences police may serve as mediators and interpreters and this may protect demonstrators and counter-demonstrators from each other and irate citizens, as well protecting the property and representatives of the state.

The study sought to determine whether the police have been managing demonstrations successfully. The results are shown on Table 6 below

Question	Scale	Distribution	
		F	%
In your considered opinion have the police been managing demonstrations successfully	Yes	28	20.4
	No	109	79.6
	Total	137	100

Table 6: Effective Management of Demonstrations

Results on Table 6 above show that majority (79.6%) of the respondents stated that police have not been managing demonstrations successfully, while 20.4% indicated that the police have been managing demonstrations successfully. The results seem to resonate with media reports that have more often than not highlighted excessive force used by the police during public demonstrations.

In order to establish why the police officers were deemed not to be successful in managing public demonstrations, participants were asked to rate a list of indicators of effective management of demonstration. The results are shown in the Table 7 below

Management of Demonstrations		n =137; %=100				
		SA	A	N	D	SD
In maintaining order during demonstration police have not been flexible and humane in their response	F	16	48	13	25	35
	%	11.7	35.0	9.5	18.2	25.6
Police rigidly enforce the law through use of overwhelming force	F	18	52	32	23	12
	%	13.1	37.9	23.4	16.8	8.8
Police officers during demonstration do not negotiate, educate, and maintain continual dialogue with organizers and crowd members	F	59	14	13	28	23
	%	43.1	10.2	9.5	20.4	16.8
During demonstrations Police officers prevent physical injuries or property destruction	F	27	76	9	21	4
	%	19.7	55.5	6.6	15.3	2.9

Table 7: Indicators of Effective Management of Demonstrations

The study analysis indicated on Table 7 above shows that majority (35.0%) said that police have not been flexible and humane in their response, (37.9%), expressed the view that Police rigidly enforce the law through use of overwhelming force (43.1%) Police officers do not negotiate, educate, and maintain continual dialogue with organizers and crowd members; while (55.5%) of the respondents agreed that during management of demonstration, Police officers remain neutral and prevent physical injuries or property destruction. Rigidity and use of inhumane ways to break the crowd in management of public demonstration could encourage resistance making it difficult for the police.

The study found out that police rigidly enforce the law through use of overwhelming force and do not always consider the option of negotiation, education, and maintaining continual dialogue with organizers. The study enriches the findings of Temple (2003) who established that effective police officers negotiate, educate, and maintain continual dialogue with organizers and crowd members. These could help calm the crowds thus avoiding chaotic management of public demonstrations.

#### 4.2.4. Management of Available Resources

This is the second objective sought to test whether availability of resources (vehicles, Human resources, protective equipment, standard-issue equipment for crowd control, physical barriers) influence the management of public demonstrations. The findings are shown on Table 8 below

Question	Scale	Distribution	
		F	%
In your view does availability of resources influence the management of public demonstrations	Yes	112	81.8
	No	25	18.2
	Total	137	100

Table 8: Whether Resources Affect Management of Demonstrations

Results on Table 8 above show that majority of the respondents represented by 81.8% of the respondents agreed that availability resources influence the management of public demonstrations, while 18.2% of the respondents indicated that availability resources (vehicles, Human resources, protective equipment, standard-issue equipment for crowd control, physical barriers) do not influence the management of public demonstrations.

From the study it can be concluded that availability of resources influences the management of public demonstrations. Gimode, (2007) observed that police are availed minimal vehicles to carry out their duties and this affected their mobility and in return negatively affecting their response to incidents of crime.

The study further examined the effects of availability of resources on the management of demonstrations in Nairobi County. The findings are shown in Table 9 below

Performance Indicators		n =137; %=100				
		SA	A	N	D	SD
Police officers are usually constrained by the available resources that are inadequate for crowd management	F	20	78	16	19	4
	%	14.6	56.9	11.7	13.9	2.9
Police are not availed minimal vehicles to carry out their duties, even the few available ones are poorly serviced and scarcely fuelled	F	98	12	2	17	8
	%	71.5	8.8	1.5	12.4	5.8
There are inadequate tools and equipment available for proactive crowd management and officer protection is extensive	F	28	55	10	23	21
	%	20.4	40.1	7.4	16.8	15.3

Table 9: Effects of Resources on Management of Demonstrations

The study analysis on Table 9 above indicated that most of the respondents agreed with the following statements regarding availability of resources: Police officers are usually constrained by the available resources that are inadequate for crowd management represented by (56.9%) of total respondents; Police are not availed minimal vehicles to carry out their duties, even the few available ones are poorly serviced and scarcely fuelled as indicated by (71.5%) of the respondent; there are inadequate tools and equipment available for proactive crowd management and officer protection is extensive represented by (40.1%) of the study respondents.

It can be concluded from these study findings that inadequate human resources, protective equipment, standard-issue equipment for crowd control and physical barriers affects the manner and commitment of police officers to successfully manage public demonstrations. These study findings concur with those of Mwenda (2005) who established that police have inadequate tools and equipment available for proactive crowd management and officer protection. The study sought to examine the level to which available resources influence the management of public demonstrations in Nairobi County. The findings are shown in Table 10 below

Question	Scale	Distribution	
		F	%
To what level do resources influence management of public demonstrations in Nairobi County?	High	94	68.6
	Moderate	32	23.4
	Low	11	8.0
	Total	137	100

*Table 10: Level of Effect of Resources on Management of Demonstration*

Findings shown on Table 10 above indicate that majority of the respondents represented by 68.6% stated that the level to which available resources influence the management of public demonstrations is high, 23.4% indicated that available resources influence the management of public demonstrations to a moderate extent, while 8.0% of the respondents indicated the level to which available resources influence the management of public demonstrations is low. From the study it can be concluded that available resource influences the management of public demonstration to high extend as it determines the pace of police reaction to threat to peace and the actual management of the situations. The study findings of riots in London, Stott (2011) established that there are inadequate tools and equipment available for proactive crowd management and officer protection.

#### 4.2.5. Multi-Agency Coordination

The multi-agency coordination was the third objective of the study. It is important to analyse the effect of multi-agency coordination on management of public demonstration as, police forces regularly request for support from other agencies such as National Intelligence Service, National youth service and local county security officers to help support them in their policing duties and this impacts on the manner and the outcome of crowd management.

The study sought to establish whether multi-agency coordination influences the management of public demonstrations. The findings are shown on Table 11 below

Question	Scale	Distribution	
		F	%
Does multi-agency coordination influence the management of public demonstrations?	Yes	78	56.9
	No	59	43.1
	Total	137	100

*Table 11: Whether Multi-Agency Coordination affects Management of Demonstrations*

Results of the study shown on Table 11above indicated that majority of the respondents represented by 56.9% of the respondents stated that multi-agency (Police, National Intelligence Service, National youth service, Local county security officers) coordination influence the management of public demonstrations, while 43.1% of the respondents indicated that multi-agency (Police, National Intelligence Service, National youth service and local county security officers) coordination does not influence the management of public demonstrations.

From the study it can be concluded that multi-agency coordination influences the management of public demonstrations as the support comes with issues related to coordination so as to achieve effective crowd management. Poor coordination of the multi-agencies will result in these agencies working at cross purpose resulting in poor crowd management. The study results agree with the observations of (LePard, 2011) that some crowd events often take place in a variety of venues that span jurisdictional lines necessitating multi-agency cooperation so as to effectively manage the demonstrations.

The study sought to measure the effects of multi-agency coordination on management of demonstrations on scale of 1 to 5 where 1 is Strongly Disagree (SD), 2 is Disagree (D), 3 is Neutral (N); 4 is Agree (A) and 5 is Strongly Agree (SA). The findings are shown on Table 12 below

Performance Indicators		n =137; %=100				
		SA	A	N	D	SD
Due to the significant numbers of people attending these events, police forces regularly request mutual aid from other forces	F	26	74	2	15	20
	%	19.0	54.0	1.5	10.9	14.6
Large-scale events often take place in a variety of venues that necessitate multi-agency cooperation is a key factor	F	36	40	11	22	28
	%	26.3	29.2	8.0	16.1	20.4
shared responsibility and cooperation are essential to a successful crowd management during crowd demonstration	F	45	44	12	17	19
	%	32.8	32.1	8.8	12.4	13.9

Table 12: Effect of Multi-Agency Coordination on Management of Demonstrations

Results of the study shown on Table 12 above shows that most of the respondents agreed with the following statements that: due to the significant numbers of people attending these events, police forces regularly request mutual aid from other forces as indicated by (54.0%) of the study respondents; large-scale events often take place in a variety of venues that span jurisdictional lines therefore multi-agency cooperation is a key factor was agreed by (29.2%) of the respondents ; while shared responsibility and cooperation is essential to a successful crowd management during crowd demonstration was indicated by (32.8%) of the respondents.

From the study findings it can be inferred that at times significant numbers of people attend public demonstration which often take place in a variety of venues hence police forces at times request mutual aid from other forces (agencies) which necessitate shared responsibility and cooperation for a successful crowd management. This poor shared responsibility result in chaotic management of public demonstrations giving opportunity to some crowd to cause chaos resulting in loss of property and lives the results of the study agree with the views of Gimode, (2007) that mass demonstrations because of their size, potential for violence, and the sheer demands place on the police greater responsibility which they may not be able to manage hence they usually call upon neighbouring law enforcement agencies for assistance.

The study sought to establish the level of influence of multi-agency coordination on the management of public demonstrations in Nairobi County. The findings are shown on Table 13 below

Question	Scale	Distribution	
		F	%
To what level does multi-agency coordination influence the management of public demonstrations in Nairobi County?	High	59	43.1
	Moderate	43	31.4
	Low	35	25.5
	Total	137	100

Table 13: Level of Effect of Multi-Agency Coordination on Management of Demonstrations

The results of the study on Table 13 above indicate that majority of the respondents represented by 43.1% stated that the level to which multi-agency coordination influence the management of public demonstrations in Nairobi County is high, 31.4% indicated that multi-agency coordination influence the management of public demonstrations in Nairobi County a moderate extent, while 25.5% of the respondents indicated the level to which multi-agency coordination influence the management of public demonstrations in Nairobi County is low.

From the study findings it can be deduced that the level to which multi-agency coordination influence the management of public demonstrations in Nairobi County is high as it directly and indirectly affects the efficiency with which these agencies execute their shared mandate. The findings are in line with views expressed by LePard, (2011) that understanding shared responsibility and unprecedented cooperation would be essential to a successful police operation of managing public demonstrations.

#### 4.2.6. Planning of Management of Public Demonstration

Planning was the fourth objective of the study based on the fact that it is important to preparation, allocation of resources and monitoring necessary in successfully managing mass demonstrations.

The study sought to establish whether planning affect the management of public demonstrations in Nairobi County. The findings are shown on Table 14 below

Question	Scale	Distribution	
		F	%
Does crowd planning affect the management of public demonstrations in Nairobi County?	Yes	128	93.4
	No	9	6.6
	Total	137	100

Table 14: Whether Planning Affect Management of Demonstrations

Results of the study on Table 14 above indicated that most of the respondents represented by 93.4% of the respondents stated that crowd planning affects the management of public demonstrations in Nairobi County, while 6.6% of the respondents indicated that crowd planning does not affect the management of public demonstrations in Nairobi County. From the study it can be concluded that crowd planning affects the management of public demonstrations. The study findings enrich the findings of Mwenda, (2005) which found out that properly executed planning process helps police to prepare its internal resources for a variety of contingencies, and to secure cooperation among partner agencies that will be sharing resources and knowledge in the management of demonstrations.

The study sought to measure the effect of planning on management of demonstrations on scale of 1 to 5 where 1 is Strongly Disagree (SD), 2 is Disagree (D), 3 is Neutral (N); 4 is Agree (A) and 5 is Strongly Agree (SA). The findings are shown on Table 15 below

Planning		n =137; %=100				
		SA	A	N	D	SD
Police usually plan well for management of demonstration	F	39	52	12	20	14
	%	28.5	38.0	8.7	14.6	10.2
Before deployment police officers develop in-depth operational plans, and also rely upon standing plans to manage demonstrations	F	74	26	13	16	8
	%	54.0	19.0	9.5	11.7	5.8
In planning, police officers always include logistics as an essential part of mass demonstration management	F	13	76	11	14	23
	%	9.5	55.5	8.0	10.2	16.8
In effective management of demonstrations police usually identify and arrange for special support, sufficient resources and adequate administrative/ support personnel	F	4	85	12	24	12
	%	2.9	62.0	8.8	17.5	8.8

Table 15: Effect of Planning on Management of Demonstration

Results of the study on Table 4.11 above indicated that most and of the respondents agreed and strongly agreed that: Police usually plan well for management of demonstration in planning, agreed by (38.0%) of the total study respondents; before deployment police officers develop in-depth operational plans, and also rely upon standing plans to manage demonstrations, strongly agreed by (54.0%) of the respondents; (55.5%) of the study respondents agreed that in planning, police officers always include logistics as an essential part of mass demonstration management; while (62.0%) of the study respondents agreed that police usually identify and arrange for special support, sufficient resources and adequate administrative/ support personnel.

It can be inferred that in the management of demonstrations police do not usually identify and arrange for special support, sufficient resources and adequate administrative/ support personnel and this adversely affect their operations and explains the poor management of public demonstrations. The findings agree with Perry & Guy, (2002) that a properly executed planning process helps police to prepare its internal resources for a variety of contingencies, and to secure cooperation among partner agencies that will be sharing resources and knowledge during the event.

The study sought to establish the level of influence of planning on the management of public demonstrations. The results are shown on Table 16 below

Question	Scale	Distribution	
		F	%
To what level does planning influence the management of public demonstrations in Nairobi County?	High	79	57.7
	Moderate	41	29.9
	Low	17	12.4
	Total	137	100

Table 16: Level of Effect of Planning on Management of Demonstrations

Results of the study on Table 16 above shows that most of the respondents represented by 57.7% stated that the level of effect of planning on management of demonstrations is high, 29.9% indicated that planning affect management of demonstrations to a moderate extent, while 12.4% of the respondents indicated the level to which planning affect management of demonstrations is low.

From the results of the study, it can be concluded that the level of effect of planning on management of demonstrations is high as planning impacts on setting of the demonstration management objectives, allocation of responsibilities and tasks, allocation of required resources and monitoring which ensures that there is improvement in the management of future demonstrations. This agrees with Richardson, (2002) who observed that the key to effectively managing mass demonstrations and other major events is planning and preparation.

#### 4.2.7. Gathering Intelligence

Gathering Intelligence on public demonstration was the fifth study variable as information is crucial to managing mass demonstrations. Gathering intelligence prior to the event help police prepare for a host of possible scenarios

contributing greatly to management of the public demonstration event, while after-action assessments may help police to examine what worked and what needs to be improved.

The study sought to establish whether intelligence gathering affect the management of public demonstrations in Nairobi County. The findings are shown on Table 17 below

Question	Scale	Distribution	
		F	%
Does the gathering of intelligence influence the management of demonstrations in Nairobi County?	Yes	117	85.4
	No	20	14.6
	Total	137	100

Table 17: Whether Intelligence Gathering Affect Management of Demonstrations

Results of the study on Table 17 above shows that most of the respondents represented by 85.4% of the respondents acknowledged that intelligence gathering affect management of demonstrations, while 14.6% of the respondents denied that intelligence gathering affect management of demonstrations

It can be inferred from the study that gathering of intelligence influence the management of public demonstrations as this permits the police force to plan effectively and pinpoint areas that require more resources so as to effectively manage public demonstration. These findings concur with the views of Reicher, Stott, Cronin, and Adang (2004) that more sophisticated intelligence activities permit greater selectivity in response to protest activities and that rather than stereotyping all demonstrators, authorities are better able to discriminate and can be more selective in their strategies.

The study sought to measure the effects of intelligence gathering on management of demonstrations on scale of 1 to 5 where 1 is Strongly Disagree (SD), 2 is Disagree (D), 3 is Neutral (N); 4 is Agree (A) and 5 is Strongly Agree (SA).

Intelligence Gathering		n =137; %=100				
		SA	A	N	D	SD
Gathering intelligence from myriad sources prior to the event help police prepare for a host of possible scenarios	F	34	66	12	15	10
	%	24.8	48.2	8.8	10.9	7.3
Gathering and analysing information or intelligence about the activities of demonstrators can strengthen police demonstration management plan	F	25	79	11	13	9
	%	18.2	57.7	8.0	9.5	6.6
Police agencies are usually inept at gathering useful intelligence and information	F	48	22	25	34	8
	%	35.1	16.1	18.2	24.8	5.8
Intelligence gathering can be overt and combined with other pre-event planning initiatives	F	61	25	13	24	14
	%	44.5	18.2	9.5	17.5	10.3

Table 18: Effect of Intelligence Gathering on Management of Demonstrations

Results of the study on Table 18 above indicated that majority of the respondents indicated by: (48.2%) of the study respondents agreed that gathering intelligence from myriad sources prior to the event help police prepare for a host of possible scenarios; (57.7%) of the respondents agreed that gathering and thoroughly analysing information or intelligence about the activities of demonstrators can dramatically strengthen police demonstration management plan; (35.1%) strongly agreed that police agencies are usually inept at gathering useful intelligence and information; while (44.5%) also strongly agreed that intelligence gathering can be overt and combined with other pre-event planning initiatives.

From these study findings it can be inferred that police agencies are usually inept at gathering useful intelligence and information negatively affecting the management of public demonstrations as poor intelligence gathering results in poor planning, operation and review of crowd management tasks. The findings add to those of Gimode, (2007) who found out that police because of limited experience due to a variety of reasons, have not been successful in gathering and using intelligence effectively in managing public demonstrations.

The study sought to establish the level of effect of intelligence gathering on the management of public demonstrations. The findings are shown on Table 19 below

Question	Scale	Distribution	
		F	%
To what level does gathering of intelligence influence the management of public demonstrations in Nairobi County?	High	69	50.4
	Moderate	54	39.4
	Low	14	10.2
	Total	137	100

Table 19: Level of Effect of Intelligence Gathering

Results of the study on Table 19 above indicate that most of the respondents represented by 50.4% stated that the level of effect of intelligence gathering on management of demonstrations is high, 39.4% indicated that intelligence gathering affect management of demonstrations to a moderate extent, while 10.2% of the respondents indicated the level of effect of intelligence gathering on management of demonstrations is low.

It can be deduced from the research findings that police crowd intelligence gathering from different sources prior to the event help police prepare for a host of possible scenarios and strengthen police demonstration management plan. The results of the study point out the importance of careful attention to managing information before, during and after crowd demonstration management to offer timely input to commanders and other decision makers as expressed by Richardson, (2002).

#### 4.2.8. Relationship between Independent and Dependent Variable

The study used multiple regressions to establish the relationship between independent and dependent variable. Hence the study regressed Management of Public Demonstrations (MPD) as dependent variable against Availability of Resources (AR), Planning (P); Inter-Agency Coordination (IC) and Intelligence Gathering (IG) as independent variables based on the following regression model:

$$Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1X_1 + \beta_2X_2 + \beta_3X_3 + \beta_4X_4 + \varepsilon$$

Whereby

Y = Management of Public Demonstrations

$\beta_0$  = constant term

X1= Available Resources

X2= Planning

X3= Inter-Agency Coordination

X4= Intelligence Gathering

While  $\beta_1$ ,  $\beta_2$ ,  $\beta_3$  and  $\beta_4$  are coefficients of correlation

$\varepsilon$  = the error term

Hence the regression model was translated to:

$$MPD = \beta_0 + \beta_1AR + \beta_2P + \beta_3IC + \beta_4IG + \varepsilon$$

In order to determine the test, the goodness of fit and the significance of the linear regression model in predicting the effect of independent variables on dependent variable; the study used coefficient of determination (R<sup>2</sup>); adjusted coefficient of determination (adjusted R<sup>2</sup>) and ANOVA test as shown on tables 4.17 and 4.18 below.

The data analysis on Table 20 below shows the test of goodness –of fit of the linear regression model in testing the relationship between management of public demonstrations (dependent variable) and availability of resources, planning; inter-agency coordination and intelligence gathering (independent variables) using goodness –of fit statistics of coefficient of determination (R<sup>2</sup>) and adjusted coefficient of determination (adjusted R<sup>2</sup>). The study used coefficient of determination (R<sup>2</sup>) for multiple regression to measure the proportion of the variation in the dependent variable that would be explained by variations in the independent variables. Because of the number of independent variables (four) in the model and to attempt to align R squared to more closely reflect the goodness of fit of the model, the study also used adjusted coefficient of determination (adjusted R<sup>2</sup>) to measure the proportion of the variance in the dependent variable that would be explained by variations in the independent variables. In analysing the data, the study used significance level (alpha) of 0.05 (95%), degrees of freedom (df) of 4 and two tailed test.

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	df	Sig
1	.612a	.374a	.309 a	.170	4	.001

Table 20: Model Summary  
Dependent Variable: Management of Public Demonstrations

Results of the study shown on Table 20 above shows that the degree to which availability of resources, planning; inter-agency coordination and intelligence gathering is related to management of public demonstrations expressed in the positive correlation coefficient (r) = 0.612 and coefficient of determination, (r<sup>2</sup>) =0.374 as shown on table above. This implies that the four variables together predict about 37.4% of the total variations in the management of public demonstrations can be explained by the linear relationship between availability of resources, planning; inter-agency coordination and intelligence gathering and management of public demonstrations as shown by the regression equation (Y =  $\beta_0 + \beta_1X_1 + \beta_2X_2 + \beta_3X_3 + \beta_4X_4 + \varepsilon$ ), while the other 62.6% of the total variation in the management of public demonstrations remains unexplained hence there is need to undertake further studies on the subject to establish other factors that affect management of public demonstrations.

On the other hand, the Adjusted (r<sup>2</sup>) shows that 30.9% (Adj r<sup>2</sup>=0.309) of the variance in the management of public demonstrations can be explained by the linear relationship between available resources, planning; influence of inter-agency coordination and intelligence gathering and management of public demonstrations, while the other 69.1% of the total variance in the management of public demonstrations remains unexplained and can be attributed to other challenges not under study hence further studies may be undertaken to uncover other factors that affect management of public demonstrations.

Analysis of variance shown on Table 21 below was used to test the significance of the regression model:  $Y = \beta_0 + \beta_1X_1 + \beta_2X_2 + \beta_3X_3 + \beta_4X_4 + \epsilon$ , using availability of resources, planning; inter-agency coordination and intelligence gathering (independent variables) to determine if they predict the management of public demonstrations (dependent variable). The study used Anova F test to determine whether the model is significant.

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	3.642	5	1.167	3.216	.002a
	Residual	6.248	31	.175		
	Total	9.890	36			

Table 21: ANOVA

a. Dependent Variable: Management of Public Demonstrations

Findings on Table 21 above shows that ANOVA test produced an F-value of 3.216 which was significant at  $p=0.002$ . Hence the variation in the independent variables and dependent variable was explained by the smaller significance value of the F value of 0.002 which is smaller than the significance level of 0.05 implying that the regression model is significant.

The regression analysis shown on Table 22 below was done to determine whether independent variables predict dependent variable.

Coefficients <sup>a</sup>					
Variables	B	Standard Error	Beta	T	Sig
(Constant)	2.132	0.521	0.000	4.092	0.000
Resources	1.225	0.611	0.189	2.004	0.001
Multi agency coordination	1.118	0.545	0.220	2.051	0.004
Planning	1.038	0.439	0.127	2.068	0.002
Intelligence Gathering	1.033	0.510	0.037	2.025	0.007

Table 22: Regression Coefficients

a. Dependent Variable: Management of Public Demonstrations

The results of the study shown on Table 22 above indicate that availability of resources, planning; inter-agency coordination and intelligence gathering have positive coefficients, implying that these independent variables are directly proportional to management of public demonstrations. Therefore, taking all independent variables (availability of resources, planning; inter-agency coordination and intelligence gathering) constant at zero (0) management of public demonstrations will be 2.13 (21.1%). Therefore, a unit increase in availability of resources, planning; inter-agency coordination and intelligence gathering will lead to 1.225 (12.3%), 1.118 (11.2%), 1.038 (10.4%) and 1.033 (10.3%) unit increases in management of public demonstrations. Thus

$$MPD = 2.132 + 1.225 AR + 1.118P + 1.038IC + 1.033IG + \epsilon$$

The results of the study further indicates that p-value of = (0.001) for availability of resources, (0.004) for planning; (0.002) for inter-agency coordination and (0.007) for intelligence gathering are smaller than the significance level of 0.05. The implications of these results are that there is a significant relationship between availability of resources, planning; inter-agency coordination and intelligence gathering and management of public demonstrations. From the study it can be deduced that management of resources which include among others: standard-issue equipment and conducted-energy devices which require constant review of applicability, proper utilization and officer proficiency for use in controlling demonstration; vehicles and protective clothing are all essential in crowd management by police; that proper planning process lays the foundation for informed and competent decision making and greatly enhances success of crowd management. In cases of large events police agency cannot handle alone hence makes cooperation with other agencies necessary, this also applies to effective intelligence gathering and sharing which is instrumental in accessing and utilizing this information for crowd management.

These findings agree with the observations of South Consulting, (2012) that the management of available resources such as: standard-issue equipment, such as straight- or side-handle batons, hand-held pepper spray and conducted-energy devices for use in controlling demonstration by the police is often a challenge to police. They are also in line with views expressed by Mwenda, (2005) that a properly executed planning process helps an agency to prepare its internal resources for a variety of contingencies, and to secure cooperation among partner agencies is key to greater safety and security for both officers and the public. In addition, they confirm the findings of Gimode, (2007) that effective intelligence gathering and sharing is important in crowd management as it is critical to operational planning during and after the event.

#### 4.3. Summary

Data analysis was done by editing and coding with the goal of highlighting useful information, suggesting conclusions, and supporting interpretations. It involved breaking down factors identified through the data collected into simpler coherent parts in line with the objectives of the study in order to derive meanings. The tabulated data was

analysed quantitatively by calculating various percentages, while descriptive data was analysed qualitatively by organizing collected data into meaningful notes. The presentation of the results of quantitative analysis was in form of frequency tables, pie-charts and bar graphs so as to highlight the results and to make it more illustrative and easier to understand and interpret, while the results of qualitative analysis was provided in form of explanatory notes. The data analysis established existence of a correlation between management of available resources, planning; inter-agency coordination and intelligence gathering in the management of public demonstration. These study findings enrich the views of LePard, (2011) that police face difficulties on how to deal with large numbers of people who may be either expressing their fundamental constitutional right to protest; how to work with members of public who are not involved in the demonstration but who have an expectation that the police will protect them and their property from unlawful or destructive behaviour.

## 5. Summary of Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations

### 5.1. Introduction

The purpose of this chapter was to discuss and draw conclusions and recommendations on the findings of the main objective of the study which was to analyse the challenges facing police service in the management of public demonstrations in Kenya, and the specific objectives which pertains to the effects of management of available resources, planning; inter-agency coordination and intelligence gathering on management of public demonstrations.

### 5.2. Summary of Findings

The main objective of the study was to investigate the challenges facing police service in the management of public demonstrations in Kenya based on the specific objectives which included effective management of available resources, planning; inter-agency coordination and intelligence gathering on management of public demonstration in Kenya. Out of the 163 issued questionnaires, 137 questionnaires representing 84.0% of the total questionnaires distributed were returned fully completed. The study established that majority were male, had attended college and were aged between 18-25 years respectively.

The study established that police are often involved in crowd management during demonstrations, however the police have not been managing demonstrations effectively and in humane way. The study revealed that police have not been flexible and humane in maintaining order and in preventing physical injuries or property destruction during demonstration. The study found out that police rigidly enforce the law through use of overwhelming force and do not always consider the option of negotiation, education, and maintaining continual dialogue with organizers and crowd members.

The study found out that management of available resources influence the management of public demonstrations in Kenya to a higher level as police officers is usually constrained by inadequate tools and equipment available to them for proactive crowd management and their protection. In addition, police officers are availed minimal vehicles to carry out their duties, while even the few available ones are poorly serviced and scarcely fuelled.

The study revealed that multi-agency coordination influences the management of public demonstrations to a higher extent. The study also found out that based on the significant numbers of people attending large scale public demonstration which often take place in a variety of venues that span jurisdictional lines, police forces regularly request mutual aid from other security agencies which necessitate shared responsibility and cooperation for a successful crowd management during crowd demonstration.

The study established that crowd planning affects the management of public demonstrations to a higher level and that before deployment police officers develop in-depth operational plans, and also rely upon standing plans which also always include logistics as an essential part to manage demonstrations. The study also revealed that in the management of demonstrations police do not usually identify and arrange for special support, sufficient resources and adequate administrative support personnel.

The study found out that gathering of intelligence influence the management of public demonstrations to a higher extent. The study also established that police crowd intelligence gathering is overt and are combined with other pre-event planning initiatives and that the gathering of intelligence from myriad sources prior to the event help police prepare for a host of possible scenarios and strengthen police demonstration management plan. The study revealed that police agencies are usually inept at gathering useful intelligence and information negatively affecting the management of public demonstrations.

### 5.3. Conclusion of the Study

Police are often involved in crowd management during demonstrations; however, the police have not been managing demonstrations effectively and in humane way. They have not been flexible and humane in maintaining order and in preventing physical injuries or property destruction during demonstration. In managing public demonstration, the police rigidly enforce the law through use of overwhelming force and do not always consider the option of negotiation, education, and maintaining continual dialogue with organizers and crowd members.

Management of available resources influence the management of public demonstrations in Kenya to a higher level as police officers are usually constrained by inadequate tools and equipment available for proactive crowd management and officer protection. In addition, the numbers of police officers for deployment are inadequate. Furthermore, police

officers are availed minimal vehicles to carry out their duties, while even these few available ones are poorly serviced and scarcely fuelled.

Multi-agency coordination influences the management of public demonstrations to a higher extent. Based on the significant numbers of people attending large scale public demonstration which often take place in a variety of venues that span jurisdictional lines, police forces regularly request mutual aid from other forces (agencies) which necessitate shared responsibility and cooperation for a successful crowd management during crowd demonstrations.

Crowd control planning affects the management of public demonstrations to a higher level and that before deployment police officers should develop in-depth operational plans, and also rely upon standing plans which also always include logistics as an essential part to manage demonstrations. However, police do not usually identify and arrange for special support, sufficient resources and adequate administrative/ support personnel for the management of demonstrations and this negatively affects their performance.

Gathering of intelligence greatly affects the management of public demonstrations. Police crowd intelligence gathering are overt and from myriad sources prior to the event and should be combined with other pre-event planning initiatives which will help police prepare for a host of possible scenarios and strengthen public demonstration management plan. However, the police agencies are usually inept at gathering useful intelligence and information negatively affecting the management of public demonstrations.

#### *5.4. Recommendation for Policy*

There is need for the authorities to avail policemen necessary resources such as protective equipment, straight- or side-handle batons, hand-held pepper spray and conducted-energy devices and at the same time offer regular training on the use of these specialized tools to ensure officer proficiency.

In ensuring the efficiency of multi-agency cooperation in the management of crowds the agencies should be able to develop written agreements that outline the roles and rules for each of the agencies involved in the joint endeavour covering such areas as: supervision, assignment of personnel, authority, joint organizational structure, equipment, facilities agreements, internal and external communication plan, documentation, operational plans and use-of-force policy. In managing mass demonstrations, strong emphasis needs to be put in early and effective planning. A thorough planning process lays the foundation for informed and competent decision making. A properly executed planning process will help the police to prepare its internal resources for a variety of contingencies, and to secure cooperation among partner agencies that will be sharing resources and knowledge during the event.

To gather viable intelligence that will be useful in making decision on the management of demonstrations, there is need for the police to communicate intelligence gathered in a timely manner; undertake consistent assessment to separate truth and accuracy from rumours, rhetoric, exaggerations and half-truths, and establish mechanisms to record and retain the outcome arising out of the intelligence gathered.

#### *5.5. Suggestion for Further Research*

Due to the limiting factors mentioned earlier in this study, it was not possible to carry out a comprehensive research on the challenges facing police service in the management of public demonstrations in Kenya. The study only focused on management of available resources, planning; influence of inter-agency coordination and intelligence gathering as challenges yet there are other challenges facing police service in the management of public demonstrations. Hence there is need to widen the study by including a bigger sample size and to include other variables that have not been covered by this study.

## **6. List of Abbreviations**

ESIM= Elaborated Social Identity Model

FTAA =Free Trade Area of Americas

HR = Human Resource

IMF =International Monetary Fund

OCS = Officer Commanding Police Station

PIC = Prior Informed Consent

SRIC= Security Research and Information Centre

USA = United States of America

VIP =Very Important Persons(s)

## **7. Acknowledgement**

First, I thank The Almighty God for enabling me to come up with this research project. Secondly, I wish to acknowledge the guidance provided to me by my Supervisors Dr. Meresia Sirera and Dr. Tom Destiny N. Namwambah. Their patience, dedication and sacrifice coupled with their wide knowledge and logical ways of thinking have been of great value towards enabling me conceptualize issues articulated in refining this project.

Many thanks go to my colleagues in the Master of Security Management and Police Studies program, year 2011 class for offering me moral support, useful critique and suggestions for improvement.

Finally, I acknowledge the assistance offered to me by other persons not mentioned here, but who helped me in one way or the other in writing this project.

## 8. References

- i. Ajulu, R. (2002). "Politicized Ethnicity, Competitive Politics and Conflict in Kenya: A Historical Perspective." *African Studies* no.2: 251-68.
- ii. Baker, B. (2006) "Beyond the State Police in Urban Uganda and Sierra Leone." *Afrika Spectrum* no.1: 55-76.
- iii. Baylely, D. (1987). *Patterns of Policing*. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers Univ. Press.
- iv. California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (2003). "Crowd Management and Civil Disobedience Guidelines. Policing management Vol 15.
- v. Brown, K.C. (1965), *Hobbes Studies*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- vi. Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (2006) *The Police, the People, the Politics: Police Accountability in Kenya*. Nairobi: Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative at 13 and 14.
- vii. Connors, E. (2010). *Planning and Managing Security for Major Special Events: Guidelines for Law Enforcement Office of Community Oriented Policing Services U.S. Department of Justice*.
- viii. Della Porta, D. (1995). *Social Movements, Political Violence and the State*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press.
- ix. Foisneau, L. and T. Sorell, (eds.) (2004), *Leviathan after 350 years*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- x. Galtung, J. (1990). *Violence and Peace*. New York: Pergamon Press.
- xi. Gimode, E. (2001). "An Anatomy of Violent Crime and Insecurity in Kenya: The Case of Nairobi in the Last Quarter of the Twentieth Century." Paper presented to the Conference on the Urban Experience in Eastern Africa. Nairobi: British Institute in Eastern Africa.
- xiii. Gimode, E. (2007). *The Role of the Police in Kenya's Democratization Process: The Struggle for Democracy*. London: Zed Books.
- xiv. Hobbes, T. (1985). *Leviathan*, London: Penguin Groups.
- xv. INCLCLO (2013) *Repression and criminalization of protest around the world*. New York
- xvi. International Network of Civil Liberties Organizations.
- xvii. Human Rights Watch (HRW) (2012) *Country Summary Uganda Human Rights Watch*.
- xviii. Katumanga M (2005). "A City under Siege: Banditry and Modes of Accumulations in Nairobi, 1991-2004," *Review of African Political Economy* 32, no. 106 505-520.
- xix. Kenya Police Service (2003). *Kenya Police Service Strategic Plan 2003-2007 Draft 2*. Nairobi: Kenya Police Service.
- xx. Kimani, M. (2012). *Security for the Highest Bidder: Shoddy Policing for the Many, Costly Private Protection for the Few*. United Nations report on security vol 23, pp 3-233.
- xxii. Le Bon, G. (1895, trans. 1994). *The crowd: A study of the popular mind*. London: Ernest Benn.
- xxiii. Marx, G.T. (1969). "Civil Disorder and the Agents of Social Control," *Journal of Social Issues* 26, no. 1.
- xxiv. Mill, J S (1859). *On Liberty*: London: Penguin Groups.
- xxv. Mueller, S. D. (2008). "The Political Economy of Kenya's Crisis." *Journal of Eastern African Studies* 2, no. 2: 185-210.
- xxvi. Mutai, E. (2013, November 27). Kenya police fired tear gas at protest over MPs higher pay demand. Nairobi, *Business daily*.
- xxvii. Mwenda, A. (2005). *A Review of the Kenya Police Force Budget and its Effect on Crime Management*. New Delhi: Matrix.
- xxviii. Narr T., Toliver J. Murphy J., McFarland M., and Ederheimer J. (2006). *Police Management of Mass Demonstrations: Identifying Issues and Successful Approaches*. Washington, Police Executive Research Forum.
- xxx. Ndung'u, N. (2008). "Kenya: The December 2007 Election Crisis." *Mediterranean Quarterly* 1: 111 - 2.
- xxxi. Njuguna N., Michuki, G., & Wanjiru, R. (2013). *Police Reforms in Kenya: Perception and Expectations of Key Stakeholders*. IPAR Discussion Paper No.116/2013, Nairobi.
- xxxiii. LePard, D. (2011). *Managing Major Events: Best Practices from the Field*: Washington, DC: Police Executive Research Forum.
- xxxiv. LePard, D. (1984). *Managing Major Events: An Explanation of the Limits of Crowd Action in Terms of a Social Identity Model*," *European Journal of Social Psychology* 14: 1-21.
- xxxv. Perry, D. and Guy K. (2002). "G-8 Summit: After-Action Report." Calgary Police Service.
- xxxvi. Punch, M. (1985). *Conduct Unbecoming: The Social Construction of Police Deviance and Control*. London: Tavistock.
- xxxvii. Reicher, S.D. (1987). *Crowd Behavior as Social Action*: M.A. Oakes, Reiter, L. (2012). *Occupy and Beyond: Practical Steps for Reasonable Police Crowd Control*," *Legal and Liability Risk Management, Journal Crime Management* Vol 5.
- xxxviii. Reicher, S., Stott, C., Cronin, P. & Adang, O. (2004). *An Integrated Approach to Crowd Psychology and Public Order Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies and Management*. 27, 558-572.
- xxli. Richardson, Stewart. (2002). "Senior Command Course 2002—Managing Operations: International Students' Handbook." Centrex (Central Police Training and Development Authority).
- xli. Rogers, G.A.J., (ed.), (1995), *Leviathan: Contemporary Responses to the Political Theory of Thomas Hobbes*, Bristol: Thoemmes Press. Stott, C. (2011).
- xlii. Study Identifies Best Approach to Policing Football Matches. Liverpool, University of Liverpool.

- xliii. Stott, C. (2009). *Crowd Psychology and Public Order Policing: An Overview of Scientific Theory and Evidence*, University of Liverpool, School of Psychology.
- xliv. Seattle Police Department. (2001). "Seattle Police Department: After Action Report: Mardi Gras, August 1.
- xlv. Seattle Police Department. (2001). "Mardi Gras task force says more events need city supervision, permits Seattle Source- mardigras.
- xlvi. South Consulting (2012). *Ready or Not: An Assessment Of Kenya's Preparedness For*
- xlvii. *The General Election Kenyans for Peace with Truth & Justice (KPTJ) Election Series.*
- xlviii. Spuy, E., and Rontsch, R. (2008). *Police and Crime in Africa: A Brief Appraisal of*
- xlix. *Structures, Policies and Practices.* Cape Town: Centre of Criminology.
- i. Sunday Standard (Sunday Standard, 6/6/2009). Kenya's most guarded VIPs- using taxpayer's money and foreign aid to pay the bill: Nairobi, Standard Newspapers.
  - ii. Temple, R. (2003). "The Policing of Demonstrations in the Nation's Capital: A Misconception Of The Mission and a Failure of Leadership: Police Demo Report. Aclu-nca.
  - iii. Timoney, J.F. (2004). F.T.A.A. 2003 After-Action Report. Miami Police Department
  - liii. Torpey, J. (1998). "Coming and Going: On the State Monopolization of the Legitimate "Means of Movement." *Sociological Theory* 16, no. 3: 239-59.
  - liv. The International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), (2011) A protest for freedoms inspired by the events in Tunisia and Egypt severely repressed by the National and Security Service, International Federation for Human Rights.
  - lv. UN Women (2011), *Progress of the World's Women: In Pursuit of Justice*, available at <http://progress.unwomen.org/>.
  - lvi. William G. O, (2007). *Report on Gender and Police Reform in Post-Conflicts*, UNDP/BCPR, UNIFEM, DPKO/UN.
  - lvii. Zeitz KM, Tan HM, Zeitz CJ (2009). *Crowd behaviour at mass gatherings: A literature review.* *Prehospital Disast Med*; 24(1):32-38.

## Appendix




Figure 2: A Map of Nairobi County

### Introductory Letter

Dear Respondent,

Re: Challenges Facing Police Service In The Management Of Public Demonstrations In Kenya.

I am a master's student at Kenyatta University pursuing Master of Arts degree program. Currently, I'm carrying out a research on the challenges facing police service in the management of public demonstrations in Kenya. I kindly request you to fill in this questionnaire. The information collected will be used strictly for the purpose of this study and will be treated confidentially.

Thank you for agreeing to participate in the study.

Yours Faithfully

Kiprop Chepkwony Jonathan

### Research Questionnaire

Please answer all the questions as best as you can.

Respondent Profile

1. What is your Gender?

Male  Female

2. What is your age?

Between 18-25  Between 26-35   
 Between 36-40  Between 41-50

3. What is your highest level of education?

Secondary  College  University   
 Others  specify.....

**PART 1- Crowd Management**

How often are police involved in crowd management during demonstrations in Nairobi County in Kenya?

More Often  Often  Rarely

1.2 In your considered opinion have the police been managing demonstrations effectively and in humane way?

Yes  No

1.3. Explain your answer above

1.4. Please Tick the Numeric Value Corresponding to Your Personal Opinion for Each Statement

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral	disagree	Strongly disagree
In maintaining order during demonstration police have been flexible and humane in their response.	①	②	③	④	⑤
Police rigidly enforce the law through use of overwhelming force	①	②	③	④	⑤
Police officers during demonstration negotiate, educate, and maintain continual dialogue with organizers and crowd members	①	②	③	④	⑤
During demonstrations Police officers remain neutral and prevent physical injuries or property destruction	①	②	③	④	⑤

Table 23

1.5. Indicate Your Recommendation on the Crowd Management during Demonstrations in Nairobi County in Kenya

**Part 2- Management of Available Resources**

2.1. In your view does management of available resources influence the management of public demonstrations in Kenya?

Yes  No

2.2. Explain how management of available resources influences the management of public demonstrations in Kenya?

2.3. Please tick the numeric value corresponding to your personal opinion for each statement

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral	disagree	Strongly disagree
Police officers are usually constrained by the available resources that are inadequate for crowd management.	①	②	③	④	⑤
Some police are engaged in office administration duties, guarding politicians or serving as drivers to top government officials reducing the number of officers for deployment	①	②	③	④	⑤
police are availed minimal vehicles to carry out their duties, even the few available ones are poorly serviced and scarcely fuelled	①	②	③	④	⑤
There are inadequate tools and equipment available for proactive crowd management and officer protection is extensive	①	②	③	④	⑤

Table 24

2.4. In your assessment to what level does management of available resources influence the management of public demonstrations in Nairobi County?

High  Moderate  Low

Part 3- Multi-Agency Coordination

3.1. In your view does multi-agency coordination influence the management of public demonstrations in Kenya?  
 Yes [ ] No [ ]

3.2. Explain how multi-agency coordination influences the management of public demonstrations in Nairobi County?  
 .....

3.3 Please tick the numeric value corresponding to your personal opinion for each statement

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
Due to the significant numbers of people attending these events, police forces regularly request mutual aid from other forces	①	②	③	④	⑤
Large-scale events often take place in a variety of venues that span jurisdictional lines; multi-agency cooperation is a key factor	①	②	③	④	⑤
shared responsibility and cooperation is essential to a successful crowd management during crowd demonstration	①	②	③	④	⑤

Table 25

3.4. In your assessment to what level does multi-agency coordination influence the management of public demonstrations in Nairobi County?  
 High [ ] Moderate [ ] Low [ ]

3.5. Indicate your recommendation on the influence of multi-agency coordination on the management of public demonstrations in Nairobi County?  
 .....

Part 4- Planning

4.1. In your view does crowd planning affect the management of public demonstrations in Nairobi County?  
 Yes [ ] No [ ]

4.2. Explain how crowd management planning affects the management of public demonstrations in Nairobi County?  
 .....

4.3. Please tick the numeric value corresponding to your personal opinion for each statement

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral	disagree	Strongly disagree
Police usually plan well for management of demonstration	①	②	③	④	⑤
Before deployment police officers develop in-depth operational plans, and also rely upon standing plans to manage demonstrations	①	②	③	④	⑤
In planning, police officers always include logistics as an essential part of mass demonstration management	①	②	③	④	⑤
In effective management of demonstrations police usually identify and arrange for special support, sufficient resources and adequate administrative/ support personnel	①	②	③	④	⑤

Table 26

4.4. In your assessment what is the level of influence of crowd management planning on the management of public demonstrations in Nairobi County?  
 High [ ] Moderate [ ] Low [ ]

4.5. Indicate your recommendation on the influence of the crowd management planning on the management of public demonstrations in Nairobi County?  
 .....

**PART 5- Gathering Intelligence**

5.1. In your opinion does the gathering of intelligence influence the management of public demonstrations in Nairobi County?

Yes [ ] No [ ]

5.2. Explain how the gathering of intelligence influences the management of public demonstrations in Nairobi County?  
 .....

5.3. Please tick the numeric value corresponding to your personal opinion for each statement

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral	disagree	Strongly disagree
Gathering intelligence from myriad sources prior to the event help police prepare for a host of possible scenarios	①	②	③	④	⑤
Gathering and thoroughly analysing information or intelligence about the activities of demonstrators can dramatically strengthen police demonstration management plan	①	②	③	④	⑤
Police agencies are usually inept at gathering useful intelligence and information	①	②	③	④	⑤
Intelligence gathering can be overt and combined with other pre-event planning initiatives					

Table 27

5.4. In your opinion to what level does gathering of intelligence influence the management of public demonstrations in Nairobi County?

High [ ] Moderate [ ] Low [ ]

5.5. Indicate your recommendation on the influence of gathering of intelligence on the management of public demonstrations in kenya  
 .....

**PART 6- Use of Force in managing public demonstration**

6.1. In your opinion does use of force influence the management of public demonstrations in Nairobi County?

Yes [ ] No [ ]

6.2. Explain how use of force influences the management of public demonstrations in Nairobi County?  
 .....

6.3. Please tick the numeric value corresponding to your personal opinion for each statement

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neutral	disagree	Strongly disagree
Allegations of improper or excessive use of force by the police undermine the legitimacy of police action and reduce public confidence in the police	①	②	③	④	⑤
The police have the authority to use force in specified circumstances, however the degree of cooperation of the public that can be secured diminishes proportionately to the necessity of the use of physical force	①	②	③	④	⑤
all police officers are clear about the circumstances in which they can use force and the legal thresholds that must be met before they use any level of force	①	②	③	④	⑤
Police officers use lethal or potentially lethal force only when absolutely necessary to protect life					

Table 28

6.4. In your opinion to what level does use of force influence the management of public demonstrations in Nairobi County?

High [ ]      Moderate [ ]      Low [ ]

6.5. Indicate your recommendation on the influence of use of force on the management of public demonstrations in Kenya

.....