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Dynamics of Post-Cold War Violent Conflicts in Africa and Humanitarian Interventions

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Abstract:
Violent conflict and the power of armed non-state actors persist as anxious surgencies in 21st century in Africa region. Organized violence has also shocked a group of youngsters and young grownups, throughout local societies, devastated teaching and healthcare systems, disturbed conveyance ways and substructure, and done untold injury to the landmass's biology. The twin strategy examinations are to endorse conflict resolve procedures and to recognise who can stand up to equipped non-state actors when the host government's security forces showing sufficient. The horrible and appalling nature of violence in Africa with its attendant trans-border effects attracted intervention from the international communities with intention of rescuing civilians and restoring peace and order. Records of recurrent peacekeeping interventions has shown that approaches are rather curative, which are geared towards a mere violence mitigation than a holistic conflict prevention mechanism. Most studies on humanitarian intervention focused largely on post-conflict intervention and this study attempts to critique this post-cold war posture and argue for a humanitarian intervention based on conflict prevention.

Keywords: Dynamics, Post-cold war, violent, conflict, Africa

1. Nature and Dynamics of Post-Cold War Violent Conflicts in Africa

Africa is a vast and varied continent, made up of countries with specific histories and geographical conditions as well as uneven levels of economic development. The causes of conflicts in Africa reflect the continent's diversity and complexity. While some causes are purely internal and portray specific sub-regional dynamics, others have a significant international dimension. Notwithstanding these differences, African conflicts show several crosscutting themes and experiences (Adedeji, 1999: Zeleza, 2010).

Given the range and diversity of Africa's wars, it stands to reason that their causes are as varied and complex as their courses and consequences. Some attribute these wars to the lingering legacies of colonialism, but for many, especially in the Western popular and academic media, singular a historical and internalist explanations tend to be offered, assigning the wars to either Africa's primordial afflictions of 'tribalism', or the depredations of the continent's proverbial poverty and inequalities, or authoritarianism and poor governance. The 'ancient ethnic hatreds' thesis is sometimes overlaid by the 'new barbarism' thesis that depicts African wars as irrational and pathological (Zeleza, 2010). These wars are often provoked and sustained by ethnic rivalries and polarizations, economic underdevelopment and inequalities, poor governance and elite political instability and manipulations, but these factors, individually or collectively, have a history rooted in the political economy of colonialism, post-colonialism, and neo-liberal globalization; they are as much internal in their causation and scale as they are regional and transnational, involving national, regional and international actors and networks that are simultaneously economic, political, military and social (Adedeji 1999: UN, 1999, Debiel, 2006: Zelaza).
Recent studies have reaffirmed the link between poverty and armed conflict, in relation to both the outbreak and the duration of wars. Collier and Hoeffler (2003) found that in countries with a per capita income of US$ 250, the probability of a war breaking out within five years is around 15%, whereas with a per capita income of US$ 5000, the probability is less than 1%. Similar conclusions are drawn by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) which notes a correlation between the risk of conflict and a low ranking in the Human Development Index (HDI). Researchers from the World Bank, such as Collier et al. (2004) point out that this is because the state in poor countries has weak capacities and is unable to guarantee the security of its citizens. In such cases, it is not only the suffering of the general population which could trigger a rebellion, but also the combination of abuse of power and mismanagement and the emergence of 'greedy' rebels who, in poor countries, have especially good prospects of breaking down the state's monopoly of force and recruiting followers. But according to Collier et al. (2004), an even more significant risk factor than low per capita income is the availability of 'lootable resources' such as diamonds, high-grade timber, oil, coltan or the raw materials which are the source of opium and cocaine. Rather than being a blessing for development, their existence creates a 'resource curse' in many cases. And indeed, the 'new wars' are less about ideological differences or political ambitions than opportunities for self-enrichment. The wars which erupted in the 1990s in Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leone are good examples (Debiel, 2006).

It is undeniable that intense elite political competition for control of the state is generally for purposes of using the state and its institutions for accumulation of wealth. But this is far from the deterministic argument that all African conflicts are caused by competition for control of economic resources. In any case argument based on economic determinism is not new and is generally attributed to Marxism. But even the Marxists have a more sophisticate level of argument when it comes to conflict, that the superstructure of any society is too sophisticated to be guided entirely by economic forces, particularly when it comes to conflicts. Adedeji (1999) on the other hand, admits that competition for economic resources is an important factor in conflict, but is not the only one. He argues that competition for resources typically lies at the heart of most conflicts. This accounts for the intensity of the struggle for political power in many an African country (Adedeji 1999: Debiel, 2006). This may explain the competition amongst the elite in a stable political environment. It does not follow, however, that competition for economic resources is the cause of all rebel movements. As pointed out earlier, these rebel movements have much more complex causes than a mere need for economic resources.

The UN Secretary-General's Report on Africa (UN, 1999) pointed out the causes of African conflicts:

- Historical legacies: (i) the colonial boundaries forced on the newly independent states a simultaneous task of state-building and nation-building. State-building led to heavy centralisation of political and economic power and the suppression of pluralism. But the challenge of forging a genuine national identity from among disparate and often competing communities has remained (ii) the character of the commercial relations instituted by colonialism, also created long-term distortion in the political economy of Africa. The consequences of this pattern of production and exchange spilled over into the post-independence state. As political competition was not rooted in viable national economic systems, in many instances the prevailing structure of incentives favoured capturing the institutional remnants of the colonial economy for factional advantage (iii) across Africa, undemocratic and oppressive regimes were supported and sustained by the competing superpowers in the name of their broad goals but, when the cold war ended, Africa was suddenly left to fend for itself.
- Internal factors: the multi-ethnic character of most African states makes conflict even more likely, leading to an often-violent politicisation of ethnicity.
- External factors: In the competition for oil and other precious resources in Africa, interest external to Africa continue to play a large and sometimes decisive role, both in suppressing conflict and in sustaining it.
- Economic motive: Very high on the list of those who profit from conflict in Africa are international arms merchants. Also high on the list, usually, are the protagonists themselves. (e) Particular situations: In Central Africa, they include the competition for scarce land and water resources in densely populated areas. In African communities where oil is extracted, conflict has often arisen over local complaints that the community does not adequately reap the benefit of such resources or suffers excessively from the degradation of the natural environment. In North Africa, the tension between strongly opposing visions of society and the state are serious sources of actual and potential conflict in some states (UN, 1999: Bujra, 2002).

More recent researchers are particularly attracted by the argument that political forces are largely responsible for much of the conflicts in many countries. They clearly describe the complexity of the processes which lead to conflict: poverty, youth unemployment, inequality in the distribution of development resources, ethnicity, and elite manipulation of grievances and use of sectarian ideologies for mobilisation purposes, all these come to play. The political arena is wide and the struggle to seize state power ostensibly in order to redress grievances leads to the weakening of the state, its eventual collapse and capture by one group or another sometimes with support from outside (Bujra, 1999: Debiel, 2006: Moe, 2009: Okano, 2012).

Having briefly reviewed the causes of African conflicts, it is necessary now to look at the context or environments within which these conflicts occur. The main argument here is that the political, economic and social forces together constitute or provide an environment within which conflicts occur; that these environments change according to a particular historical period thus affecting both the nature and extent of conflicts; and that the combination of these forces vary in different countries and sub-regions thus giving conflicts in those countries their specificities. In particular, observing carefully the changes in the type and extent of conflicts during the different decades of the post-independence period and it will be clear that the increase in the number and type of conflicts is directly related to the specific dominant forces extant during each decade. These decades as: (a) the nationalist-euphoric phase (1960-1970); (b) the Cold War phase (1970-1989, including the SAP decade of 1980-1990); and (c) the transition to democracy phase (1990-2000s). Obviously, the forces which are dominant in these different phases and which, have affected the conflicts of the time, continue and interact with the forces in the next phase. Thus, the forces which are dominant during the transition phase did not necessarily start in 1990, nor have they ended in 1999. These are processes which are continuous and assume importance in certain periods but lose their significance in other periods (Bujra, 1999: Debiel, 2006: Moe, 2009: Okano, 2012).

Ali Mazrui (2001) offered intriguing paradoxes that characterize conflicts in Africa. He posits, controversially, that postcolonial wars have been more ruthless than anti-colonial wars; conflicts within borders more common and ferocious than across borders; ethnic conflicts tend to be preponderant in sub-Saharan Africa and religious conflicts in Arab North Africa; conflicts between blacks and whites have been more about the distribution of economic resources, while among blacks they have largely cantered on the demarcation of cultural identities; conflicts have become more prevalent as African armies have become less disciplined but better equipped; and dual societies have been more prone to conflict than plural societies (Mazrui, 2010: Zeleza, 2010).

A full account of any of Africa's wars and conflicts would show the complex interplay of national and transnational forces, and that internal and external forces are deeply implicated with each other. As dependency theory has taught us,

ever since the emergence of the modern world system the external is always already implicated in the local, although many dependency writers were wont to overemphasize external forces and underestimate local agency, and to depict the structural forces largely in materialist and economistic terms at the expense of their ideational, political and cultural dimensions. This underscores the difficulties of disaggregating the global-local nexus and capturing the exact nature of external-internal connections and how they relate to each other. Kassimir (2006) puts forward the concept of trans-boundary formations as an analytical device to transcend the external-internal divide and capture the dynamics created by the intersection of forces emanating from various spatial, social, structural and sectoral levels (Kassimir, 2006: Zeleza, 2010). There can be little doubt that external contexts and actors have had a major impact in instigating, facilitating, aggravating or prolonging conflicts in Africa from the time of the Atlantic slave trade, through the colonial period, to the postcolonial era.

Straus (2012) provides the following crisp summary on the changing nature of conflict: 'Today's wars are typically fought on the peripheries of states, and insurgents tend to be militarily strong and factionalised' (Straus, 2009: 2012). The latter part of the Cold War was particularly violent period characterised by protracted proxy wars fought by protagonists in Southern Africa, the Horn of Africa and South-East Asia over several decades. According to both the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) and the Heidelberg Conflict Barometer, there was a steady increase in the number of armed-conflict incidents, casualties and civilians affected during the period (Heidelberg Conflict Barometer, 2011: UCDP, 2012).

Conflict in Africa appears to be increasingly fragmented and the number of actors, particularly non-state factions, involved in conflicts is rising (UCDP, 2011). This is evident in regions such as Darfur, in Sudan, where the peace process that was finalised at the All-Darfur Stakeholders' Conference in May 2011 (in Doha, Qatar) was significantly complicated by divisions among various rebel factions. More recently, the Seleka coalition in the CAR (whose advance on the capital, Bangui, was temporarily halted by the intervention of other African countries with French support) eventually consisted of five separate groupings. Three of these signed a peace agreement with President François Bozizé on 13 January 2013. Bozizé was eventually ousted when the coalition resumed their advance a few months later.

The CAR crisis could be categorized as multi-faceted and falling within many classifications of African conflicts; first, CAR had a record of previous instability, the conflict under review was mobilized on identity and sectarian grounds by the former marginalized Seleka rebels, championing the course of minority Muslims, a claim allegedly used as a pretext by the colonial power, France, to depose Bozize. The crisis further degenerated by the reprisal attacks and further become more pronounced in its complexities and dynamics. The actors increasingly become fragmented and strong, matters blurred with time and a protracted violent conflict continued on the periphery of the state. Depicting convergence of history, identity, sect, fragmentation, external influence and blurring, typical to the dominant literatures on trend and context of African conflicts.

2. Conflict System Theory

Conflict system theory suggests that human behaviour in social contexts results from conflicts between competing groups. Conflict theory originated with the work of Karl Marx in the mid-1800s. Marx understood human society in terms of conflict between social classes, notably the conflict in capitalist societies between those who owned the means of economic production (factory or farm owners, for example) and those who did not (the workers). Subsequent thinkers have described different versions of conflict theory; a common theme is that different social groups have unequal power, though all groups struggle for the same limited resources. Conflict theory has been used to explain diverse human behaviour, such as educational practices that either sustain or challenge the *status quo (Raimo, 1991;* Bartos and Wehr, 2002: Crossman, 2011).*

Conflict theory emphasizes the role of coercion and power in producing social order. This perspective is derived from the works of Karl Marx, who saw society as fragmented into groups that compete for social and economic resources. Social order is maintained by domination, with power in the hands of those with the greatest political, economic, and social resources. When consensus exists, it is attributable to people being united around common interests, often in opposition to other groups.

Following on the heels of Marx, Italian scholar and activist Antonio Gramsci argued that consensus to rule is achieved in large part through cultural hegemony, which refers to the dominant group's ability to attain consent to their rule through ideas, norms, values, and beliefs.

According to conflict theory, inequality exists because those in control of a disproportionate share of society's resources actively defend their advantages. The masses are not bound to society by their shared values, but by coercion at the hands of those in power. This perspective emphasizes social control, not consensus and conformity. Groups and individuals advance their own interests, struggling over control of societal resources *(Raimo, 1991;* Bartos and Wehr, 2002: Crossman, 2011).

Those with the most resources exercise power over others with inequality and power struggles result. There is great attention paid to class, race, and gender in this perspective because they are seen as the grounds of the most pertinent and enduring struggles in society.

3. Nature of Post-Cold War UN-Peacekeeping Operations

Peacekeeping Operation is conventionally referred to actions where flippantly armed soldiers were deployed as a neutral 3rd party cease-fire monitoring group between two clearly identifiable opposing forces (UN, 2008). In the 1990s the Brahimi Report introduced a new term 'Peace Operations'. The African Union, the European countries and NATO adopted the 'Peace Support Operations' concept (Williams, 2013).

A peace process difficult to combine if it is not locally owned. Missions have often lost credibility because they were unable to meet the expectations of local communities (Coning, et al., 2008).Present leading form of consent-based robust UN peacekeeping operation is the recent UN Security Council mandates in contexts such as Darfur, Chad and the Central African Republic, (UN, 2008: Williams, 2013). The 2008 UN peacekeeping principle thus underlines UN operations as fundamentally political and security focussed (UN, 2008: Coning, et al., 2008).

4. Humanitarian Intervention: A classic Debate

Humanitarian intervention, in the works of Walzer (2000), Holzgrefe and Keohane (2003), Seybolt, (2009) and International Committee of Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) means the threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or group of states) aimed at preventing widespread and grave violations of fundamental human rights. Conflict of law and morality on intervention is intensely contended; Vienna Convention on Laws of Treaties and Articles 1 of Genocide convention is allowing intervention in stemming the prevalence of genocide. Article 2(4) and 2(7) of the UN Charter is prohibiting states from intervening in sovereign states' affairs. Still within this strand, there is a contention between Restrictionists vesting their argument on Article 2(4) and 2(7) for non-intervention and Counter-restrictionist insisted on moral responsibility to protect (Guraziu, 2008: Teson, 2003). Justification to intervention is the moral duty to protect (M2P) (Blair, 1999: Teson, 2003: UN, 2004: Annan, 2004), humanitarian intervention is justified when it is a response to acts that shock the moral conscience of mankind (Weiss et al., 1995: Henry et al., 2000: Huntington, 2000: Kithure, 2001: Dowell, 2003). Critics like Kassner (2007) shared the same view that intervention could have been morally justifiable if such action is intended to address cause of conflict. Article 39, Resolution 1199 and Chapter VII of the UN Charter authorized the UN Security Council to intervene in response to any threat of peace, breach of peace or an act of aggression. Important also in this review is the issue of Selective response and Abuses (O'Hanlon, 1996: Brownlie, 1998: Annan, 1999: Luttwak, 1999: Terry, 2002: Teson, 2003: Guraziu, 2008: Dowell, 2010: Bellamy et al., 2010).

4.1. Conflict Mitigation Efficacy of Peacekeeping Operations

Doyle and Sambanis (2000) was the first quantitative analysis of the effect of Peacekeeping Operations on the duration on post-conflict peace. The authors and a significant and substantial positive effect of peacekeepers on peace building, measured two years after the end of the conflict. This conclusion holds in several later studies. Fortna (2008) finds that the risk of repeat war drops by 75%/85% or more when peacekeepers are present (Fortna 2008). Beardsley (2010) finds that Peacekeeping Operations limits the spatial and temporal contagion of conflict and Melander (2009) demonstrates that peacekeeping can have a preventive effect, reducing the risk of genocidal violence breaking out (Fortna et al. 2010: Hegre et al. 2010).

Fortna (2004) highlighted difference between during and post the cold war regarding the effectiveness of Peacekeeping Operations. Collier, Hoeffer and Soderbom (2008) studied based on the same matter. They suggest that a stable peace can be achieved through the economic recovery. They also highlight Peacekeeping Operations as a solution. Most of the scholarly literature reflecting on the 1990s, as well as most newspaper and policy analyses, focuses on these crushing cases of failure despite many significant cases of peacekeeping success: for example, in Namibia, El Salvador, Cambodia, Mozambique, and Eastern Slavonia (a region of Croatia). Books with such hyperbolic titles as *Why Peacekeeping Fails* (Jett, 1999), *Peacekeeping Fiascos of the 1990s* (Fleitz, 2002), and *Peacekeeping in the Abyss* (Cassidy, 2004), and a seminal article in *Foreign Affairs* called 'Give War a Chance' (Luttwak, 1999), epitomize the pervasive sense of pessimism. But even the less tendentious literature about this time period focuses primarily on the cases of failure (e.g., Thakur & Thayer, 1995: Weiss, 1995: Mayall, 1996: Clarke &Herbst, 1997: Hillen, 1998: Moxon-Browne, 1998: Biermann &Vadset, 1999: Daniel et al. 1999: Walter & Snyder, 1999: Cousens, et al. 2001: Boulden, 2001: Hawk, 2002: Crocker, et al. 2005). Of the numerous works, only two texts are concerned primarily with comparing successful cases (Doyle et al. 1997: Krasno et al. 2003).

Meanwhile, the UN had all but turned away from peacekeeping after the devastations in Somalia, Angola, Rwanda, and Srebrenica. From late 1993 to 1998, the organization fielded only one new large mission, in Eastern Slavonia. There were several smaller missions, but none with the breadth or mandate of those of the previous era. The pessimism of the mid to late 1990s affected both the practice and the study of peacekeeping (Fortna et al. 2010: Hegre et al. 2010). All peacekeeping operations are not equally effective. Important characteristics are the operations' mandate and their size in terms of budget and troop strength. The most comprehensive study of the effect of Peacekeeping Operations on the duration of peace is carried out by Doyle and Sambanis (2006). Combining a statistical analysis with several case studies they investigate the effect of four types of Peacekeeping Operations on several measures of peace-building success. The four types of mandates are:

- Observer missions restricted to observing actions such as a truce, troop withdrawals, or a buffer zone, always deployed with the consent of the parties to the conflict.
- Traditional missions also deployed with the consent of the parties, but with somewhat extended mandates such as policing a buffer zone and assisting in negotiating a peace agreement.
- Multidimensional missions {referred to as `second-generation operations', the mandates, also consent based, are extended with activities intended to go to the roots of the conflict, such as economic reconstruction, institutional transformation (reform of police, army, judicial system, elections).
- Enforcement missions `third generation' operations that do not require the consent of both parties, and therefore must draw on the authority of UN Charter articles 25, 42, and 43 to apply force to protect the activities of the operation (Hegre et al. 2010)

Along with few commands, the traditional peacekeeping operations comes with unprotected or lightly armed troops (Doyle and Sambanis 2000). Peace-building success can be achieved by the Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations (Doyle and Sambanis 2000). Strong mandates seem particularly important for the purpose of reducing violence. In a similar vein, Krain (2005) argues that impartial interventions are ineffective in managing genocidal violence. Such missions are effective only if they challenge the perpetrators. The mandate strength is crucial in determining the effectiveness of managing also more low-intensive violence against civilians. According to Kreps and Wallace (2009), only traditional peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions are effective in reducing violence against civilians, and Hultman (2010) shows that only missions with an explicit mandate to protect civilians actually help to reduce such violence. Both these studies imply that missions with weak mandates may not only be ineffective but may actually increase levels of violence against civilians.

Findings for the size of missions are a bit mixed. Doyle and Sambanis (2006) argue that the number of peacekeeping troops is a poor predictor of peace-building success, the number of `boots on the ground' must be considered in relation to the Peacekeeping Operation's mandate. The reason for this, they argue, is that a `large troop deployment with a weak mandate is a sure sign of lack of commitment by the Security Council. This suggests a mismatch between the nature of the problem and the treatment assigned by the UN (Doyle and Sambanis 2006). However, most studies indicate that the size is important. Time trends presented by Heldt and Wallensteen (2006) suggest that an increase in the number of UN troops deployed in peace operations during the 1990s coincided with a decrease in the number of intrastate armed conflicts (Hegre et al, 2010).

The bulk of the quantitative work on peacekeeping's effects focuses on civil wars (perhaps not surprisingly, as most of the current need for peacekeeping is in internal conflicts). Most studies cast doubt on the effectiveness of peacekeeping in general (Dubey 2002), and several distinguish between the effects of peacekeepers on making peace in the first place and on keeping it once it is established, finding that peacekeepers are not so good at the former (Greig& Diehl, 2005: Gilligan &Sergenti, 2007). However, the finding that peacekeeping makes civil war much less likely to resume once a ceasefire is in place has emerged as a strongly robust result in the quantitative literature. Despite its limitations and the dysfunction highlighted in the previous wave of studies, peacekeeping keeps peace surprisingly well. Although in some cases peacekeepers have trouble leaving for fear that war will re-erupt as soon as they leave, peacekeepers have generally been quite good at establishing self-sustaining peace that lasts after the mission departs. Examples are found in Namibia, Mozambique, El Salvador, Croatia, and the West African peacekeeping mission in Guinea-Bissau (Fortna, 2010).

Another important issue in peacekeeping relates to the most intrusive of the multidimensional or integrated missions: UN transitional administrations (also called transitional authorities). Transitional administration mandates generally resemble those of typical multidimensional peacekeeping operations, but with the added requirement that the UN hold executive authority over the state administration. Sometimes this means the UN mission merely has veto power over the decisions of a transitional government (as in Namibia and currently in the CAR) (Arieff, 2014: UN, 2014: UN News Service, April 2014). At the other end of the spectrum, the UN is asked to take over the very governing of the state (as in East Timor), putting members of the international civil service in executive, legislative, and judicial positions that would usually be held by the citizens of the state in question. Although transitional administration has become a major topic of discussion in the literature and in policy circles (Chopra, 2000: Marten, 2004: Paris, 2004: Pouligny et al. 2007), it has only been attempted (in its modern form) in following places: Namibia, Cambodia, Eastern Slavonia (Croatia), Kosovo, EastTimor, and presently in the CAR. Rendering social scientific generalizations somewhat difficult, in all these cases, the UN sought to play the role of 'benevolent autocrat' (Chesterman, 2004), violating the norms of sovereignty and democracy with the goals of establishing sovereignty and democracy. The central debate in the transitional administration literature is over the extent to which third-party actors may be able to build states for others (von Hippel, 2000: Marten, 2004: Edelstein 2008).

4.2. Peacekeeping Operations in Africa: Lessons Learned

Despite the focus is on Al Shabaab in Somalia, the Janjaweed in Darfur, Sudan, or Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and Ansar al Dine in northern Mali have chosen animportantpart in dealing with these 'spoiler' groups (Stedman, 1997). From late 1990s, a new upsurge of peace operations has been started. A total of 52 peacekeeping operations have been implemented in the 18 African countries. Since 2011 alone, there are 10 new peacekeeping operations. Other Regional Economic Communities (RECs) from Africa also took some initiatives. Since 2003 the new principle of 'non-indifference' has been introduced. To that end, the AU has authorized more than 40,000 peacekeepers (Williams, 2011: UN, 2013). Most of the operations that involve collaboration among two or more international institutions (Boutellis et al, 2013). Many of these operations have proved to be effective tools for managing the conflict (Fortna, 2008: Strauss, 2011). Most of the peacekeepers have been suspect of ineffectiveness, dishonesty, or sexually exploiting the people. Western states have been reluctant to deploy their own soldiers after establishing more and more ambitious operations in Africa (ASB, 2013). To make peacekeeping operations successful, it is mandatory to make them an effective political strategy. As former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Susan Rice put it, 'peacekeepers cannot do everything and go everywhere' (Rice, 2009). Many actors are involved in the contemporary peacekeeping operations (UN, 2008). While the United Nations remains the single most important organization for conducting peacekeeping operations (AU, 2013). Necessary resources are important to fulfil the goals (Benjamin, 2012). Goals should be properly planned and set. Once goals are fixed the policymakers must avoid large vacancy rates. As per the Brahimi Report', the peacekeeping operations must be based on vigorous principle (ASB, 2013: Williams, 2013). In case of peace operation, Force generation is a crucial part. Certain number of personnel are required for this. Policymakers must therefore move beyond a slender obsession with figures of

personnel for each mission. Maintaining legitimacy is also very important (UN, 2008: ASB, 2013). Last but not the least it can be summarized that AMISOM, MONUC/MONUSCO, and UNAMID prolonged their exertions to include fortification of citizens into their assignments over time by ornamental their local rightfulness. Respect for international humanitarian law and effectiveness on the ground comes as a result (UN, 2008).

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