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The Shadow of Somalia or Mogadishu Syndrome being the Popular Reason for the International Neglect in the 1994 Rwandan Genocide Is Inaccurate

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Abstract:

100-day Rwandan killings in 1994 took approximately 800,000 lives and displaced about 2 million people. The United States and the International Community have been blamed for this 'catastrophic snub', and stakeholders in International Relations have argued that the reason behind this is 'the shadow of Somalia' or 'Mogadishu syndrome' during which 18 US soldiers were killed, and scores injured in a UN-peace keeping exercise in Mogadishu. I critically analyze these two events to indicate that the events in Somalia have very little influence on the international community's neglect of Rwanda. It is also paramount to note that external influences from the same international community played crucial roles in the genocide, making it even clearer why such an excuse will stand. This review is, therefore, aimed at critically analyzing these separate events in the two African nations to indicate that the events in Somalia had very little influence on the decision of the international community to totally neglect Rwanda, especially if the UNISOM II operations had learnt from UNITAF and operated differently from the way it did; also putting into consideration, the UN, Belgium, France and the United States who played crucial roles in letting the genocide happen.

Keywords: Shadow of Somalia, syndrome of Mogadishu, Rwandan genocide, United Nations Security Council, military intervention as humanitarianism, armed conflicts in Africa, African genocide, human rights

1. Introduction

The Rwandan genocide, which lasted for 100 days between April and July 1994, is one of the most intense events of political violence since World War II that left 800,000 people killed, between 250,000 and 500,000 women raped and about 2 million to flee the country. It also caused great economic and environmental devastation as natural resources, infrastructures and Service-rendering facilities were destroyed (Destexhe, 1994). Despite clear factors responsible for international inaction, the 'shadow of Somalia' remains the most popular opinion as the reason for the complete neglect by the international community and the UN's 'sluggish approach' to engage in another peace operation in Africa (Barnett, 2018; Melvern, 2019). This popular opinion is shared among politicians, scholars and stakeholders of international relations (Dotson, 2016; Maritz, 2012; Power, 2001). As much as this may be true, I disagree more to this statement, finding it inaccurate, after carefully considering the events that occurred in both situations- the crisis in Somalia and the Rwandan genocide.

Even after learning that choosing sides was the root cause of the hostility in Mogadishu, which led to the 'shadow of Somalia', the international community would still have intervened in Rwanda without choosing sides to show that it has actually learnt its lesson in Somalia. To fully establish my argument, it is paramount that I visit the events that occurred in Somalia and the events that occurred in Rwanda and then compare them to assess the lessons learned or not learned.

2. Discussion

2.1. Root Cause of Conflict in Somalia

Colonization had a stronghold in Somalia. Pre-independence, the British and Italian influence in Somalia affected the country's demographics as these two masters divided the country into two parts- the British colony and the Italian colony. These two parts have distinct administrative, political, legal and educational systems. The two parts also speak different languages with strongly divergent views of life, all championed by their elites. In 1960, the year of its independence, Paolo Contini, the then UN expert, was appointed by the UN as the head of a newly formed 'Consultative Commission for Integration' to lead in the integration of the people of both regions and the merger of the country's laws and institutions to reconcile their differences (Philipp, 2005).

A bloodless coup was carried out by Maj. Gen Siad Barre, in 1969, put an abrupt end to the process of a party-based constitutional regime. He called the Somali society a 'scientific socialism' in line with so-called 'Marxism' as he defined his

coup as a Marxist revolution (Philipp, 2005). At regional and local levels, civilian administrators were replaced with military and police governors. Force and terror were used to oppressing the Somali citizens, and with more displays of impunity and recklessness, the emergence of several insurgent groups which combined to oppose his regime in a bloody civil war by the 1980s ensued. This resulted in the fleeing of thousands of Somalis to neighbouring states, seeking refuge (Makinda & Debiel, 2003).

Maj. Gen Siad's massive looting to fund his anti-insurgency activities and his weakening political power, especially from the gradual withdrawal of international support, meant that the Somali state almost collapsed by the end of 1990 (Philipp, 2005). Somalia was condemned to Anarchy when Siad fled in 1991. The USC, a league of all resistant movements against Barre, appointed Ali Mahdi, belonging to the Abgal clan of the Hawiye clan family, a clan that played virtually no role in the anti-Barre struggle until a few months before his fall (Makinda, 1993). General Aideed of the Habar Gedir clan of the Hawiye expectedly contested this appointment, and by the end of 1991, fierce fighting between the Aideed and Mahdi forces in Mogadishu wreaked havoc on the city, which instantly spread across the country (Philipp, 2005). Not even international organizations such as the OAU, the OIC and the Arab League could either stop the fighting or initiate dialogue, bringing to an end any hope of a trans-clan coalition between Aideed and Mahdi (Makinda, 1993).

2.2. United Nation's Involvement

In 1991 in Somalia, together with the worst drought of the century, a devastating famine and the civil war killed approximately 300,000 people and affected 3 million, displacing a staggering 1.7 million Somalis (Philipp, 2005) and neighboring countries such as Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen and Djibouti had to harbor about 2 million fled Somalis. Mogadishu became uncontrollably congested due to the setup of relief Camps (Makinda, 1993), and supplies of relief materials proved difficult due to massive looting by combatants, extortion, robbery, poor road conditions, shortage of running water and electricity (Murphy, 1995). The International Community was not adequately informed of the situation in Somalia as the country ran short of journalists and there were no functional embassies within Mogadishu, more so, the 1991 Iraq-Kuwait crisis, the beginning of the former Yugoslavia crisis and the breakup of the Soviet Union dragged the world's attention away from Somalia (Annan, 1993). The conflict escalated and began to threaten the security of the entire eastern region of Africa. This prompted Javier Perez de Cuellar, the UN Secretary-General, days before the end of his term to discuss an attempted restoration of peace in Somalia with the president of the Security Council, Boutros Boutros-Ghali (Philipp, 2005). Moreover, that was the beginning of the United Nation's involvement in Somalia.

Despite no agreement being reached for a ceasefire, the United Nations got unanimous support from the various factions to foster peace and national reconciliations when the incoming President Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who was the then Under-Secretary-General for special political Affairs, led a team of United Nations officials to visit Somalia in early January 1992 (Philipp, 2005). In line with Somalia's request to consider the country's situation with the Security Council, the report of the Boutros Boutros-Ghali-led team's visit to Somalia was written to the Security Council, which was unanimously adopted on 23 January (Doc S/RES/733; Doc/S23445). When Somalia requested the United Nations' intervention, Osmer Arteh Ghalib was the interim Prime Minister, whose government was not universally recognized and since Egypt had very close relations with the Barre regime, Boutros Boutros-Ghali's presidency complicated the situation, which was even further complicated by the accusations of the United Nation's bias from the Aideed's faction. This particular event indicated that the seed of distrust on account of choosing sides has now been planted with the potential of growing to something big later. Moreover, this distrust was against the United Nations.

2.3. Formation of UNOSOM I

The perceptions of the dangers of civil war grew within the United Nations, just as they were first experienced when the United Nations assisted the Congo in its deadly post-1960 independence (Doc S/RES/161). An embargo was therefore placed on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia (Doc S/RES/733). In February 1992, the various factions were invited by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to establish peace talks that were done in collaboration with other international organizations: the League of Arab States, the OAU and the OIC in the United Nations Headquarters in New York and a cessation of hostilities was agreed (Philipp, 2005). The most significant breakthrough was the agreement of both sides to accept the United Nations Security component for convoys of humanitarian assistance (Doc S/RES/746). A high-priority plan was developed to establish mechanisms to ensure the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance. This agreement emphasizes monitoring ceasefire by unarmed military personnel, escorting relief supplies, and providing security for relief personnel, equipment, and supplies at the Mogadishu Port and Airport by a highly armed force. Hence, there is a need to establish an operation known as UNOSOM 1 (Philipp, 2005).

UNOSOM I was formed to implement a peace-keeping Mission and not a peace-enforcement one (Murphy, 1995); hence, it was allowed to use force only on account of self-defence, stopping attacks on humanitarian relief distribution, and this proved to be a major stumbling block on the exercise (Philipp, 2005). UNOSOM 1 was dispatched in April 1992; at this time, Mohammed Siad Barre, the dictator, had been overthrown in a military coup staged by the coalition of Ali Mahdi Muhammed and Muhammad Farad Aideed (Philipp, 2005). Despite \$43 Million (Philipp, 2005) invested in the UNOSOM 1 'Operation Provide Relief', challenges of no leadership in Somalia, jungle streets of reckless survival in Mogadishu and insubordination by soldiers who would rather wait for commands from their respective nations than to follow the UNOSOM 1 Commanders, added strain to the mission. So, the mission unsuccessfully ended in March 1993 (Philipp, 2005).

2.4. The End of UNOSOM I and Need for UNITAF

Before UNOSOM I ended, it was supplemented by the backing of President George Bush as American troops started arriving in Somalia on 9 December 1992. But this time, it was a peace-enforcement mission known as the UNITAF and

backed by contributions from 24 other countries to send a total of about 41,000 soldiers (Philipp, 2005) in an exercise that was dubbed 'Operation Restore Hope' (Zvijac et al., 1994). James Tubbs gave a documented account of how the US troops demonstrated their air strike power to the warlords, showcasing their willingness to use force however necessary to achieve a smooth operation of the distribution of relief materials (Tubbs, 1997). Robert B. Oakley, the then US Ambassador to Somalia, recounted how he had several meetings with the Clan leaders, using the avenue to showcase several F-14 Tomcats as a warning of the use of maximum force, peradventure the clans do not cooperate (Oakley, 1993).

In James Tubbs's (1997) words, Ambassador Robert B. Oakley met with the two major clan leaders, Aideed and Ali Mahdi, on 7 and 8 December to pave the way for the Marine landings. During these meetings, Ambassador Oakley reminded the clan leaders of the overwhelming firepower that had defeated Iraq in Desert Storm. At the same time, US F-14 Tomcats were flying low over Mogadishu to announce the arrival of the I-MEF and to help Ambassador Oakley make his point very clear. Evidently, the tactic worked as the two leaders agreed to a ceasefire on 11 December and did not actively resist the arrival of UNITAF forces.

He applied a similar tactic when he consulted with the clan elders prior to introducing coalition forces into new humanitarian relief sectors, and it was equally effective. The coalition forces expanded their operation in the face of minimal resistance (Lieutenant Colonel Donnell, 1995).

2.5. UNISOM II and the Mogadishu Syndrome

Since the UNITAF operation was focused on the missions and never interfered with the political balance of the chaotic society, the UNITAF operation proved highly successful as minimal resistance was recorded throughout the operation (Lieutenant Colonel Donnell, 1995). By March 1993, there was a commencement of transfer of operations from UNITAF to UNOSOM II in a \$1.6 Billion exercise and the transfer ended in May (Philipp, 2005). The UNOSOM II operation had 29 countries contributing to it. UNOSOM II, which was highly ambitious- going beyond the limits of neutral peace-keeping missions, ended up choosing sides, thereby interfering in the political balance of the civil war. This was evident from their persistent attempts to arrest Muhammed Farrad Aideed, which led to, firstly, the ambushing and killing of 24 Pakistani soldiers while they were inspecting weapons-storage facilities (Boulden, 2001; Lorch, 1993; Maren, 1997) and most notably, the death of 18 US soldiers with 84 others wounded in a seventh attempt of capturing the warlord in the Olympic Hotel in Mogadishu on 3 October 1993 (Bailey, 2008; Bowden, 2020; Chun, 2012; Dauber, 2001).

In all, there were 140 UN fatalities from hostile acts, prompting the withdrawal of troops by March 1994, and by March 1995, UNOSOM II ended [7]. Though the Mission was able to distribute aid quite effectively and civilian lives were protected, the events of Mogadishu on 3 October 1993 created a 'Mogadishu syndrome' or what is known as the 'Shadow of Somalia' that greatly contributed to killing the enthusiasm by any nation to take part in UN peace-keeping missions 9 (Møller, 2009).

2.6. Spillover of the Mogadishu Syndrome to Rwanda

In Rwanda, Belgium, the colonial master, contributed the largest Western contingent to UNAMIR when it was formed in 1993 (UNDPI, 1996) as part of its quest to maintain its status as a military might globally and an African peace-keeping specialist since the Cold War (African Rights, 1995). The killing of the 10 Belgian Soldiers on April 7, 1994, made the Belgian public angry, demanding the return of the rest of the soldiers (African Rights, 1995). The MIR mission had already gained zero support from other Western states (Des Forges, 1999; Organization of African Unity, 1994). The 10 dead Soldiers reflected the 'shadow of Somalia', and even the UN Secretary-General, Boutros-Ghali, lamented, "Belgium, afflicted with 'the Somalia syndrome,' pulled out at the first encounter with serious trouble" (Boutros-Ghali, 1999).

2.7. Contributing Factors to the Rwandan International Neglect

Contrary to popular opinion, there will also be the possibility of exaggerating the 'Mogadishu syndrome', hiding behind it to avoid future peace-keeping responsibilities. This is evident in the fact that the UN secretariat was under immense pressure from President Clinton's constant blame for the event in Mogadishu (Des Forges, 1999). This tendency to exaggerate the events of Somalia contributed to scaring the hardworking UN staff from sharing vital information on Rwanda as they were more concerned about ending the UN peace-keeping exercise than just another peace-keeping failure (Barnett, 2018; Anglin, 2001). The shadow of Somalia truly caused a ripple effect as civil war' and 'ceasefire' was the emphasis and not 'genocide', despite the massive information available on the Rwandan killings (Des Forges, 1999). Dallaire, the UNAMIR Force Commander, lamented the genocide vanishing into the abyss of non-action in New York (Dallaire, 2009).

Since the UN Secretariat, a bureaucratic arm of the UN is responsible for passing vital information to the Security Council, a major decision-making body responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security (Barnett, 2018), the misinformation about Rwanda had led the non-permanent members of the Security Council to rule out genocide (Boutros-Ghali, 1999). With complex missions in Bosnia and Somalia, Rwanda was considered less important (Wheeler, 2000), and the daunting work pressure on the over-worked staff across 17 missions around the world, which included 70,000 peacekeepers by the Department of Peace-keeping Operations (DPKO) at that time also contributed to the easy choice of neglecting Rwanda (Boutros-Ghali, 1999). These were the actual factors that played out and not the 'Mogadishu Syndrome.'

2.7.1. The US-Factor and Belgium

Furthermore, there was never a national interest from the United States in Rwanda (Power, 2013; The White House, 1994). The United States and Belgium knew of the eventual dangers of the rising tensions within Rwanda that would lead

to genocide. As early as 1993, CIA studies, after close monitoring and intelligence gathering, warned of imminent massacres with up to 500,000 potential victims (Des Forges, 1999; Power, 2013). The signs were obvious that some terrified Tutsis left the country weeks before the genocide while humanitarian organizations such as ICRC and MSF began contingency planning for a huge number of casualties (Melvern, 2006).

In the same vein, proof of Belgium's knowledge of the soon-to-happen genocide was its strong stance in further strengthening the UNAMIR. However, the complete lack of support of other Western states (Des Forges, 1999) further discourages the international community from taking responsibility, as no international action can be taken without the leading role of the United States (Destexhe, 1995). The US officials also understood that it would be against moral obligations to call it a 'genocide' and do nothing about it [40], and based on legal obligations, calling it a genocide automatically calls for action from the international community, irrespective of where it is happening (Genocide Convention, 1948). According to Samantha Power (Dallaire, 2009), the reason is 'the dance to avoid the g-word in the USA.' The argument that the Western world misunderstood African conflicts, which led to the popular belief that 'these people do this from time to time' (Power, 2013), does not hold water. The lack of international media also used as another excuse (Power, 2013), is also not enough reason since CIA intelligence gathering gave the US enough information to be able to prevent the genocide (Kuperman, 2000; Organization of African Unity, 1994).

This lack of national interest in Rwanda from the US was buttressed more by Holly J. Burkhalter (PBS, 2004), who partitioned the Rwandan genocide into five phases. Despite the lack of leadership within the Clinton administration's foreign policy bureaucracy, which led to its refusal to deal with the crisis as a human rights disaster, it responded decisively and creatively to the fifth phase, deploying troops in Zaire and Rwanda itself in late July as humanitarian relief materials were provided during a massive cholera pandemic. This became a top priority of the white house, the State Department and the Pentagon. The vigorous nature of their approach during this refugee phase of the Rwandan genocide contrasts markedly with the US policy during earlier phases when hundreds of thousands of Rwandans were being slaughtered- clearly indicating the political unwillingness of the United States to intervene (Des Forges, 1999; Power, 2001; 2013).

Among Washington policymakers and pundits, only two basic principles addressing deadly communal conflicts have achieved some consensus. Firstly, US ground troops should not be made involved in humanitarian interventions in ongoing civil wars. Secondly, cases of genocides are an exception, especially where intervention can succeed at low cost (Kuperman, 2000). This shows that the US, through its policies, is always willing to stand up against genocide anytime it occurs, so why the cold feet on Rwanda? Another excuse of note is that, unlike Somalia, Rwanda is a landlocked country in Central Africa, which gives Rwanda a geographical disadvantage in transporting troops and Military hardware. It is argued that the entire force of 13,500 troops was needed and would have to be airlifted, which would be a problem since speed is needed in halting killings of genocidal proportions. At an optimistic rate of 800 tons daily, the military involved will need 33 days to get the 26,550 tons of military hardware, including 200 helicopters, transported into Rwanda. This period is enough to wipe out a race (Kuperman, 2000).

However, endorsed by members of Congress, human rights groups and a distinguished panel of the Carnegie Commission on preventing deadly conflicts, the UN's force commander of the peace-keeping mission in Rwanda, Lieutenant General Dallaire, claimed that 5,000 troops deployed at the outset of the killing in April 1994 could have prevented the genocide (Kuperman, 2000). Therefore, going by his words, 13,500 soldiers would have been surplus to requirement and just an exaggeration to validate the excuse. Even if the General were too idealistic rather than realistic, his 5,000 troops, which would require 10,000 tons of military hardware, would have saved about 100,000 Tutsis, which would be about 20% of the death toll, if the 21 days of transportation of hardware was put into consideration, as estimated by Alan Kuperman (2000). Since the warning signs of genocide lingered in Rwanda since 1990, the international community should have put Rwanda on a red alert with the readiness to act swiftly when the need arises, hence having enough time to transport whatever number of Troops and Military hardware needed making this excuse not acceptable.

2.7.2. The Role Played by the UN Security Council

The UN Security Council also played a role in the genocide by not giving the UNAMIR sufficient mandate, restricting its function to simply 'monitor', 'assist' and 'investigate' under a Chapter VI mandate (UNDPI, 1996), according to the UN security council Resolution 872 on 5 October 1993. The Security Council went further to constantly pressurize the mission to save money, making it ill-equipped to stop the killings (Burkhalter, 1994). Dallaire was not allowed to use force other than in cases of self-defence; an exception was granted during the evacuation of foreign nationals between 7 and 10 April- which is a show of impartiality as clearly, the Europeans were treated more superior to the Africans in this regard (Power, 2013). After the Belgian peacekeepers were withdrawn, resources became so scanty that they could not even secure transportation or buy proper food and medicine (Dallaire & Sarty, 2006). Therefore, they watched completely helplessly as Rwandans were massacred (Prunier, 1997). Even considering the fact that a modest force of 5,000 troops, which was requested, could not be provided says a lot about the lack of interest from the UN Security Council and the West at large (Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, 1997).

Another UN factor that played out in this massacre, which had absolutely nothing to do with 'an experience' from Somalia, was the power tussle between the office of the Secretary-General of the UN and the UN Security Council in 1994. This rift brought tension between these two arms of the UN, particularly as the Secretary-General, Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, did not want the council to 'micro-manage' UN missions and had wanted to manage operations himself (Maritz, 2012). There were no coherent policy options presented to the council once the genocide began and during its progression. The speed of the decision by the West to abandon Rwanda and the hasty evacuation of expatriates has never

been properly explained. It is assumed that the deaths of the ten Belgian UN peacekeepers in the first hours made a decisive difference (Maritz, 2012).

2.7.3. Role of France

While the US is blamed for having 'no interest' in Rwanda, France, on the other hand, had a dangerously selfish interest. France, as a matter of fact, clearly chose a side- the same crime committed by the UN in Somalia and together with other atrocities committed; France has been dubbed a 'Silent accomplice' of the genocide (Wallis, 2014). France sees Anglo-Saxon countries as a threat to its 'International Prestige' (African Rights, 1995), and it detested the Anglo-Saxon invasion of the RPF in October 1993 (Prunier, 1997; Wallis, 2014). From records, the French embassy was deserted a few days into the genocide, leaving a heap of shredded documents and about 70 soldiers who trained and gave firearms to militias, held checkpoints to harass, capture and hand over the Tutsis to the Rwandan Army-hence choosing sides (Melvern, 2019; Prunier, 1997; Wallis, 2014). The French government deliberately kept media coverage about the genocide out of the French populace in France (Prunier, 1997).

Together with South Africa and Egypt, France sold firearms to Rwanda, making one of the poorest countries of the world at that time, to be the third largest importer of weapons in Africa, doing so for three years from October 1990 and spending an estimated \$112 Million (Human Rights Watch, 1994). Since 1995 was an election year in France, the government deployed troops to join in the Security Council's 'Multinational Operation for humanitarian purposes' in July 1994 to be seen as 'humanitarian' and win the mandates of its electorate (African Rights, 1995; UNDPI, 1996). However, its actual reason was to keep the advancing Anglo-Saxon RPF at bay and demonstrate an open commitment to Francophone-African countries (African Rights, 1995). This deceptive demonstration and their earlier intervention between April 7 and 10 in the quick and highly effective evacuation of their expatriates from Rwanda are clear evidence of the capacity of the international community to prevent and stop the genocide if only it had the political will to do so (Melvern, 2019; The White House, 1994). Instead of being deceptive by joining the 'Multinational Operation for humanitarian purposes,' France should have joined Belgium in the initial UNAMIR, which was ignored by Western states if it truly meant to save Rwanda. Therefore, using the 'shadow of Somalia' or the 'Mogadishu syndrome' to avoid intervention was ruthlessly opportunistic and a convenient excuse from the international community, especially from France.

2.8. Negating the Other Excuses

Genocide is a form of one-sided mass killings in which the state or other authority intends to destroy a group as that group and membership in it are identified by the perpetrator (Palmer, 1998). In 1963, the Tutsis were massacred, during which notable military officers such as Colonel Theoneste Bagosora took part. Bertrand Russell, the British Philosopher, termed these killings in 1963 as the 'most systematic extermination' of a people since the Nazi extermination of the Jews (Kuperman, 2000). In exact fashion, these killings repeated themselves again, test-running the genocide between 1990 and 1993, killing about 2,000 people, most of whom were of the Tutsi tribe. These killings were because of organized massacres fueled by hate propaganda, instigating neighbors to kill neighbors, roadblocks to prevent escapes and the systematic murders of administrative officers (Kuperman, 2000).

These events led to predictions of mass killings months and even years before they actually occurred. Certainly, by January 1994, it was clear to the UN's special envoy for human rights that death lists were being drawn up in preparation for the killing of Batutsi and the elimination of Bahutu opposition politicians and human rights activists (Reyntjens, 1996). From 1992 onwards, members of 'Hutu Power' militias were being trained in techniques of hunt-and-destroy operations rather than in open-armed combat. The regime in power in Rwanda during the early 1990s, along with its regional and international allies, was fully responsible for the genocide of 1994. The 1963 episode of killings and warnings from 1990 are enough signs for the international community to be aware of imminent genocide ahead, thus negating the excuses of lack of media, intelligence gathering or awareness. So, the intelligence agencies committed virtually no incoming resources in what was considered a tiny state in a region of little strategic value (Destexhe, 1995) because they actually did not show interest, and that was it.

Propaganda from international media also showed bad intent, solidifying this line of thought. The beginning of the havoc caused by the international media was the initial depiction of the Rwandan violence as a two-sided war, where the Tutsis were winning rather than a one-sided genocide against the Tutsis. This is even more evident by the reportage of a waning war when it was, in fact, accelerating. The typified 'diminished in intensity' reportage by the New York Times just 4 days into the war indicated no interest. Also, the early gross underestimated death counts, which never suggested genocidal proportions, the 'too much' focus on Kigali, deliberately excluding other areas to show a broader scope of the violence and the absence of credible and knowledgeable observers, including human rights groups, all pointed to propaganda (Destexhe, 1995). The neglect was intentional.

Thus, the failure of the international community to act in Rwanda, leading to genocide, was neither a function of lack of early warning information nor a function of malevolence but essentially a function of neglect. As much as it is true that the outcome of an earlier crisis in Somalia scared the international community to act in Rwanda, it is misleading to pin this neglect on lessons learned in Somalia.

3. Conclusion

I argued that the genocide in Rwanda happened due to complete neglect from the international community and not 'largely' due to the 'shadow of Somalia' or 'the Mogadishu syndrome', as scholars or politicians would suggest. I briefly discussed the happenings in Somalia, a country that was ravaged by violent conflict between the militant factions of Ali

Mahdi and General Aideed after Maj. Gen Siad Barre, the then president, fled the country to leave it in ruins in 1991. Somalia suffered gruesome human, infrastructural and socio-economic damages whilst millions of Somalis fled. The United Nations, through UNOSOM I, intervened, and then an American-led UNITAF followed, which was a highly successful humanitarian operation. UNOSOM II took over from UNITAF but chose sides in the conflict by trying to capture General Aideed by all means while delivering humanitarian services in Somalia. This led to the killing of 18 US soldiers with scores injured- The Mogadishu syndrome. In Rwanda, the genocide happened as the US, Belgium, France, and the UN played key roles in making the genocide happen and 'not knowing,' 'not being aware', or not understanding the conflict going on at the time have been suggested. However, these other excuses have been addressed, as I hold the international community responsible for its total neglect of the country.

4. Abbreviations

1. I MEF: I Marine Expeditionary Force (A branch of the United States Marine Corps and a part of the United States Marine Forces Pacific)
2. ICRC: International Committee of the Red Cross
3. MSF: Medecins Sans Frontieres
4. OAU: Organization of African Unity
5. OIC: Organization of the Islamic Conference
6. PDD 25: Presidential Decision Directive 25
7. RPF: Rwandan Patriotic Front
8. UN: United Nations
9. UNAMIR: United Nations Assisted Missions in Rwanda
10. UNITAF: United Task Force
11. UNOSOM I: United Nations Operations in Somalia I
12. UNOSOM II: United Nations Operations in Somalia II
13. US: United States (of America)
14. USC: United Somali Congress

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