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Global Trends in Arms Proliferation in Third World Countries and the Impending Apocalypse of the Human Race: A Case Study of Arms Race and Security Challenges in Nigeria

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Abstract:

The study focuses on the consequences or implications of arms proliferation on the contemporary human society, with particular emphasis on the emergent arms race and security trends in Nigeria. The growing debates across intellectual bent and traditional boundaries of states are on how armed conflicts and crimes are related to or engendered by arms proliferation. The debates find confluence in the fact that the evolving trend is a universal evil; posing challenges to human civilization and must be tackled to halt the blistering reign of destructive culture and impunity from gaining deeper roots in the world. This is in recognition of the fact that today's world is faced with varying degrees of crisis which involves use of arms of differing sophistications, many of which are possessed illegally despite prohibitions on illegal arms trade. It props up armed related crimes and resort to use of arms for attacks in conflict situations. The hallmarks are incidences like gang shooting, kidnapping, terrorism, armed robbery, and communal conflicts. They are essentially promoted and sustained by arms at the disposal of unauthorized users. The study observes that it causes collateral damage and invariably results in avoidable deaths, injury, discomfiture and displacement of many innocent citizens. Many others are victims of legitimate arms abuse by some ruthless law enforcement agents. The entire scenario plunges society into psychological trauma of insecurity and there is no room for a healthy air of life in such precarious situation. To that extent, the study recommends that there should be community focused mopping of illegal arms in circulation, closure of arms black market to destroy the network, clampdown on syndicates and dealers on illegal arms and promulgation of deterrent laws with severe penalty to discourage trading on illegal arms. The data used for the study is generated from the secondary source and evaluative method applied in data analysis. It adopted "Attribution Theory" for an explanatory framework, to show how armed conflicts is attributed to arms proliferation. The central thesis is that there is logical relationship between arms proliferation and armed crimes and conflicts.

Keywords: Global Trends, arms proliferation, impending apocalypse, human race, third world, security issues and Nigeria

1. Introduction

In 2008, the United Nations Security Council, held an all important 5881st Meeting (UNSC/9316) where some 50 speakers examined "Means of Intensifying Fight against Illicit Trade in Arms". The exclusive attention devoted to the issue was an express admission that it has speedily got to an alarming rate. Incidentally, most of the speakers were from third world countries. The theme of their message was on the threat posed to international peace and security by uncontrolled trade in small arms. Despite the landmark resolutions on how to combat the problem, several events that occurred thereafter, diminished the earlier high hopes. At the very time the meeting was held, Arab Spring inferno had not occurred, and none was also looking forward to the emergence of killer squads like Boko Haram, ISIS and other murderous organizations.

However, the later upsurge in domestic, national and international violence shows that the world was speedily drifting towards self-destruction. This is accentuated by the fact that at no time in the remote past was human life and existence threatened as it does in the meantime. Several factors combine to nurture this tendency and each finds its being in the rapidly increasing production capacity of small arms and light weapons which widespread availability to public and private use has become potent sources of criminal activities, wars; ethnic or communal conflicts and other forms of atrocities being committed against humanity and society. The statistics of arms production and trends in arms proliferation was articulated by Arendshort (2003) and shows that,

- There is an estimated 1,734 companies in 98 countries worldwide involved in arms production. There are 639 million firearms in the world today of which 41% are illegally held. In other words, the developed countries of the world; U.S.A, Britain, Russia, China and France account for 88% of the world conventional arms exports.

Since the end of the Cold War, increasing international attention has been focused on problems arising from the worldwide proliferation of small arms and light weapons. This is so because these weapons have been the primary tool of violence in the many ethnic and internal conflicts that have erupted in recent years (Klare, 2015). In some cases, ethnic nationalities have fought each other in the name of hatred, most especially in some semi-cosmopolitan societies, for example, in the conflicts between the Zango-Kataf and the Hausas in Kaduna state, the Aguleri-Umuleri/Umuoba Anam in Anambra state, the Hausas-Yoruba groups in Ogun state, etc. All these have contributed to the very low socio-political and economic development of the country (Adetiba, 2012). The conflicts are too frequent and commonplace and each has had or inflicted landmark effects on the victims. The casualty or fatality rates are usually unreasonable, sometimes beyond state's imagination to engender institutional fragility and thus, doubts on the state's capacity to protect lives and property of citizens.

There are two forms of arms that are commonly accessible for prosecution of these conflicts and crimes; the first is small arms, which refers to hand-held weapons like assault rifles, carbines, pistols, and submachine guns; and the second type, light weapons, that refers to easily portable crew-served weapons like heavy machine guns, bazookas, and light mortars (Arendshort, 2003). Guns seem to be so accessible that in 2009, the Congressional Research Service estimated that there are 310 million firearms in the United States, and these exclude, of course, the weapons owned by the US military. Of that number, 114 million were handguns, 110 million were rifles and 86 million were shotguns (Obi, 2016). These small arms and light weapons have been responsible for the majority of the combat deaths in recent wars and figure in much of the crime and civil violence visited upon vulnerable societies around the world.

- In 2013, total number of deaths caused by guns in the United States as computed by the Center for Disease Control and Prevention, stood at 33,169. In Japan for that period the figure was under 70. The breakdown of the figures showed that 11,208 deaths were the result of homicide; 21,175 deaths resulted from suicide; 505 deaths resulted from accidental discharge, and 281 deaths were due to firearms use of "undetermined intent" (Obi, 2016).

Monumental devastations are caused by arms proliferation and the crime does not have any geographical insignia, as both the advanced and developing countries are deeply affected. Each is afflicted by sporadic and often times widespread incidents of gang shooting, as occurred lately in France, the US, Germany, Britain, etc but more frequent in developing societies like Nigeria where armed robbery, kidnapping, assassination; communal conflict, sectarian violence and ethnic rivalry, including militancy and insurgency are the hallmarks. Most arms used for these operations pose great challenge not only to the constituted authorities whose duty it is to regulate the flow of the arms, but also the unsuspecting victims who suffer from their possession and use in every little disagreement. In this context, commentators, policy makers and law enforcement agents; including victims of conflicts and crimes that are perpetrated with illegal arms have raised serious concerns about the horrific development; across national boundaries but particularly in the developing societies.

From the perspective of this paper, some critical questions are interrogated to situate the study within empirical realm. In specific terms, they include to identify: (i) Where and who is responsible for production and distribution of the arms? (ii) Which institution or persons are designated or supposed to possess and use the arms? (iii) What implication does their proliferation and illegal acquisition portend for human peaceful co-existence? (iv) What can be done to curb the virulent effects of their circulation and usage for commission of crime? These questions stem from the nefarious activities of various groups that showcase murderous intentions across the globe, like ISIS, Boko Haram, al-Shabab, Fulani herdsmen; militants and terrorists of all colourations; including the subsisting rampancy of communal conflicts and criminal activities of dissimilar intensities and repercussion.

In several instances, the sophistication of the arms used by various groups for prosecution or commission of crimes surpasses the ones available to law enforcement agencies, especially in developing societies. It makes insecurity widespread and renders peaceful co-existence barren. It is, however, a problem in a country that is polarized along ethnic, linguistic, religious and ideological divides; where each struggles for survival and uses every legitimate and illegitimate means available to pursue the cause. It is further compounded by volatile competition for leadership and scarce resources, which has been a characteristic trend in the political and economic practices of most third world countries including Nigeria. It thus necessitates this study. The research dwells on scientific methodology; the aim being to ensure that it follows the requisite approach in data collection, data classification, analysis and interpretation. The study made use of secondary source of data, interpreted the key variables forming the subject themes using content analysis model; while "Attribution Theory" was used as explanatory framework. The general objective is to unravel the relationship between arms proliferation and commonality of armed related crimes across nations of the world, which Nigeria serves as a focal reference point.

2. Theoretical Framework

Attribution theory is basically an approach that relates events to their likely causes. This approach was made prominent in the works of Heider (1958), Jones and Davis (1965), and Kelley's (1967). In particular, Kelley's (1967) developed co-variation model of attribution theory. It was a logical model for judging whether a particular action should be attributed to some characteristic of the person (internal) or the environment (external). The term co-variation simply means that a person has information from multiple observations, at different times and situations, and can perceive the co-variation of an observed effect and its causes. He asserts that in trying to discover the causes of behavior, one takes into account some kinds of evidence embedded in two types of causal information which influence judgments. These are Low factors = person (i.e. internal) attribution and High factors = situational (i.e. external) attribution. However, the approach, according to Fiske & Taylor (1991), focuses on how the social perceiver uses information to arrive at causal explanations for events. It examines what information is gathered and how it is combined to form a causal judgment.

Applying the method to this study, many scholars and public commentators have attributed the cause of arms proliferation to many factors based on varied observations. Their judgments recognize the internal and external dynamics of the problem. The external factors relate essentially to national policies of countries regarding production and distribution of small arms and light weapons, how they treat the regulatory laws guiding small arms and light weapons and the overall assessment of economic interests attached to their production and distribution. In other words, the internal influence emanates from peculiar state's characteristics involving her leadership style, pattern of sharing social, economic and political rewards; the nature of relationship between and among her constituent units and the ways her laws are enforced. When these indices operate in the negative, the consequence degenerates into conflict that frequently escalates into armed violence; thereby necessitating the needs for arms and weapons that translate to arms proliferation.

These, all together, intensify the production, distribution and harvesting of economic and military benefits which investment and trade in arms yield. Attributing arms proliferation to economic factors, Chilaka (2010) posits that many arms brokers have become established through trade in arms. More profound is the fact that illegitimate trade yields huge revenue, as more arms are continually pumped into the arms black market of the continent. Many of these end up in black market in Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire, Niger, Guinea, Mali and Senegal, etc. Arendshort (2003) amplified the argument, stressing that liberalism, the capitalist principle and the process of globalization help to persist the problem of arms proliferation by the positive self-interest that weapon supplied by first world nations have continued to be in the negative interest of the user country. The reason is that international arm dealers and brokers utilize the systemic incapability of these states as an opportunity to circumvent international arm regulations so as to make more money. As a result, arms brokers breach embargoes to supply these arms (Wezeman, 2009).

This is often complemented by domestic arms proliferation. For example, the annual value of small arms and ammunition exports from Nigeria was reported by Customs to be in several million US dollars - US\$211 in 2011; the same period the annual value of small arms and ammunition imports to Nigeria was US\$12,912 (Nicholas, 2014). In other words, arms production depends on the state's industrial capacity to produce weapons for export (Annual Reports of the International Studies Association, 1998). The production capacity determines the amount of arms that are proliferated and invariably, the rate of armed violence that occurs. It shows that there are many factors that influence arms proliferation. Nevertheless, the concluding premise is that arms related conflicts, violence and crimes are attributable to arms proliferation and this is argued extensively with substantial facts, in this work.

3. Contextual Issues Underlying the Study

Arms proliferation is of remote origin. Scholars have accounted for this development from different historical perspectives. Each, nonetheless, shares the view that insensitivity of those who benefit from the production and distribution of arms has ensured sustained engagement in the business - both at individual, corporate and state levels. The developed and developing states are culprits but predominantly driven by the advanced countries with third world as destination points.

Okafor (2004) built a link between Trans-Atlantic Slave trade and arms proliferation, especially in the third world countries, most of which were victims of colonization and European domination. It is argued that in the course of European merchants bringing guns, gun-powder, brass-belt, beads, etc, to Africa in exchange for African slaves, it opened the routes for trades in arms with the consequent arms proliferation in the continent. Arendshort (2003) corroborates the assertion, observing that Africa, following ceaseless arms trade from the West is flooded with weapons and the potential to pursue violence is immediate and endlessly available to all. It results in the active destruction and impoverishment of the third world which is at a very bad side of the economic colonialism that typifies neo-liberal economic globalization. He maintains that wars or crisis in West Africa sub-region has been occasioned by centre countries-peripheral countries relations.

Brunwasser (2002) and Chilaka (2010) identified several supply routes through which arms are proliferated in the African region. These are Entebbe, Goma, Kigali and Uganda airfields and African seaports such as Aseb, Beira, Conakry, Dares-Salam, Djibouti, Uganda, Merca Mombas, Monrovia and Nacada. Three notorious dealers were spotted and listed to be responsible for illegal trades in arms. Firstly, Victor Bout, who owns 5 airlines that flew 60 aircrafts and employed some 300 people who served as network provider and bridging gap in the chain of supply of arms to destination points. Secondly, Leonid Effimovich, a major broker and dealer in arms, indicted over proliferation of arms in West Africa. Thirdly, Geza Mezosy, a Hungarian - Yugoslavian born Belgian, who established a company "Eastronition" through which he sold illegal arms across Belgium, Luxembourg and Hungary; and ran dirty arms deals and sponsored many cliques of arms dealers and gangs (Brunwasser, 2002). Essentially, Hazebn (2007) in an article, "The International Dealers in Death", contends that their activities supported corrupt regimes, contributed to the use of child soldiers and fuelled endless wars and insurrection in West Africa. These are common occurrences in Nigeria, as was the case in most other third world countries, example, Iraq, Libya, Syria, Sudan, Egypt, Yemen, etc; and cases of illegitimate transfers are also not on records. Fleshman (2001) links the proliferation of arms in Africa to structural breakdown of institutions that have long standing pervasive political and social ills. According to him, the diversion of large quantities of arms from government armouries is attributed to corruption. In this connection, Akpor (2012) cited the case of Boko Haram in Nigeria where, most of the sect's weapons enter the country through the Apapa Warf and the northern borders of Chad, Mali and Niger Republic. They are evacuated into tankers with the alleged assistance of some members of the authorized security agencies suspected to be members of the group at these borders. The tankers normally sail through all checkpoints until they get to their destinations where the contents are again evacuated into designated mosques. Camels are equally used in this movement of arms and ammunition. In a similar analogy, Lt. Col Sagir Musa, in an article published by Daily Trust (2013), espoused the security complicity argument further, that:

- The exchange of stolen crude oil for arms/ammunition is a well known “trading activity” nurtured and ferociously protected by militants or sea pirates and their financiers and collaborators with the possible connivance of unscrupulous law enforcement agents in the Niger Delta. This is one major source of arms and ammunition that strengthen militants’ arms and ammunition holding not only in the Niger Delta but also in the South East and South Western parts of the country.

Based on the foregoing observations, Kamavauko and Luvenga (1995) discussed how the laxity or connivance with armed criminals frustrates efforts at curbing the menace, especially in cases where dereliction by the responsible authorities in arms control or on enforcement actions are the order of the day. They revealed that in the course of their investigation of arms exports to Zaire, through Zaventem airport near Brussels, with the help of the cargo department Head of Air Zaire, it was discovered that Belgium was a turn table for arms exports to Zaire, which they claimed the Belgium authorities are aware of. Their report indicted two Belgian firms - European Tours Voyages and Know Nedge Holding. The collaborators and members of the arms trade net are multiple people who are related to the President’s Councillors and Officials, and wanted the preservation of the status quo in Zaire’.

Nonetheless, Bender (2014) underscores the implication of the nefarious practice, saying that ultimately, this proliferation lead to the widespread availability of the firearms around the world; such that today, the weapon remains a standard among insurgent and terrorist groups. According to him, it is pretty hard in many parts of the world, particularly in Afghanistan, to go into territory under insurgent control, and not be ambushed by Kalashnikovs. Despite the widespread violence and insurgent groups that the Kalashnikov has become associated with since its inception, Mikhail Kalashnikov ((its founder) alleges that “it is the politicians who are to blame for failing to come to an agreement and resorting to violence”. Whether the excuse is logical or not is subject to debate but if viewed from the context of many conflicts and crimes that AK-47 is the source of inspiration, there would be less truth in the claim. It is therefore a defensive error and horrific.



Figure 1: Mikhail Kalashnikov experimenting with AK-47, the object of threat he created

Most importantly, several studies have documented records of arms production locations, the destinations of their supply, and perhaps the recognized end users that no longer have clear definition based on their availability to almost everybody. The consensus is that demand for arms is a global phenomenon with the greatest concentration of demand being located in the south, with many instances as characterized by violent conflict.

Hazen and Horner (2007) assert that there are two primary factors that drive demand for small arms in Nigeria: security and personal gain. The first, according to their description, has wide range of users, encompassing institutionally defined bodies like law enforcement agents; and subsidiary entities like community groups, corporate organizations, other groups and individuals who acquire arms by obtaining official licence. From institutional sphere, the National Security Forces obtain small arms primarily for the purpose of enforcing the law and protecting the country. The reasons for procurement of arms by civilian populations vary and include: - (i) Security as a result of the inability of the police to maintain law and order in a consistent and reliable fashion, (ii) Threats to personal security, crime, communal clashes and land disputes, (iii) For community vigilante groups and ethnic militias, and (iv) For personal gain either individually or collectively through armed robbery, oil bunkering, cultism or clashes with other groups. Accordingly, personal gains have also been sought by politicians who arm youth gangs and use them as personal election campaigning tools.

These arms have been identified to flood the country from many sources, both through local production, smuggling and importation (Florquin and Berman, 2005). According to Wellington (2007), most of the assault rifles – such as the Russian AK-47, the German G3, the Belgian FN-FAL; the Czech machine-guns and the Serbian RPGs – are supplied by dealers and sellers. There are also European dealers involved in the trade, but, unlike their Nigerian counterparts, they almost always escape the arm of the law, in some cases due to their connection with powerful figures in various governments. Given that the phenomenon of arms proliferation relates

to a product of huge industrial production capacity of arms in the industrialized and industrializing nations of the world, Europe and the United States of America have well established arms producing companies with license from their various states and undertake mass production of all categories of arms (Arendshort, 2003, and Boutwell and Klare, 2005). They note that the trend has also incorporated China which has begun to increase rapidly in arms production. These arms are supposed to be for defense purposes by an internationally recognized government but distributed indiscriminately.

Many other scholars and analysts have equally done additional works aimed at expatiating on the proposition. Honwana and Lamb (1998) stressed that the bulk of these weapons are manufactured in the North and shipped to the South. China with approximately 16 arms producing factories has the world's largest industrial capacity for manufacturing infantry weapons. The United States, Britain, France and many of the former Eastern bloc countries are also major suppliers of arms to developing countries. According to Asogwa (1999), imbalance among nations is the cradle of arms proliferation. The developed nations of the world, namely; USA, China, France, Russia and United Kingdom, have well established arms producing companies. Developing countries of the world, including Nigeria as a result, invest in arms production to bridge the gap between them and the developed countries. Both developed and developing countries, in that order, produce varieties of weapons, thereby resulting in arms proliferation. An example is shown in the table below.

S/No	Country (Ies)	Type of Arms Produced
1	United States of America	M16 Riffle
2	Russia	AK-47 and AK-74
3	China	AK-47 look alike
4	Germany	G3 Riffle
5	Belgium	FAL Assault Riffle
6	Israel	UZI Submachine Gun

Table 1: Countries and Conventional Arms they produce

Source: Boutwell and Klare (2005) – Scientific American. New York: 45 Department of State Bureaus of Political Military Affairs

Consequently, large numbers of these arms are exported to conflict zones or war-torn regions especially in the West African sub region and they encourage the abuse of fundamental human rights (Berman, 2007). This was corroborated by Arendshort (2003), who argues that these supplies have been to the detriment of African states of which West Africa suffers most. He states that the issues of external conspiracy by developed nations to some degree promote violent conflict and war around the world. In that vein, Adeniyi (2016) indicated that the Libyan and Malian crises compounded the nature of circulations of arms in the whole of Africa. Assaf (2011) substantiates the assertion, stating that prior to the uprising in Arab region, it was revealed that Britain was selling sniper rifles to Libya; Spain was supplying high explosive shells; the US firm General Dynamics was finalizing plans to rearm the regime's notorious Khamis Brigade; as well as offer cooperation in the "war on terror. In a significant way, Belgium has records of arms transfer to war-torn countries in Africa. To many observers, this is a common trend that set many nations that are in conflict situations on bonfire.

What scholars agree, irrespective of national biases, is that there is large scale global mismanagement of small arms and light weapons, resulting in contravention of the primary purpose of their production; in addition to the regulatory procedures governing their distribution and possession. This has accounted for the mindboggling number of deaths and injured that are traced to arms proliferation. Apart from government's held arms, there is further decentralization of arms possession to individuals who adapt them to private ventures and criminal expeditions, thereby threatening the fabric of every society. This facilitates movement of stupendous arms into Africa through various merchants and networks. It is also blamed for the frequent armed conflicts and other criminal activities which are rife in all countries of the world but more rampant in third world in particular. By focusing on Nigeria, this study shows the influence of arms proliferation in stimulating, reinforcing, sustaining and boosting most armed conflicts or crimes in the country. The proliferation, no doubt, serves as stimulant for many intractable armed related crimes being committed everywhere and almost on regular basis.

4. Arms Proliferation and Security Issues in Nigeria

Since the end of Nigeria-Biafra civil war in 1970, proliferation of illegal arms tends to be taken for granted. As it is observed lately, proliferation of small arms and light weapons is increasingly and dangerously becoming a transnational organized crime in Nigeria with Boko Haram's insurgency, reemergence of Niger Delta crisis and escalating kidnappings, communal crisis and armed robbery in the South East serving as hubs or impetus for arms trafficking (Musa, 2013). The availability of these arms escalate security crisis in volatile areas. In other words, armed robbers, cultists, cattle rustlers; Fulani herdsmen and kidnappers access arms with relative ease, and use them to terrorize innocent citizens and put the peace and security of the nation on the edge.

However, the complexity of the phenomenon manifests in most latent conflict factors taking on provocative dimensions and makes life miserable for the general public. The numbers of arms in the custody of unauthorized persons are alarming, and despite that some seizures are occasionally made, the resupply network fills the gap by hundred-folds. In 2015, over 5,078 arms and 11, 917 ammunitions were recovered from armed robbers, kidnappers and cultists by the Rivers State Police Command. In addition, 243 armed robbers and kidnappers were killed in various gun battles with security agents across the state (Akasike, 2016). Between 2012 and 2016, the Nigerian Customs impounded over 60,000 rounds of ammunition imported into the country from the United States and

Europe, on 17 different occasions at various points of entry. This remains a worrisome development because of the direct nexus between smuggling and various criminal acts like insurgency, militancy, communal crisis, kidnapping and others (Adeniyi, 2016).

The influx of arms gives impetus for criminals to operate. Some of the people who are armed robbers and kidnappers, without arms in their hands, cannot confront most of their victims. This makes arms become relevant arsenals for crime, thereby giving effect to their proliferations. They are of various dimensions and stretches also to include heavy arms as revealed lately. For example, over 288 rifles, 35 Rocket Propelled Guns and 35 Improvised Explosive Devices, IEDs; including pistols, mortar bombs, submachine guns, various calibers of ammunitions, 50 Cameroonian passports and a Toyota Jeep were recovered by the Cameroonian security forces from two suspected arms suppliers to terrorists in Nigeria (Ibeh, 2014). Another arrest of a terrorist in a green Peugeot vehicle led to the recovery of 15 AK-47 rifles, 12 magazines and various unassembled rifles (Ibeh, 2014). In October 2006, for example, the Rivers State Police Command also arrested a Nigerian importer and dealer on prohibited firearms (Chris Ndudi Njoku) and recovered hundreds of G3s, AK-47s and Beretta automatic rifles (Wellington, 2007). In Anambra State, the weapons found in the armoury of a kidnap kingpin created well informed anxiety that the nation could sink in arms violence if proliferation in small arms and light weapons were not checked. They included: 27 AK 47 rifles, 1 K2 rifle, two type-06 rifles, one General Purpose Machine Gun, one Rocket launcher, 17 rockets, six pump action guns, three Dane guns; one Barrett pistol and 13 Rocket grenades. Also included were 12,800 rounds of AK 47 live ammunition, 530 rounds of LAR ammunition, 95 rounds of GPMG live ammunition, 1000 rounds of K2 live ammunition and 143 magazines (Ujumadu, 2012). These arms are primarily for crime purposes and personal gain and not for national security.

Looking at the magnitude of weapons in individual possessions, it elicits questions as to whether they are solely for acts relating to robbery and kidnapping or there is ulterior motive to levy war on the state. Heavy cache of sophisticated weapons is paraded and publicly displayed by militants and insurgents; the same with cattle rustlers and Fulani herdsmen. The rate at which these illegal rifles freely circulates, questions the commitment of government towards arresting the ugly trend. There are no sufficient or significant efforts to trace their sources or unravel the network and end proliferation of arms by direct (licenced) and indirect (unlicenced) syndicates. Ironically too, some of the recovered arms and some disused weapons by the security agents still find their ways back to the black market and nobody is held responsible. Many innocent citizens have died in the hands of these illegal arm bearers. This is buttressed by the mindless killings of Ajatu people in Benue State and Nimbo people in Enugu State by Fulani herdsmen. In reaction to the large number of arms and weapons noticed in some rural communities in Niger State, which facilitated invasion of some villages by cattle rustlers, kidnappers, bandits and armed robbers, the State Governor Sani Bello, gave a seven-day ultimatum to individuals or groups in possession of illegal firearms to surrender them to the appropriate authority in the state (Bello, 2016). Most times, this kind of directive or ultimatum is regarded as political rhetoric because it does not address the real problem.

The cases of militancy, insurgency and terrorism in Nigeria are vivid examples. It is remarkable that both Niger Delta militants and Boko Haram insurgents in the north-east gained relevance in armed attacks and level of collateral damage they inflict on human lives and infrastructure because of availability of arms which sources remain unsolved. Many communal conflicts that span the history of modern civilization are known to be inflamed by arms and weaponry. Communal land conflicts involving Aguleri- Umuleri in Anambra state; Umuode-Oruku in Enugu state; Ezza-Ezilo in Ebonyi state, Neke-Ikem in Enugu state, Fulani - farmer's confrontations in Plateau, Niger, Nasarawa, Beneue and several other flashpoints in Nigeria could not have prolonged if there were no arms at their disposals. The phenomenon has created serious reappraisal of the dastard consequences of arms proliferation. The sources of these arms are worrisome, and in some instances show clear cases of complicity and dereliction by security agents; and many other times blamed on the porosity of our borders that lack necessary or adequate security attention.

Taking a cursory look at supply chain of arms to criminal gangs in Nigeria; firstly, President Muhammadu Buhari dissociated it from external affiliate terror groups, and disclosed that there was no credible intelligence linking Boko Haram's source of weaponry to the Islamic State (Premium Times, May 15, 2016). Secondly and which is of great interest to our analysis, is that a major source of Boko Haram sophisticated weaponry was from the various military and police bases attacked at the peak of the insurgency in Nigeria and the neighbouring countries (The News, May 14, 2016). And thirdly, there is also a critical view that Boko Haram militants get explosives and other weapons through theft and purchase from local shops (Igbonwelundu, 2015). According to Ige (2016), unsecured stocks and ineffectively managed stockpiles are a major contributing factor to the trafficking and diversion of arms into the illicit market and their subsequent flow to the terrorists and other criminal groups like Boko Haram and Niger Delta militants. She warned that if the situation was left unchecked, it will jeopardize the developmental gains achieved over the last 50 years, as well as impede the nation's capacity to achieve its developmental goals.

Weapons have been recovered in droves from the various police and military raids of the militant's armouries and hideouts or through government's initiated disarmament or cash-for-arms programs. The weapons vary from AK-47s, Czech SAs, Light Machine guns, Czech model 26s, Stem MK 2s, Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG), MAT-49s, MG 36s, Berettas, HK G3s, FN-FALs, home-made guns, pump-action, and shot guns; to other sophisticated European-made assault rifles and explosives (Wellington, 2007). Shown below are some of the recovered arms.



Figure 2

These calibers of sophisticated arms are found in the hands of militant groups in the Niger Delta and apply to other gangsters that use illegal arms for their deadly operations. It supports the postulation that small arms and light weapons and groups misusing them, are dangerously out of control in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria (Naagbantou, 2006). Sadly, some bad elements in the security forces serve as accomplices and rent or supply arms to these unauthorized groups. Nigerian soldiers arrested two errant soldiers, labelled as “black sheep”, for the criminal supply of arms to Boko Haram, which encompasses: 1 Smoke grenade, 2,136 live rounds of 7.62 (Special) ammunitions; 50 live rounds of 7.6mm (NATO) ammunition; 5 magazines of AK 47 rifles, and 2 Browning machine gun live rounds of ammunitions. This is in addition to 1 Axe, 1 Cutlass, 1 Jack knife, 9 Jungle hats, 11 pairs of Camouflage (9 Desert and 3 Woodland green), 4 military Pullovers, 1 Black beret, 1 Green beret, 1 pair of number 7 dress, 2 General Duty belt, 12 Army T-shirts, 2 Rain Coats, 2 Water bottles, 1 pair of Rain boot and 5 pairs of Desert boots” (Haruna, 2016).

Astonishingly, the terrorist group has at its disposal a seemingly limitless amount of heavy weaponry, vehicles, bombs and ammunition that it uses to kill with unfathomable wantonness (McCoy, 2014). Boko Haram killed over 6,600 in 2014 (Vanguard, 18 November 2015). In July 2014, Nigeria was estimated to have had the highest number of terrorist killings in the world over the past year records, 3477, killed in 146 attacks (Nkala, 2014). Since the current insurgency started in 2009, it has killed 20,000 and displaced 2.3 million from their homes (The New York Times, 18 November 2015), and was ranked as the world’s deadliest terror group in 2015 (Global Terrorism Index, 2015, PDF). The group has carried out mass abductions including the kidnapping of 276 school-girls from Chibok in April 2014 (Human Rights Watch, 2012).

The arms give them the boldness to wage war against state authorities and the innocent citizens. This carnage is not peculiar to Nigeria but commonplace around the world. For instance, in Orlando, Florida on June 12, 2016, a heavily-armed gunman fired and seized hostages at a gay nightclub, killing 50 and injured 53, in what was described as the worst mass shooting in US history (Punch, June 12, 2016). Sequel to the development, there were mass protests requesting for review of laws authorizing arms possession in the country. Although the United States Senate rejected plans to tighten gun controls, including the restriction of weapons sales to people on terrorism watch lists (The Nation, June 21, 2016), there is a shared view that unrestricted arms supply and reinforcement of nefarious gangs with weaponry for operation is sheer insensitivity. This is more so when those behind these supplies are aware of their devastating impact in human society. It invigorates the activities of global and local terrorists, insurgents, kidnappers, armed robbers and other crimes committed with audacious nostalgia. It is, no doubt, unhidden hypocritical posturing by western countries to pretend opposition to arms proliferation, and at the same time, intensify efforts in their production and supply to nefarious groups and gangs, including oppressive governments and rebel forces without discrimination. Not even the entrenched pecuniary economic or financial considerations or benefits could justify the glowing absurdity. The eloquent testimony derives from the fact that placing economic interest above the sanctity of human lives portend imminent apocalypse of human species, and Nigeria is already on the brink.

This conforms to the United Nations alarm over the illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons, SALW, in Nigeria, saying that more than 350 million out of the estimated 500 million of such weapons in West Africa is domiciled in the country. It was further stated that the weapons can be found in almost all corners of the country, which explains the rise in incidences of crime in the country, with the attendant threat to lives and property of the citizenry. It has had a dramatic impact on peace and security in Africa, threatening not only the existence of the state, but also the livelihoods of millions of people across the continent (Ige, 2016). The development makes security situation look chaotic. Cultists are rising in their numbers; the same way guns are easily accessible for commission of crimes. The tertiary institutions have suddenly turned to safe haven for notorious armed gangs. In every street in the city, armed robbers make illicit arms look like commonly exhibited commodity, displayed as normal wares. Even to snatch worthless phones and other valuables are executed with the aid of gun. Surviving has become a matter of the hard way. In all these, law enforcement agents are not always handy to assist the victims or prevent the crime. It appears that gun is legalized in Nigeria, as each individual is forced to take up the role of providing his/her own security and those of his/her dependents.

No country is insulated from the repercussions of war or conflicts occasioned by arms proliferation. Many wars, terror attacks, militancy, insurgency; kidnapping and armed robbery that characterized the situations in Somalia, Liberia, Congo Republic, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, Syria, and South Sudan, including of course, Nigeria, Benin Republic, Cameroon and Egypt, etc are

typical examples. They have caused many deaths, displaced many households and created refugee crisis. The most vulnerable are usually women and children. In Enugu state, Umuode people were forced into exile for almost ten years by their Oruku neighbours with many of them taking refuge in the church and other public places. The same were the cases for Ajatu people in Benue state and Nimbo people in Nsukka area of Enugu state, when sacked by the Fulani herdsmen.

The refugee situation created by the activities of Boko Haram in the north east Nigeria was monumental to the extent that it attracted attention of many donor organizations and governments. In other words, there are political crisis in many countries where rebel and opposition forces are fighting to unseat their governments. The situation brings about unimaginable hardships and greater security crisis. European countries are presently grappling with the overwhelming influx of refugees from Arab nations into their continent. The development has given rise to a new wave of terror attacks in some host countries - UK, Germany, France, etc and these are being attributed to terrorists who disguised as refugees to infiltrate the continent. This was never envisaged and it has put most European states in security dilemma. The magnitude of this on a global scale demands that prohibition of arms proliferation receives necessary attention.

5. Legal Framework and Policy Measure for Control of Illegal Arms

There are impressive and comprehensive legal frameworks that each government or state authority put in place to facilitate easy administration of firearms. At sub-regional, regional and global levels, these legal instruments are well documented but compliance and level of commitment to them by national governments remain unclear (Alpers, Philip and Wilson. 2016). These include:

- ❖ Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Light Weapons, adopted by the ECOWAS countries on 31st October 1998 (Berkol, 2007). Initially, the moratorium was more of a political and voluntary instrument, but subsequently transformed into a legally binding instrument in order to ensure more effective and comprehensive implementation. This was diversified with the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, adopted on the 14th June 2006. The Convention prohibits all international transfers of small arms within the sub-region unless a Member State obtains an exemption from the ECOWAS Secretariat. It stipulates strict controls on the manufacture of SALW and lays down measures to support transparency and exchange of information between Member States. Further provisions deal with civilian possession, stockpile, marketing, trading and brokering. The Convention also contains a provision for a register of arms destined for use in peace operations and calls for a dialogue with manufacturers and international suppliers.
- ❖ African Common Position on United Nations Programme of Action (UNPoA) to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects, adopted by the African Union (AU) in December 2005 (African Union / UNODA. 2005). It called on member states and the AU commission to take number of steps to strengthen their efforts to prevent; combat and eradicate illicit trade in small arms and light weapons. A follow up conference was held in 2006, which welcomed other developments in the small arms arena, such as civilian possession of military-style weapons, transfer of small arms and light weapons to non-state actors, transfer control initiative and the Arms Trade Treaty.
- ❖ The United Nations Protocol against the illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, their parts and components and ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNGA. 2001).
- ❖ The United Nations Small Arms Programme of Action (UNPoA), adopted essentially to curb the proliferation of illicit small arms and to reduce armed violence. Although all 194 UN Member States are party to the UNPoA, their level of participation in the programme varies widely. The UNPoA is a politically binding, not a legally binding process, and all outcomes are decided by consensus at meetings of the United Nations in New York (UN Document A/CONF.192/15. 2001),
- ❖ Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), adopted on 2 April 2013, by the General Assembly of the United Nations to regulate the international trade in conventional arms, from small arms to battle tanks, combat aircraft and warships. The treaty aims at fostering peace and security by putting a stop to destabilizing arms flows to conflict regions. It also aims to prevent human rights abusers and violators of the law of war from being supplied with arms; and to keep warlords, pirates, and gangs from acquiring the deadly tools (UNODA, 2013).
- ❖ National Reports on Small Arms Exports, (UNODA, 2011) which requires all member states to include, on a voluntary basis, their imports and exports of small arms in their annual National Report on arms exports to the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms (UNRCA). Since its inception in 1991, most countries submitting reports now include small arms in their yearly submissions and the UN Register has received reports from 173 states.
- ❖ Wassenaar Arrangement (1996), which sought to contribute to regional and international security and stability by promoting transparency and greater responsibility in transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods and technologies. Participating States were mandated to ensure that transfers of these items do not contribute to the development or enhancement of military capabilities which undermine these goals, and are not diverted to support such capabilities (Wassenaar Arrangement, 1996).

In spite of these bold steps, there are certain impediments to arms control programs that continue to undermine efforts and seeming commitments to eradicating the scourge. First, it exists at the systemic, sub-systemic and domestic levels. There are also structural problems built into proliferation control development syndrome'' (Akinyemi et al, 1986). The systemic impediments to arms control in Africa derive from:

- i. Super-power confrontation: - Super-power confrontation constitutes a serious impediment to arms control. It perpetuates the existing dominance dependency structure between the developed and the developing countries of Africa. The divides are influenced more by concerns for East-West strategic balance than any interest for self-sustaining economic growth and social developments of Africa.

- ii. Foreign intervention: - The connection between the increasing and changing patterns of foreign interventions in African states, the presence of foreign military bases and foreign troops in various African countries; and the problem of foreign intervention. The competitive foreign military intervention in the continent impedes arms control as a policy objective of many black African countries and
- iii. Basic inequality in the existing global economic order: - There is inequality in the global economic order which creates imbalance in international politics, thereby requiring socio-economic changes within and among nations before a development oriented arm control can take place.

An important addition to this debate was the emphasis independent commentaries laid on the improbability of successful arms control under a discriminatory global regime (Yusuf, 2007). These are all the more dependent on each state's domestic legal provisions and the level of commitments in enforcing them. In Nigeria, laws relating to small arms and light weapons can be classified as administrative, constitutive and regulative laws, consisting of Firearms Act, (1990); Firearms Registration Act, (1990), Firearms Regulation Act, (1990); in addition to the subsisting Firearms Ordinance, (1958). Each of these Acts clearly articulates the national goal of ensuring sustainable national defence and security and public safety in Nigeria. This is in view of the fact that proliferation in illegal arms constitutes serious security threats to people of all nations, whether their forms of governance and legal administrations are liberal, democratic or autocratic regimes.

The focus now shifts to laws adopted in Nigeria. Firstly, The Firearms Act (1990) provides that:

- i. The right to private gun ownership is not guaranteed by law,
- ii. Civilians are not allowed to possess machine-guns, military rifles and handguns,
- iii. Private possession of fully automatic weapons is prohibited,
- iv. Private possession of semi-automatic assault weapons is prohibited,
- v. Private possession of handguns (pistols and revolvers) is prohibited,
- vi. The private sale and transfer of firearms is prohibited, and
- vii. Dealing in firearms by way of business without a valid gun dealer's licence is unlawful, etc (Nigeria.1990, 'Firearms Act).

Secondly, The Firearms Regulation Act (1990) further provides that:

- i. Guns in Nigeria are regulated by the President
- ii. Civilian possession of rifles and shotguns is regulated by law
- iii. Only licensed gun owners may lawfully acquire, possess or transfer a firearm or ammunition
- iv. The law requires that a record of the acquisition, possession and transfer of each privately held firearm be retained in an official register
- v. Licensed firearm dealers are required to keep a record of each firearm or ammunition purchased, sold or transferred on behalf of a regulating authority
- vi. Licensed gun makers are required to keep a record of each firearm produced, for inspection by a regulating authority
- vii. State agencies are required to maintain records of the storage and movement of all firearms and ammunition under their control
- viii. Firearm regulations in Nigeria include written specification for the lawful safe storage of private firearms and ammunition by licensed gun owners;
- ix. firearms and ammunition by licensed arms dealers and firearms and ammunition by state entities
- x. A unique identifying mark on each firearm is required by law

Thirdly, The Firearms Ordinance (1958) set out rules requiring a licenced firearms possessor,

- i. Not to allow its use by any other unlicensed person.
- ii. To secure the firearm in a safe place when not in use.
- iii. To notify the Licensing Authority within 14 days if the Firearm is lost, stolen or destroyed.
- iv. To notify the licensing authority of his intention to leave Nigeria and how the owner proposes to dispose of his firearms.
- v. To transfer weapon only to a person holding a license.
- vi. Not to import or export firearms or ammunition except if licenced and must be declared to the custom authorities.
- vii. To produce the firearms and license when required by a police officer.
- viii. To produce the firearms and license to the competent fire arms licensing authority within 14 days of withdrawal from a registered Dealers Armory.

However, in 2013, the House of Representatives passed a bill for establishment of small arms national commission. This follows an observation that Nigeria was the only ECOWAS member country without the commission despite being one of the signatories to ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Weapons. The sponsor of the bill, Hon. Nnenna Elendu-Ukeje, (PDP Abia), disclosed that research has shown that out of the 857 million small arms and weapons in the world, 500 million are illegal with 100 million found in sub Saharan Africa, and 7.5 percent are in Nigeria. According to her, the problem of militancy in the Niger Delta, Boko Haram in the north and sundry violence across the country was due to the uncontrolled number of weapons in private hands (Elendu-Ukeje, 2013).

Most of these provisions have remained in the spheres of theory as connivance of security authorities with firearms cartel, including pervasive corruption and inordinate quest for materialism, undermine their implementation and effectiveness. Besides that, authentic registers for arms possessions are not kept, many fraudulently acquired arms are not traced when their licences expire and are due for return to appropriate authorities. Lack of statistics on arms in Nigeria's security database worsens the matter as it does not only symbolize a symptom of weak security infrastructure but also a disenchanting enforcement mechanism. At various levels, many states

and law enforcement officers show unwillingness to enforce the provisions of the Acts, and for those who do, the implementation is below standard and ridiculed by corruption and irregularities. The situation only worsens the continued proliferation of arms, a product of structural-functional deficiency. As Coulibaly (2008) rightly notes, relapse on the mechanism opens opportunities for dealers and provides unchallenged access to insecure routes that promote the trade. This is further compounded by the fact that Nigeria shares 773km border stretch with Benin Republic, 87km with Chad and then an entire stretch of 1,049km with Niger Republic and 1,690km with Cameroon. The Nigeria Immigration Service, (NIS) announced that there are about 1,487 illegal routes to Nigeria through these porous borders (Abayomi, 2013). Surveillance on these vast routes poses problems.

Not even on the global scale is enforcement of laws on arms proliferation taken seriously. One significant deduction from the widely observed lapses is that all countries and dealers that harvest huge financial or military benefits from investment in arms production and their indiscriminate proliferation especially the western nations cannot afford to effectively and sincerely enforce laws prohibiting the trade. The consequence is that lingering conflicts and criminal activities in various parts of the world are continuously refreshed while new escapades are encouraged. It portends serious national security threats in third world societies with tendency of provoking violence that are prosecuted with arms. Unfortunately, most third world countries harbour economic inequality, social injustice and oppressive regime with legions of rebel or opposition forces; including criminal gangs and other nefarious elements that patronize arms.

6. Enforcement Structures on Arms Proliferation in Nigeria

The implementation structures constitute an embodiment of the nation's law enforcement agencies. They include the Police, the Army, Navy, Air Force; the Department of State Security (DSS), the Nigerian Civil Defence Corps (NCSDC), the Nigeria Immigration Service, (NIS) and the Nigeria Customs Service (NCS). Each plays one form of roles or the other in tracking arms proliferation in Nigeria. These roles are either expressly provided in the Acts establishing them or derived from the Constitution of the Federal Republic or other extant laws and in some instances are implied in their roles in the nation's security surveillance.

The enforcement takes the forms of prevention, seizure and prosecution. Governments, on the other hand, implement voluntary firearm surrender schemes, and/or weapon seizure programmes in order to reduce the number of illicit firearms in circulation. This method is widely used and it pays off, in some occasions. For example, in the course of government's initiated Amnesty Programme in the Niger Delta, the number of firearms collected, seized or destroyed between 2002 and 2003 was reported to be 1,902 (Nigeria, 2005) and 1,466 in 2004 (Aaron, 2009). It is obligatory and now a state policy to destroy disused, collected and seized firearms rather than return them to the secondary arms market. The law, therefore, criminalizes unlawful possession of firearms and provides a maximum penalty of five years' imprisonment in prison for offenders (Robbery and Firearms Act, 1984).

In spite of these, most of the security agencies entrusted with this important responsibility fail in their duties. The water-ways, borders, seaports and airports are still porous without tight security. It is either lack of the modern state-of-the-art facilities/equipments are blamed or inadequate security personnel is made the scapegoat. There is more of lip service in the enforcement of the laws than the requisite action. In several instances, they form cartel and circumvent the law by circulating arms using their security identity. It has made the level of illegal arms in the hands of unauthorized persons in Nigeria to quadruple in recent past, accounting for the astronomical increase in armed related crimes. Virtually every community or urban settlement is infected with one form of armed crisis or the other, and it has adversely affected every facet of government's administration and national integration. According to Karp (2007), the estimated total number of guns (both licit and illicit) held by civilians in Nigeria is 2,000,000. In other words, the estimated rate of private gun ownership (both licit and illicit) in Nigeria is 1.5 firearms per 100 people and Nigeria ranked at No. 133 in a comparison of the rate of private gun ownership in 178 countries.

There is no doubt that the figure may not represent the actual number of guns in circulation. This is most probable as people rarely volunteer information on who possesses gun illegally, which combine to pose serious challenge in compiling comprehensive and objective statistics. Dowdney (2006) was in admission of this fact, noting that whereas the number of handguns in civilian possession is reported to be 1,000,000; the unlawfully held guns cannot be counted, but in Nigeria they are estimated to be 1,000,000. In addition, the percentage of unlawfully held guns cannot be counted in Nigeria, but they are estimated to be 0.71 illicit firearms per 100 people (GunPolicy.org.2014) The percentage level made Nigeria rank No. 34 in a comparison of the number of privately owned guns in 178 countries, (Karp, 2007). This development casts doubts on the essence of the regulatory and prohibition laws, including the enforcement strategy put in place by Nigerian government to prevent arms proliferation and control of illicit possession of firearms by private persons. The stake in the trade is high notwithstanding provisions for punishment of offenders (Nigeria, 1990 - 'Enforcement of Act').

The problem is spontaneously expanding in scope, and now involving state authorities and rural communities. There is, in the meantime, a flourishing practice where governments or communities undertake direct purchase and distribution of these arms to unauthorized persons, whether as individuals or in group. Today, failure of police to provide adequate security has given rise to last resorts like Vigilante or Neighborhood Watch groups and other non-state actors, notwithstanding whatever nomenclature they bear as names. In several instances, public funds are used for purchase of the arms and bulk registration done for their cover without necessarily knowing whosoever uses them. It represents an indirect or direct legitimization of possession of arms by unauthorized groups. As Ibe (2016) posits, "vigilante groups have sprouted across the country amid mounting insecurity, many of them armed-even illegally". A recent case was the announcement by Zamfara state governor, Abdulaziz Abubakar, that he had procured rifles for distribution to the state vigilante groups to aid security efforts. Although the Senate rejected the move after a motion seeking approval was tabled, (Ibeh, 2016), it does not remove the fact that many groups purchase arms secretly to strengthen the operations of auxiliary

security outfits without drawing public attention to it. On the other hand, Civilian JTF emerged as volunteers to help flush out insurgents in the North East and are seriously armed under no definite legal provisions. Some of them use these guns to commit human rights abuses and extrajudicial killing. Most arms provided for this fire brigade security groups could be a source of new crisis, if not at local level, then in a larger scale.

7. Conclusion and Recommendations

Arms proliferation poses serious security threats to any state or human society. In most third world countries, it exacerbates insecurity and stimulates volatility of crimes that attract some economic benefits and others that unleash dastard consequences on human safety. The injustices associated with the distribution of nation's wealth and other political or economic benefits by government, are found to nurture grievances to astonishing destructive level. With grandiose public display of wealth by the rich in the midst of widespread poverty, hardship and intractable unemployment rate, crime becomes a waiting employer of the displaced and frustrated class, who seek to dislocate the economic rewarding system and restructure the imbalance. In the event, it creates socio-economic and political problem that the state authority battles with scarce resources and inadequate security personnel. With persistent material scarcity and inability of individuals and groups to meet their simple financial obligation, it results in implosion of tendencies towards commission of crimes. These are made possible by arms and weapons, which are at the beck and call of the prospective users.

The major concern is the fact that production and exportation of these arms and weapons of war by the developed countries of the world have assumed a threatening dimension and contradicts the clamour for global peace and security that drives the visions of the UNO which lie on maintaining a peaceful world. The fact that virtually all the UNSC permanent members are the prime movers in arms production and export endangers human existence and survival. It aggravates internal crisis; generates armed conflicts at most destinations and produces dislocated world order; one which is characterized by widening human annihilation which is inconsistent with the principle of global security. This trend is worsened by local production and circulation that bridges the yawning supply gap from external sources. In that vein, attention must focus on enforcement of all laws on arms proliferation by government to enhance national and global security.

The UN should invoke all treaties and laws relating to arms proliferation and other weapons of war to limit their circulation and use for criminal and subversive operations. Nigerian leaderships should develop a proactive strategy that facilitates mopping up of arms from various rural locations with the assistance of community leaders, police and other stakeholders. The seeming failure of police to brace up with the task of securing lives and property has made communities, local and state authorities to turn to alternative security arrangements (Vigilante or Neighborhood Watch). Arming of these groups should be approached with sense of caution. Police should be well equipped and motivated to perform their constitutional and professional duties. This will save further arms from drifting into unauthorized hands with the potentials for security breaches.

Generally, it will be mirage and unimaginative dreaming, to hope that the world will be secure when the concern of the developed world is to continue to export these weapons to the third world countries, which have the potential for deepening ethnic antagonism and religious volatility, including political violence commonly experienced in their societies. Such crises become an excellent opportunity to create viable markets for the arms (despite arms embargo) to further increase the spate of the violence with the consequent damages. There will be considerable differences in the rates of conflict/crime in Nigeria in particular and the world in general if there is adequate reduction in arms production and curtailment in the number of illegal arms in the hands of unauthorized publics.

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